Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Hot Blog-on-Blog Action

Lots of politico-sexual analysis over on the Volokh Conspiracy, thanks to Sen. Rick Santorum. Short version: Santorum likened homosexuality to bigamy, polygamy, and incest. Eugene, giving Santorum the benefit of doubt, defends him by saying the comparison could be construed as a kind of constitutional slippery slope argument: even if homosexuality is not the same as incest, the Supreme Court might perceive it to be sufficiently similar, and therefore a precedent that constitutionalizes a right to (consensual) sodomy might be extended to protect a right to (consensual) incest as well. Jacob, after examining the full context of Santorum’s interview, concludes that Eugene has given him too much credit: Santorum really was condemning all these practices (homosexuality, polygamy, incest) as damaging to family values.

But the sex talk doesn’t stop there. Eugene also (in the same post) enunciates the libertarian position on all of these matters – to wit: we believe in freedom of sex, as long as it’s consensual – and he responds effectively to a reader’s denunciation of his position on incest, twice. In a later post, he wonders why lesbianism is subject to the same legal prohibitions as male homosexuality, even though none of the arguments against male-on-male action (weak as they are) apply to female-on-female action. And then he defends bestiality – not as a cool thing to do, but as something that should be legal so long as it doesn’t constitute excessive cruelty to animals. All this following last week’s speculation on attitudes toward vibrators.

Eugene’s right on all of this (except for giving Santorum too much credit), but I have to think his future political career, if he wanted one, is probably shot. I’d vote for him, though, and not just for his views on the sex-related stuff. (I’ll post my own comments about incest and bestiality later.)

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Monday, April 21, 2003

Is Strategic Disengagement in the Cards?

I was pleased, if somewhat skeptical, about this L. A. Times article about the Bush administration’s future plans in the Middle East. If true, then I may have to give the administration a little more credit:
WASHINGTON -- With the threat of Saddam Hussein all but extinguished and Arab suspicions of American intentions running deep, senior administration officials say the U.S. military has begun taking steps to significantly reduce its presence in much of the Middle East.

Last week's quiet removal of 30 of the 80 fighter jets and almost half the 4,500 personnel from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, where the U.S. has maintained thousands of troops since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, is just the beginning, officials said.

Within months, the Pentagon plans to close down most of its operations at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, leaving only a skeleton crew, and to move most of its aircraft and troops out of Qatar and Oman.

The plans, which are preliminary and subject to review, are a response to pressure from Arab governments incensed by the U.S. military buildup in the region over the last 12 years, the financial burden of maintaining vast numbers of troops overseas and the strain it has caused for families and military readiness.
(I recommend reading the rest -- these are only the first few paragraphs.) This is, of course, the strategy that libertarians have been advocating all along. Interestingly, the article also provided probably the most persuasive argument for invading Iraq I’ve heard yet:
"One of the unstated goals of the [Iraq] war was to be able to lance that boil and get out of this steady state of a very high-level commitment of forces in an area where that not only wears out the force, but causes all sorts of political problems," said retired Army Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, who commanded U.S. forces in the Mideast from 1991 to 1994 and helped negotiate agreements to base U.S. troops throughout the region after the Gulf War.

"The [Iraq] war has always been envisioned as a way to get out of the need to have forces in place designed to protect against an immediate assault," he said.
I wonder why no one said that *before* the war? On the downside, however, there doesn’t seem to be universal agreement on this approach within the administration. For instance, according to this article, “An undersecretary of State told Israeli officials in February that the U.S. will ‘deal with’ Iran, North Korea and Syria next.” Time will tell whether the administration is serious about making a strategic retreat.

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Sunday, April 20, 2003

Peanut Gallery Temporarily Disabled

Yes, I’m aware the comments feature isn’t working. I don’t know what the problem is, but it appears to be on SquawkBox’s end, not mine. I hope they’ll be up and running again soon. If you have any urgent comments to make before then, you’ll have to, um, do whatever you did before I installed the comments feature less than a week ago.

UPDATE: The comments are now back in service, as of Monday morning.

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Friday, April 18, 2003

Efficacy of Race Preferences

The justification-du-jour for race preferences in college admissions is the need for diversity among students. As Julian correctly points out, this justification can only stand judicial scrutiny if race is used as a *proxy* for diversity of viewpoints and experience, it being “settled law that mere racial diversity is invalid on face as a state purpose.”

If that’s so, then it seems to me that race preferences for diversity purposes should have to meet some kind of *efficacy* test. If their goal were the promotion of racial diversity per se, then efficacy would be a no-brainer: obviously a program that gives extra weight to members of underrepresented groups will tend to increase their representation (indeed, if it didn’t, then the opponents of the program would have no basis for objecting). But if race preferences are acceptable only as an instrument for attaining some other goal, then the question arises as to whether that other goal is actually being furthered by the policy.

I wouldn’t be surprised to find that it’s not. It may be difficult to measure diversity of viewpoints and experience, but as a first approximation, we could look at party membership or ideological self-identification. The question would be whether the race preference policies had increased the representation of currently underrepresented political views on campus, relative to institutions without such policies. Now, I haven’t seen any recent data on the political views of students, but according to a recent study, ideological diversity among *faculty* is ridiculously low. Liberal faculty often outnumber conservative faculty by 10 or 20 to one, whereas liberals and conservatives are approximately equal in the general population. If the views of students are anything like those of faculty, then a policy designed to increase viewpoint diversity would have to increase the number of right-leaning students enrolled. What is the chance that a preference for minority races would have such an effect, given that minority groups are typically more left-leaning than the general public?

I could be wrong. Maybe race preferences do increase diversity, perhaps by creating more balance between the moderate left and the far left. Diversity of experience could be another matter -- it's more plausible that minority students differ from the majority of white students in their economic background than in their politics. (But economic background could be targeted directly; there's no need for a proxy for something easily measured.) Still, if the constitutional case for race preferences now rests solely on the achievement of diversity of viewpoints and experience, shouldn’t there at least be an attempt to measure the output? If separate water fountains for blacks and whites were justified on the basis of the state’s compelling interest in encouraging good hygiene, we would either (a) reject the policy on its face, or (b) demand at least some evidence of the policy’s efficacy in improving public health. In the case of race-preferences, since we haven’t rejected them outright, shouldn’t we confront the issue of efficacy?

I’m guessing that the courts would rather not rely on such a test, because efficacy lies in the traditional province of the legislature. The Supreme Court would rather judge constitutionality on the basis of text and reason, not social scientific data. But on the other hand, if a policy’s results are so radically at odds with its supposed goals (or “compelling state interests”) as to cast doubt on whether they are its actual goals, the Court should be less willing to bow to the legislature’s judgment. And that seems pretty likely to me in the cases at hand: proponents of race-preference programs are now justifying them on the basis of diversity because that’s the only constitutionally valid argument left to them. Some of them *might* care about diversity, but I suspect most would happily sacrifice viewpoint diversity on campus if it implied the inclusion of more right-wingers or fewer members of minorities.

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Thursday, April 17, 2003

Love Is a Direction-Field

More evidence for the analytical perspective on love and marriage.

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The Legacy of Bart Simpson

This is beyond funny. Check out the original article, and do a search for "heywood." I wonder if Stu Pedaso also attended the rally? (Thanks to Radley for the pointer.)

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Wednesday, April 16, 2003

Nazi or Commie...Who Would You Rather Have a Beer With?

In a discussion of the ethics (as distinct from law) of boycotting or refusing to deal with people who express political views with which one disagrees, as in the Dixie Chicks fracas, Eugene makes the following observation:
If we hear that a friend refuses to have dinner with people who are Nazis or Communists, we'd probably think he's acting properly; we might think the same if he refuses to do business with them, or perhaps even if he refuses to hire them (though I suspect that some people may have a different view as to the latter).
If Eugene had left out the phrase “or Communists,” this sentence would not have given me pause. But I suspect that many people would *not* treat Nazis and Commies with equal distaste. For some reason, Commies are granted a pass where Nazis are not. Why?

In terms of the sheer number of people killed by these two ideologies, Communism is arguably the worse of the two. This article estimates that the USSR killed 61 million people, as opposed to 20 million killed by Nazi Germany. Of course, the USSR had a much longer period of time in which to do its murdering – over 70 years versus about 12. So while communism was worse in terms of total body count, Nazism was worse in terms of body count per year. The fact that communism killed so many more people in total tells us something significant: part of what made communism so bad was its sheer persistence. But let’s not split hairs: both Nazism and communism resulted in the death of tens of millions of people.

Back to the original question: why are people more tolerant of Commies than Nazis? One explanation: Communists are seen as having made an error of fact, whereas Nazis are seen as having made an error of value. Communism simply misunderstood the crucial role of decentralization and private property in creating incentives for productivity, innovation, and use of private information. It was an error of economic science, not moral belief. Nazism, on the other hand, had at its core a visceral hatred of certain groups. Now, this error of fact versus error of value distinction might *explain* the different treatment of Nazis and Commies, but I’m not sure it *justifies* it. The distinction only provides a defense of historical communists, not present-day communists, because no present-day communist can be unaware of the terrible results of communism as an economic (and political) system. Also, some might argue that communism makes a value error as well, by failing to give proper weight to the moral autonomy of the individual. From this perspective, the difference between Nazism and communism is that the former gave weight to the (severely limited) moral autonomy of at least some people, whereas the latter gave no weight to the moral autonomy of anyone. Perhaps communism could be credited with at least having been an equal opportunity offender (though in practice it was not – Jews were notoriously badly treated in the USSR).

A related explanation focuses on the difference of intent. The communist wants a world in which people are happy and well-fed, whereas the Nazi only wants one in which *particular* people are happy and well-fed – the rest can go to hell. Again, the argument doesn’t quite work for present-day communists – but perhaps they can be accused of being just monstrously ill-informed or misguided, not ill-intentioned.

A third explanation is the greater association of the failure of communism with the bad guys in charge. It’s common to hear present-day Communists say that the communism of the Soviet bloc was not real communism, because it was hijacked by the likes of Stalin and Ceaucescu. Here, too, there is an analytical problem: communism as envisioned by philosophers was a literal impossibility, which meant that the apparatus for central control of the economy would inevitably be used and abused by a privileged class. And as Hayek argued in the Road to Serfdom, there are incentives inherent in such a system for the worst to rise to the top. But present-day communists obviously don’t buy that argument (or haven’t heard it); they think that a properly designed communist system would work after all, avoiding the depredations of would-be despots. I think that belief is dangerous and factually wrong, but it’s not the kind of belief that would warrant classifying the believer as a “bad person.”

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Tuesday, April 15, 2003

Coolest Defunct Website Award

Check out James Thornton’s Theory of the Week site. It hasn’t been updated in over a year, but when it was operative, each entry featured a brief description of some theory, principle, or concept. Some of the items covered are Occam’s Razor, the Gaia Hypothesis, the Butterfly Effect, and the Peter Principle. As far as I can tell, there are only 30 entries, though others might be archived somewhere. But what a great idea! We should encourage this guy to start the site up again. Maybe he just needs more ideas for theories to include.

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Monday, April 14, 2003

Agoraphilia 2.0

So I’ve finally gotten around to updating the blog template to include (a) a comments feature and (b) a longer list of blogs that I actually read, including – get this – a couple by authors I usually disagree with.

You can blame the changes on Chuck, whose email cattle-prod prompted to me to make the changes. It was also Chuck who let me know that www.agoraphilia.com turns out to be a porno site. I’m rather amused by the prospect of horny guys accidentally finding politico-economic commentary, while geeky blogger-wonks are treated to unexpected flesh. Of course, the intersection of those two demographicss might be fairly large.

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Tax-Me Driver

A couple of readers have taken me to task on my post below about “the new poll tax.” They point out that the sheer annoyance of having to fill out tax forms might be sufficient to mobilize votes for politicians in favor of tax simplification. As Chuck argues:
However, you forget that for many people--perhaps almost everyone--the big annoyance of paying taxes is the massive amount of time and the collosal invasion of privacy that occurs while they're paying. No one likes to pay large amounts of money for anything, be it a college education or taxes, but it's the sheer idea of making it DIFFICULT to fork over your money that makes taxpaying so instinctively odious.
Makes sense to me, though I’m still not sure it outweighs the other factors I mentioned. In my case, filling out the forms is a pain in the ass *and* I never get a refund, so it’s hard for me to say how much of my annoyance is attributable to each source. I suspect the people who pay few or no taxes (a surprisingly large number) are also the people whose taxes are simplest. Your taxes start to get seriously complicated when your income either is relatively large or comes from multiple sources. But hey, I could be wrong.

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Sunday, April 13, 2003

Ecce Homo

Kieran Healy reports that a large majority of Republicans believe that homosexuality is a choice, whereas a large majority of Democrats believe that homosexuality is genetic. As Mark Kleiman observes, this is another example of people’s amazing ability to fit their empirical beliefs to their desired policy conclusions.

The issue of homosexuality’s origin seems to be a hot topic at the moment; it came up on Julian’s blog a few days ago, and he was responding to a couple of posts (here and here) by Matthew Yglesias on the same subject. Julian makes the excellent point that sexual orientation could also result from nurture at such a young age that it could hardly be considered a choice even if it’s not genetically encoded. In other words, to draw a sharp dichotomy between choice and genetics is to commit the fallacy of the excluded middle.

In any case, I’m with those (like Julian and Matthew) who think the answer to the origin-of-homosexuality question shouldn’t matter. Even if one’s orientation is innate or otherwise unchosen, the conservatives are correct to observe that the *action* is chosen. I’m heterosexual, even though I don’t recall ever choosing to be – and yet I have the shocking ability to refrain from heterosexual sex. The real issue is whether homosexual sex does harm to anyone other than the participants – and the obvious answer is no. (Or more to the point, it needn’t harm anyone else. If we implement a public health system that socializes healthcare costs, then anything that increases the likelihood of health problems for oneself – including high-risk sexual behavior – could harm others through the expenditure of tax dollars. But that kind of harm doesn’t follow from the act itself, only from the policies imposed by the legislature.)

I once mentioned to a homosexual friend that I rather hoped homosexuality would turn out not to have a genetic (or otherwise unchosen) component, because then the conservatives would have to accept it as a pure choice (in the broader sense of choosing one’s orientation as well one’s action) that is nevertheless *none of their damn business*. My friend replied, “Well, you’re clearly not homosexual.” His point being that, for whatever reason, people are more inclined not to punish X if X is not a matter of choice, whether or not X is something that causes harm to others. For those who have a dog in the hunt on this issue, it’s more important to get the right policy than to get it for the best reasons. If I were homosexual, I suppose I’d cheer any evidence of a homosexuality gene, simply because there are many voters who would choose to support my “choice” in that case.

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Friday, April 11, 2003

The New Poll Tax?

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD) has an intriguing idea: move tax day from April 15 to November 1, so that the memory of filing tax returns is still fresh in voters’ minds when they go to the polls. Sounds good at first, but I’m skeptical. If we actually had to *pay* our taxes on tax day, the plan might work. The problem is that we actually pay our taxes throughout the year through mandatory withholding. For about 70% of tax filers, tax season is when they get a *refund* on their taxes because the government kept too much during the year. Now, they still might be annoyed at tax time if they actually think about the net amount they actually paid over the whole year – or if they think about the interest they could have earned if withholding had not been excessive – but I suspect that most Americans don’t think about it that way. They’re just happy to have the sudden windfall, and timing that windfall to coincide with election day is not the way to mobilize anti-tax sentiments.

If you want to set up tax collection in a way that translates into angry voters, you need to eliminate withholding so that people have to pay their taxes all at once, and *then* make that day November 1. Even then, I suspect it wouldn’t make much difference, because a minority of tax payers pay the vast majority of income taxes.

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Thursday, April 10, 2003

The Rational Romantic

When I started this blog, I decided to keep it sharply focused on economics, politics, law, language, philosophy… well, pretty much anything, really. But I ruled out anything highly personal. This is a public journal, not a private diary. Here is my pledge to you, dear reader: no specific accounts of my loves and loves lost, sexual exploits, family disputes, etc. If you want to hear that stuff, you’ll have to go drinking with me.

But my embargo on gory details needn’t prevent me from *theorizing* about the economics and philosophy of everyday life. We academic types are quite happy to discuss our personal lives in the abstract, you see. And today, this L.A. Times article got me thinking about the economic theory of romance. Mark Miller, the article’s author, must be an economist at heart, because he thinks about this just the way I do:
So when it comes to the qualities we want in a soul mate, how many of them are enough? If she has 75% of my desired attributes, should that be sufficient? Or would I feel that I'm settling and wonder if someone with 89% would have been just around the corner and much more satisfying? And if she was, would I truly be happy with her, when someone with 97% might have come along a month or two down the line? … Clearly, no one person is going to have all the traits I'd ideally like my soul mate to possess. So, what am I willing to do without?
Dedicated readers – meaning the ones who actually read my longest and most esoteric posts – may recall that I said something similar in my discussion of the rationality of satisficing behavior:
For instance, a satisficing dater might stick with a girlfriend who is not ideal but who meets certain minimum requirements for looks, personality, and so on. However, satisficing turns out to be an instance of maximizing behavior in the context of a dynamic search. When it is costly to search for something – say, a new mate, or a lower price on a product, or a job with a higher wage – you have to weigh the cost of searching further against the expected gains from finding something better than the status quo (as well as the distinct possibility of ending up with something worse than the status quo). It’s a standard result from search theory that a rational person facing these conditions will adopt a reservation level of satisfaction (quality of mate, price of product, wage of job) and stick with any outcome at least that good. In other words, he will engage in satisficing behavior.
So Miller and I seem to be pretty much on the same page. In the last couple of paragraphs, he conjures a starry-eyed moral to the story: “And one of the things I've learned is that when you're in a truly loving relationship, your partner's flaws are minimized and positive qualities maximized. Which is a really nice thing to happen, because it sends you deeper into love with them.” True, but don’t forget: that should only happen when you’ve found someone who exceeds your reservation level of romantic satisfaction.

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Let’s Go Down to the Sunset Grill

So it seems that the GOP wants to make the government’s anti-terrorism powers, granted by the Patriot Act, permanent. That, of course, is exactly why it was wise to include sunset provisions in the original law in the first place: if it weren’t for those provisions, the government wouldn’t even have to ask nicely to keep its exciting new powers, and this debate wouldn’t even be happening. The whole point of a sunset provision is to put the brakes on Robert Higgs’s “ratchet effect”: the size and power of government expand in times of crisis, but they never shrink back to their previous levels when the crisis is over.

I suppose some might argue that the terrorism crisis is not yet over, and perhaps they are right. But the powers granted by the Patriot Act don’t expire until the end of 2005 anyway. If there is still a terrorism crisis when 2005 rolls around, then Congress should simply vote to keep the relevant provisions in place for another two or three years, at which point the debate will – and should – happen again. There is no justification for making the powers granted by the Patriot Act permanent unless the government intends to be in a perpetual state of war. Of course, that’s exactly what’s needed in order to give job security to the bureaucrats at the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Hmm… I wonder which executive agency is lobbying most vigorously for the repeal of the sunset provisions?

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Tuesday, April 08, 2003

Still Bored

Try as I might, I still can’t muster any excitement over all the war coverage. Don’t get me wrong -- I do care about the outcome. I just don’t get a charge out of the play-by-play news coverage. I blame the war for my utter lack of blogistic inspiration over the last couple of weeks. I promise the posting frequency will pick up again as soon as my muse emerges from her bunker.

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Friday, April 04, 2003

Price Gouging

I’ve been meaning to write something about so-called “price gouging” in the gasoline industry, but now Jerry Taylor has beaten me to it. It just goes to show that if you procrastinate long enough, someone will do the job for you.

Jerry makes the point well, so I only have one point to add. Part of the increase in gasoline prices is attributable to the *anticipation* of higher prices in the future, when supply may be lower or demand higher. The expectation of higher future prices induces some consumers to stock up at today’s lower price, and it induces some sellers to hold back sales for tomorrow’s higher price. In short, consumers shift some of their demand from future to present, while suppliers shift some of their supply from present to future, which causes an increase in today’s price and a reduction in tomorrow’s (likely) price. The overall result is a dampening of price fluctuations, as well as better allocation of gasoline over present and future consumption.

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Monday, March 31, 2003

My Very Own Meaningless Statistic

And as long as we're discussing pointless stats, I might as well offer one of my own: Today, for the first time in its history, Agoraphilia's hit counter has exceeded the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Current Agoraphilia hit count: 8040. Today's closing DJIA: 7992.13.

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Bogus Statistic Alert

In this article from the Tax Foundation, I found the following claim: “Married Couples File Less Than Half of All Tax Returns, But Pay 74 Percent of All Income Taxes.” The point of the article was to demonstrate that the tax code penalizes marriage. But this statistic strikes me as incredibly misleading, for at least two reasons.

First, setting aside the complications raised by income-earning dependents, a tax return for a married couple filing jointly represents twice as many taxpayers as a tax return for a single filer. Thus, if tax returns from joint filers constitute 50% of all tax returns, they probably represent close to 67% of all taxpayers – which is not far from the 74% of all income taxes they pay.

Second, marriage is strongly correlated with age: the older you are, the more likely you are to be married. Know what else is strongly correlated with age? Income. As people get older and accumulate more experience, they tend to earn more. It follows that the correlation between marriage and income is probably also high, in which case it makes perfect sense that married people would be paying a larger share of income taxes, even if the tax code included no marriage penalty.

It may well be true that the tax code penalizes marriage. But the statistic above utterly fails to prove that point.

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Saturday, March 29, 2003

Just Stop Saying That Department

I am really, really tired of hearing people say that if it weren’t for the Electoral College, Al Gore would have won the 2000 election. Aside from the fact that Gore-supporters need to finally just *get over it*, the truth is that we *don’t know* who would have won under a different system. Why? Because different rules create different incentives. It’s true that Al Gore won the popular vote in 2000, but that only means he got a majority of the votes actually cast that day – and there is every reason to believe a different set of votes would have been cast under different rules. First, there are many Republican states, like Utah, where it was virtually guaranteed that Bush would win the statewide vote. As a result, many conservatives in Utah probably felt no particular need to visit the polls that day, because Utah’s electoral votes would go to Bush anyway. But if they had known their votes could counter Democratic votes in New England or California, as would have been true in a popular vote, they might have voted after all. Second, there are other states with Democratic majorities but substantial Republican minorities, like California. In those states, some conservatives may have avoided the polls because it was pointless, California being a virtual shoo-in for Gore. But if there had been a popular vote, Republican Californians’ votes might have mattered after all.

Of course, we can make similar arguments for why more Democrats would have visited the polls under a popular vote system as well. Democrats from Utah might have cast votes with the hope of countering Republican votes cast in the South. More Democrats in California might have voted because a larger margin of victory in that state wouldn’t have been superfluous. The point, again, is that we just don’t know, and we never will. We’ll never know what voters would have done if they’d had different incentives.

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Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Guns, Alcohol, and Lawsuits

In an excellent post, Eugene takes the arguments in favor of holding gun manufacturers liable for the criminal actions of some gun users and applies them to the alcohol industry, with naturally absurd results.

What I fear, of course, is that this will turn into another instance of reductio creep. Eugene’s facetious arguments might sound crazy now, but I won’t be at all surprised to hear Eugene’s facetious arguments being made in all seriousness a few months or years from now.

It’s also worth adding an economic perspective to Eugene’s legal one. Quite aside from the inequity of imposing liability on the makers of a product with lawful uses, thereby punishing the law-abiding users of the product through higher prices, it’s also likely that imposing liability on manufacturers will fail the efficacy test. When the price of any product rises, the first customers to cut back their purchases will be the most elastic, i.e., price sensitive, customers. Other customers, the less price-sensitive ones, will continue to buy. With respect to guns, my strong suspicion is that it will be mostly lawful gun buyers who restrict their gun purchases, whereas most criminals (whose livelihood depends on possession of guns) will continue to buy at the higher price. With respect to guns, it will mostly be the moderate drinkers who will reduce their alcohol consumption, while the irresponsible binge drinkers continue to buy at the higher price. The result? Placing legal liability on the manufacturers of guns and alcohol will deter exactly the wrong groups of people from using them.

It is true that gun and alcohol manufacturers could adopt more targeted marketing and pricing schemes, but I doubt most people would like the consequences of their doing so. Lacking better information, the manufacturers would have to rely on statistical correlates of the undesirable behaviors -- by, for instance, charging African-Americans higher prices for guns because African-Americans are more often convicted of violent crimes. Or, if they couldn’t do that, maybe they’d just shut down the gun shops in areas of town where the “undesirables” live. And even if they managed to adopt such policies without raising public outcry, the effect on crime would still probably be negligible or opposite that intended, as blackmarkets would emerge to transfer the products from the preferred to the unpreferred buyers. Ultimately, products will move to the buyers who value them most, through illegal channels if necessary.

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Snake Oil Update

Turns out the forum I mentioned below was televised. I saw a couple of camera crews, including one from CBS, and later someone told me they’d seen me on Channel 7 (ABC). But I have no idea how much of the forum they showed. Very exciting!

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Monday, March 24, 2003

Oil and Snake Oil

I’ve been invited to speak tomorrow (Tuesday) at a Teach-In/Forum here at CSUN, on the topic, “The U.S. at War: How Did we Get Here?” The organizer asked me to join the panel because she wanted someone who could address the economic aspects of the conflict. I interpreted this to mean, “Is it really about oil?”

Well, I’m not really an expert on the petroleum industry, but far be it from me not to hold forth based on whatever limited knowledge I have. I threw together some thoughts, and I figured I might as well post them here. Note: Since these were intended as notes to myself, they don’t have the links and citations that I would normally include. My apologies for any unintentional plagiarism, as my views have been informed by various articles and blog posts I’ve read over the last few months. I do wish to give credit to this page, though, as it stimulated my thinking on the issue.

Is this war really about oil? This question is usually presented in the form of an accusation: “No blood for oil.” But there seem to be two competing accusations at work here:

• One is that the U.S. is fighting this war to increase the supply of oil for the purpose of fueling our oil-dependent economy. This is seen as bad for environmental reasons.
• The other is that the U.S. is fighting this war because Bush wants to enrich his Texas oil cronies. This is bad because it risks American lives for the benefit of a select few.

But these two accusations are contradictory -- you can’t really have it both ways.

• If the war leads to an increase in the world price of oil, that would indeed benefit Bush’s friends, but it would not increase the availability of oil to the U.S. economy. In any case, this outcome is highly unlikely.
• If the war leads to a decrease in the world price of oil, that will increase the availability of oil to the U.S. economy, but mostly to the detriment of the U.S. oil industry. Middle Eastern oil is high quality and cheap to produce, whereas American oil is much more expensive to produce. When the price of oil falls, the first wells to shut down are the ones most costly to operate.

Iraq would happily have sold plenty of oil without a war, and the only thing preventing that was the sanctions put in place after the first Gulf war, and Bush could easily have persuaded the U.N. to keep the sanctions in place. At least, he would probably have met with greater success than he did in getting U.N. authorization for an invasion. So it seems unlikely that Bush is trying to inflate the price of oil to benefit his friends.

Yes, U.S. oil companies will be contracted to help rebuild the Iraqi oil industry. But that is a short-run gain. Once the contracts are fulfilled, it’s over. If there’s political cronyism going on here, I suspect it’s of the compensatory variety: American oil companies will take a hit from lower world oil prices, but the rebuilding contracts will soften the blow.

How effective will the war be in lowering the price of oil? My best guess is “not very.” The price may fall, but not much. Once the Iraqi oil industry is rebuilt (and it needs to be rebuilt regardless of the war, because it’s old and dilapidated), it could add about 1.3% to the world oil supply. Whether that has any substantial effect on price will depend on whether a post-war Iraq is a member of OPEC, which seems very likely. If so, then increases in Iraqi production might be balanced by reductions in production elsewhere to hold up the price.

Assuming that the goal of the war is indeed to secure access to oil at low prices for the U.S. economy, that outcome would not necessarily be a bad thing (although it might not be sufficient to justify war). It’s true there are externalities from the use of fossil fuels, but that doesn’t mean *any* increase in price is desirable. The price of fossil fuels needs to be enough higher than the private cost of production to account for the external costs imposed by their use. But OPEC has managed to keep oil prices far above the marginal cost of production for a couple of decades now, and that would not change as a result of a free Iraq. Prices will likely remain much, much higher than the marginal cost of production.

Has oil motivated other countries’ positions on Iraq? It’s certainly the case that France and Russia, two very prominent opponents of the war, have long-term contracts with the current Iraqi regime for the development of their oil fields. Those contracts would likely be voided upon the toppling of the Iraqi regime. Iraq also owes Russia a great deal of money which it planned to pay off with oil rights, but that obligation might be voided under the Doctrine of Odious Debts. So, interestingly enough, the accusation of being motivated by oil may stick better on the opponents of war than the supporters. If the war protesters are to be consistent, they should at least mention this.

Bottom line: oil slogans get thrown about as ad hominem arguments. They are typically made by people who are opposed to the war for other reasons, and who feel the need to demonize those who favor it. I think it would be better to focus on the actual reasons given. Were those reasons sufficient? I happen to think not, but I also think the oil-related arguments are mostly red herrings. Even if this war was motivated by oil, it’s possible to do the right thing for the wrong reason.

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Saturday, March 22, 2003

Bored Now

Many people are fascinated by war, but I’m just not one of them. I find war reportage mind-numbingly boring. The media love war, because it provides endless content to fill airtime and column inches. But it’s just not the kind of content that entertains me. Lots of bombing, yeah yeah, shooting heard at the something-or-other border, yada yada… it’s all the same. I never really dug war movies, either. Somebody wake me when it’s over.

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Thursday, March 20, 2003

Just for the Record

I've been expressing my opposition to a war on Iraq for quite a long time now. But given that the war has now begun, I'll express my sincere hope (a) that we win decisively, (b) that we do so with minimal loss of life on both sides, and (c) that my concerns about inciting more terrorism turn out to be totally unfounded. This is one of those situations where I'd rather be wrong than right.

UPDATE: With respect to the war-on-Iraq/war-on-terrorism trade-off, read this excellent post by Mark Kleiman (who is and has been reluctantly pro-war), as well as the accompanying UPI story.

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Tuesday, March 18, 2003

Homegrown Child Mutilation

Little Green Footballs posted this revolting photo of a Muslim mother helping her son beat himself bloody with a sword in celebration of Ashoura Day. The caption for LGF's commentary was "Cult of Blood and Death."

Radley Balko rightly observes that we shouldn't demonize an entire culture based on the behavior of a few extremists. And I think Mark is correct that condemning Muslims as a group just because of a single tradition is a form of bigotry.

But Mark makes his point in a manner that is (I think) entirely unintentional. "I wonder," he asks, "whether the folks at LGF have ever attended a bris." A bris is, of course, the ritual circumcision of male infants in the Jewish faith. Did Mark intend this to be an example of a bloody but entirely innocuous religious practice? The more I think about it -- and I've probably thought about it more than I should -- the more sickened and horrified I am by the practice of circumcision, whether performed in a religious ceremony or a hospital maternity ward.

Supposing there was ever any basis for circumcision (more on this below), there's just no justification any longer. To my knowledge, no credible study has ever shown that circumcision has medical benefits. (The word "credible" is key, as there have been numerous bogus studies, including the one about lower rates of cervical cancer among women with circumcised partners.) Some argue that circumcision reduces the likelihood of infection, but even if that's true, it's an incredibly lousy justification in the modern world, where we have ready access to (a) soap and water and (b) antibiotics. Genital mutilation should be a last resort, not a preventive measure.

And besides, the whole protection-from-infection argument always struck me as peculiar from a biological standpoint. If the foreskins really make men more subject to infections that could kill them or render them infertile, shouldn't evolution have weeded them out ages ago? Yes, I know, evolution is not a perfect mechanism -- we still have appendices, after all -- but I've never heard any plausible argument for why foreskins might have been adaptive at some point in our ancestry and then became maladaptive later on. I imagine that susceptibility to penis infections has been about the same throughout our evolutionary history, with the exception of the last century in which we have developed better medicines.

Even if there were some benefit to circumcision, is it great enough to justify the cost in terms of potential loss of sexual pleasure and personal autonomy? The foreskin houses literally hundreds (possibly thousands -- it's been a long time since I've read about this) of nerve endings. Although, like all men circumcised at birth, I haven't had the opportunity to compare, it seems highly implausible to me that removing a chunk of incredibly sensitive tissue wouldn't affect the sex act. Given that millions of men live perfectly healthy lives with their penises intact (circumcision is the exception, not the norm, in Europe), would it be so terrible to give men the option of deciding for themselves whether to become circumcised, instead of forcing an irrevocable choice on them at birth?

If Mark intended the example of circumcision to show that Westerners commit acts just as pointless and brutal as Arabs, and therefore condemning only Arabs for their bloody rituals is hypocritical, then his point is well made. But I practice equal opportunity condemnation: Arabs sometimes behave like barbarians -- and so do we.

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Monday, March 17, 2003

The Dread Pirate Roberts

For over a week, I’d been planning to administer a thorough fisking to a recent Washington Times article by Paul Craig Roberts. (It’s no longer available online without a payment, unfortunately. If you really want to read it, search for “Outsourced Economy” in the February 27th archive.) But I finally realized that I just don’t have the time to give it the drubbing it deserves, so the following will have to do.

Paul Craig Roberts poses what he think is a “new” question for economists. “Is outsourcing trade?” he asks, apparently expecting the slack-jawed economics profession to scratch its collective head, wondering how they had failed to think of that question themselves. Well, maybe it’s because the answer is jarringly, crashingly obvious. *Of course* outsourcing is trade; what else would it be?

Roberts uses the word outsourcing to refer to “when a U.S. firm or industry relocates its capital and technology in China [or some other less developed nation], where it employs Chinese [or Indonesian, or Pakistani…] labor to produce goods for the U.S. market.” Hmm…sounds an awful lot like trade to me. Trade simply means the exchange of goods and services for money or (in a barter system) other goods and services. Any time Americans buy goods or services from abroad, that’s trade. It doesn’t matter whether American consumers buy final products or American firms buy labor services -- either way, we’re paying foreigners to do things for us.

Roberts is eager to distinguish outsourcing from trade because he wants to sound like a conservative “free trader” while making arguments to the contrary. But the case for this particular form of international trade is pretty much the same as for all international trade. And the contrary arguments are as bogus as they’ve always been.

Roberts’s bugbear is the prospect of American jobs being exported merely to take advantage of lower labor costs. He seems to think this is distinct from the issue of comparative advantage, the usual justification for free trade among nations. What he misses is that lower labor costs are one of the means by which comparative advantage is revealed. God doesn’t come down and declare, “Make athletic shoes in Indonesia! Write code in North America!” Instead, wages and prices act as signals to convey the relevant information. Employers pay wages just high enough to attract workers away from their next-best options. In underdeveloped nations, workers tend to have fewer desirable outside options, so their wages tend to be lower. In developed nations like the U.S., they typically have better outside opportunities, so their wages are higher. The wage differential induces employers to hire the workers with the lower opportunity cost, thus freeing up the workers with better options to do something else.

In the past, this process has typically manifested itself in the movement of manufacturing and other low-skill jobs to the third world (Nike’s factories in Indonesia and Pakistan are probably the most visible example), while skilled jobs expand at home. But Roberts thinks he’s found a new argument, because a recent Business Week article told him that it’s no longer just low-skill jobs that are being exported. Now, American firms are hiring foreigners to do work in finance, accountancy, programming, engineering, etc. You can almost hear Roberts’s brain clicking: “Manufacturing jobs left last year, high-tech jobs are leaving this year… Good God, *all* the jobs are leaving!” But a more careful reading of the BW article (from the 3 Feb 2003 issue, not available online) reveals some of what’s actually happening:
In the 1990s, Corporate America had to import hundreds of thousands of immigrants to ease engineering shortages. Now, by sending routine services and engineering tasks to nations with a surplus of educated workers, the U.S. labor force and capital can be redeployed to higher-value industries and cutting-edge R&D. “Silicon Valley doesn’t need to have all the tech development in the world,” says Doug Henton, president of Collaborative Economics in Mountview, Calif. “We need very-good-paying jobs. Any R&D that is routine can probably go.” Silicon Valley types already talk about the next wave of U.S. innovation coming from the fusion of software, nanotech, and life sciences.”
To put the argument somewhat differently, we shouldn’t expect to see a clean division wherein only manufacturing jobs, or only low-tech jobs, move to other countries. Comparative advantage is primarily a matter of differences in personal skills and talents, not geography. Just as there are unskilled people in all parts of the world, there are skilled and educated people all over the world, too. It’s unreasonable to think that *all* programming will take place in the West and *all* garment-making will take place in India and China. Instead, free trade drives a global division of labor that may have little relation to national boundaries.

And that’s a good thing. Ultimately, it means more goods and services getting produced at lower cost, with lower prices for consumers. Yes, some people will lose their jobs in the transition, and they will have to find new ones; that’s how the market process moves labor and capital to their highest-valued uses. But on the whole, we become wealthier because our dollars go further.

And here’s the added bonus: as foreign markets become more developed, their residents become more affluent. As capital flows in, productivity increases, and wages begin to rise. The poor foreign workers begin to make money – not much at first, but more than they would have made otherwise – which they can use to improve their standard of living, save for the future, educate their children, and even buy American goods and services.

The free trade position is caught between a left-wing rock and a right-wing hard place. Leftists excoriate free trade because it allegedly harms the residents of foreign nations, by exploiting their cheap labor and selling them goods at inflated prices. Rightists like Roberts, on the other hand, say free trade helps the residents of foreign nations at the expense of Americans. In short, free trade is bad if harms foreigners, and it’s bad if it helps them!

Fortunately, the anti-traders of both left and right are wrong. Free trade does create jobs for foreigners and improve their standard of living. But the gains for foreigners need not mean losses for Americans, because trade is not, as Roberts seems to think, a zero-sum game.

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Sunday, March 16, 2003

Rationalizing Rationality

Julian and Will have a discussion going on the meaning of rationality and its relationship to ethics. The discussion was stoked by Matthew Yglesias’s observation that libertarians have a marked tendency to characterize their own views as more “rational” than others’.

This is a useful context in which to emphasize the narrow definition of the word “rationality” as employed by economists – a definition I would like to see adopted more widely. To an economist, rationality is almost entirely a matter of consistency between ends and means; an action is rational to the extent that it increases the perceived likelihood of achieving one’s own goals, whatever they might be. Rationality is not a normative stance, as it does not pass judgment on the correctness or desirability of others’ goals. It isn’t anti-normative, either: it doesn’t say you can’t pass judgment on others’ goals, only that such judgments are not strictly a part of rationality.

I said rationality is “almost entirely” just a matter of consistency because there are two more specific requirements that economists build into their notion of rationality. The first is completeness, meaning that a person is actually capable of comparing alternatives at all. The second is transitivity, meaning that if you prefer A to B and B to C, you also prefer A to C. Strictly speaking, these are both assumptions about the kind of goals people have, not merely the consistency of their choices with their goals. These assumptions are justified, though, by the fact that “consistency” doesn’t have much meaning without them. If there are people with incomplete or intransitive preferences (and there may well be such people), then to that extent the term rationality just doesn’t apply. For instance, the same action could be simultaneously consistent and inconsistent with the same set of intransitive preferences. If I had my druthers, economists would stop saying that completeness and intransitivity are part of the definition of rationality, and instead say that they are necessary conditions for rationality to be applicable as a concept.

Julian argues that the economists’ notion of rationality may be excessively narrow. As an instance of behavior that is seemingly consistent with the maximization of the satisfaction of one’s goals, but that many people would nonetheless consider rational, he offers the notion of satisficing, which means accepting any outcome that meets a certain minimum standard. For instance, a satisficing dater might stick with a girlfriend who is not ideal but who meets certain minimum requirements for looks, personality, and so on. However, satisficing turns out to be an instance of maximizing behavior in the context of a dynamic search. When it is costly to search for something – say, a new mate, or a lower price on a product, or a job with a higher wage – you have to weigh the cost of searching further against the expected gains from finding something better than the status quo (as well as the distinct possibility of ending up with something worse than the status quo). It’s a standard result from search theory that a rational person facing these conditions will adopt a reservation level of satisfaction (quality of mate, price of product, wage of job) and stick with any outcome at least that good. In other words, he will engage in satisficing behavior.

Julian correctly observes (in somewhat different words) that one can always cook up a utility function that produces the behavior one is trying to cast as rational, and I agree there’s something suspect about that. But the question we should ask is whether the behavior in question can *reasonably* be construed as maximizing, and in the case of satisficing, I think it clearly can. Find a person who is engaged in satisficing behavior, such as buying a product once they find a price below a certain threshold level (as I did today, when I bought a Playstation 2 for $180; my threshold was about $185). Then ask that person why they are acting like that. I think the answer will almost always be that it’s too time-consuming or annoying or inconvenient to keep looking longer when you’ve already found something good enough. The reference to the search cost is a dead giveaway that the satisficing behavior is really maximization in a dynamic context.

As another example of behavior that is seemingly not maximizing, and yet might be construed as rational, Julian offers Nozick’s idea of moral side constraints on behavior. This is example is stronger, I think, because it raises a big fat question mark about what a “constraint” is. Economic models typically assume that an agent maximizes utility subject to a set of objective constraints such as income, prices, gravity, etc. Morals could be incorporated in the model as constraints like any other, but they are notably subjective constraints. I can choose to follow a different moral code; I cannot choose to change the laws of physics. And once we realize that constraints may be subjective, all kinds of stuff is up for grabs – maybe those prices aren’t really objective constraints, because I could take a five-finger discount.

But I think the narrow definition of rationality is still helpful here. Indeed, it may be the only thing that allows us to address the conundrum while retaining a non-vacuous notion of rationality. While philosophers can talk about binding moral side constraints, in reality we all know they are not generally so binding. We would like to act morally, but we also face temptations that occasionally prove too strong to resist. In econo-jargon, the marginal rate of substitution of moral behavior for other desirable things is, for most people, not infinite. Thus, morality may be treated as one more preference among many, and rationality need say nothing more about it than about one’s preferences about apples and oranges.

This is not to say that morality is undebatable, or that rationality has nothing to say about morality. It simply means that we shouldn’t try to stuff all moral arguments into the rationality sack. (The attempt to do so is precisely what is so irritating about Rand: she tries to characterize all her arguments as following directly from rationality and pure logic, when in fact she imports value premises from the beginning.) Broadening the definition of rationality to include more than testing consistency of means and ends rarely illuminates moral discourse, and often just confuses matters. Rationality is more helpful as a concept if we use it to make a certain kind of directed and internal critique; e.g., we might say that particular moral rules are irrational if they systematically thwart achievement of whatever goals the rules are supposed to advance. That job becomes much more difficult when the definition of rationality is so expansive that any charge of “irrationality” could be just another way of expressing disagreement.

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Friday, March 14, 2003

Irksome Expressions and Turns of Phrase #4

“For all intensive purposes…” What in the world makes a purpose intensive? This expression is clearly a corrupted version of “for all intents and purposes,” probably heard and misunderstand by people who never saw it written down.

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Miracle Whipped

I was all set to post a long, snarky commentary on the frequent use of the word “miracle” to describe the rescue of Elizabeth Smart. But then I thought better of it. Religion is such an easy target that I feel almost bad taking potshots. So instead, I’ll just point out a couple of obvious facts and let readers draw their own conclusions. (1) Elizabeth Smart is just one among far too many children abducted every year. Many – most? – of them either turn up dead or never turn up at all. (2) People pray for all of these children, especially the ones who get media coverage.

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Thursday, March 13, 2003

The Peter Pile-On

The Peter Principle posits that in a hierarchical organization, employees will tend to be promoted to their level of incompetence. When you're performing your job well, you will be recognized as competent and be rewarded with a promotion. You will continue getting promotions until you reach a point where you are incompetent, at which point the promotions stop. But because it's often difficult to demote or fire people (especially in bureaucracies), that's where you'll remain.

I wish to propose a cousin to the Peter Principle that may apply even in non-hierarchical organizations. I'm not good at the naming thing, but until I hear a better label, I'll dub it the "Peter Pile-On." The idea is that an employee will tend to acquire additional duties until he performs none of his duties competently. As long as you're performing well, others will consider it a wise decision to burden you with more responsibilities. The process will not stop until you're performing your current duties poorly.

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Tuesday, March 11, 2003

Menu Correctness

When we fought the Germans during the world wars, patriotic Americans dubbed sauerkraut “liberty cabbage.” Well, now you don’t actually have to be at war with America to lose your menu privileges -- failure to back us 100% in the lead-up to a potential war with someone else is sufficient. The U.S. House of Representatives cafeteria has replaced “French fries” with “freedom fries.”

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Monday, March 10, 2003

Investing in Death

Amitai Etzioni is troubled by so-called “dead peasant insurance,” meaning insurance policies that companies take out on their low-wage employees. If the employee dies, the employer collects money, and Etzioni considers this to be an instance of “screaming unethical conduct.” Mark Kleiman agrees.

This strikes me as a classic example of placing blame on behaviors when it properly belongs on incentives. Etzioni and Kleiman -- I mean, Amitai and Mark -- dang, how do I handle the fact that I know Mark Kleiman personally but I’ve never met Etzioni? Anyway, as both these fellows observe, dead-peasant policies are desirable for the companies because life-insurance payouts are tax-free. If they were not tax-free, there would be very little reason to buy the policies in the first place, because insurance is typically not a great investment. As Julian correctly points out, the total revenues of an insurance company (premiums plus any interest earned) must be greater than total payments, or else the company won’t make any money. For the buyer, that means the expected return on a life insurance policy should be lower than the return on other investments of similar risk. That doesn’t mean nobody should ever buy life insurance. If you’re a risk-averse person looking to hedge against risks, a life insurance policy can make sense. But buying life insurance *purely* for investment purposes is typically a poor idea.

I say “typically” because tax policy can change things substantially. Imagine you’re a firm choosing between two different investments: (a) a regular investment with a higher rate of return, but the returns get taxed, and (b) life insurance for your employees with a lower rate of return, but the payouts are tax-free. Obviously, for a high enough tax rate and/or small enough difference between rates of return, option (b) can become more attractive. A sensible tax policy would treat all forms of investment equally (note: I realize that’s more difficult than it sounds), so that firms’ investment choices would be driven by real risk-and-return differences instead of tax biases.

There’s another possible objection to “dead peasant insurance”: it may encourage a form of moral hazard in which firms deliberately increase their employees’ risk of death. But as Jane Galt argues, this couldn’t be a good long-term strategy, because firms with elevated death rates would just face higher insurance premiums, not to mention legal ramifications. Still, given the (very limited) likelihood of moral hazard, it probably would not be a bad idea to require employers to inform their employees that they are taking out life insurance policies on them.

But the moral hazard issue is not Etzioni and Kleiman’s real objection. Kleiman admits that he objects to “dead peasant insurance policies” on ethical, not economic, grounds. Now, policies like these are certainly morbid, simply because they exploit a tax loophole connected to death, but that’s not sufficient to condemn them. (Funeral parlors also profit on death.) Nor is the fact that the employees and their relatives might become irate about the policies if they knew about them; people get angry about all kinds of things, especially when death is involved, and their anger is not necessarily based on reason.

But let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that dead-peasant policies are ethically suspect. Is our displeasure properly directed at the firms that are, not surprisingly, trying to reduce their tax burden, or at the tax policies that created this bizarre tax loophole? Every now and then, someone will ask me whether I think “People are fundamentally good” or “people are fundamentally evil.” I always reply, “People fundamentally respond to incentives.” Give people an incentive to do bad things, and more people will do bad things. In this case, the incentive is a financial one, and it is aimed directly at those entities (firms) that we *expect* to respond most readily to financial inducements. Should we be shocked and appalled when they take the bait?

I’m not trying to say that firms (and people in general) don’t have an ethical responsibility to do the right thing, regardless of how leniently they are punished. I wouldn’t excuse murderers on grounds that prison terms are too short to deter them. But in a case like this, where there is no good financial reason for firms to engage in the supposedly unethical activity other than to game the incredibly arcane federal tax code, let’s put the blame (if any need be apportioned) where it belongs: on the tax code, not the firms.

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Band Names

My brother sent me the link to this fun linguistic taxonomy of band names. For instance, which bands have names that are declarative sentences? The author lists three: They Might Be Giants, Gene Loves Jezebel, and And You Will Know Us by the Trail of Dead. I'd never heard of the latter two, but I notice that he missed Frankie Goes to Hollywood and Johnny Hates Jazz.

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Saturday, March 08, 2003

Academic Nightmares

I was highly amused by Eugene's nightmare about law school, because I've been having similar dreams for years.

Usually, the dream involves the discovery that I neglected to take a necessary course (or exam) at some point in my educational history, and I have to complete it now or else see all my subsequent educational achievements unravel. Sometimes these dreams go back to grad school, other times back to college, occasionally as far back as high school. In one extreme case -- in a dream that was like a parody of the others -- I had to go back to *first grade* to complete a reading course. So I ended up wedging my adult frame into one of those little first-grader-sized desks, while the teacher called on me and my 6-year-old classmates to read aloud from a book with colorful pictures and words in 16-point font.

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Friday, March 07, 2003

Marginal Terror Avoidance

I didn’t watch the State of the Union address, so Thursday’s press conference was the first time I’d actually seen Bush speaking since – wow, maybe not since 9/11. And I noticed something interesting: he’s learned to speak like a real president. No, seriously. The accent is milder now (I grew up in Texas, and even I couldn’t stand the accent as it was before), he speaks carefully and earnestly, and the lurking smirk is gone. He actually exhibited, dare I say it, gravitas.

And that’s too bad, really, because much of what he had to say doesn’t bear much scrutiny. Will Wilkinson has some choice commentary on the evasiveness of Bush’s answer to a question about the cost of making war on Iraq. The basic gist: in response to a question about costs, the president talked about benefits instead.

What yanked my chain, however, was his reaction to a question about whether making war on Iraq might arouse even greater anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, thereby by inciting more terrorist acts. His reply was eloquent, persuasive, and ostrich’s-head-in-the-sand wrong. “I think, first of all, it's hard to envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001. We did nothing to provoke that terrorist attack. It came upon us because there is an enemy which hates America. They hate what we stand for. We love freedom, and we're not changing.” In other words, Bush assumes that terrorism is a function of only one variable – our values – and invariant to changes in anything else. Given the Arab world’s frequent condemnation of American imperialism and involvement in the Middle East, isn’t that claim patently false? Even if we agreed that 90% of their hatred were attributable to our values (and that seems an incredibly high estimate to me), the other 10% would be due to something else that we might be able to influence. And, if I may be excused for invoking econo-speak, it’s always the marginal effect that is most relevant for optimal decision-making. The actions we take now could push the “marginal terrorist” – you know, the Arab who hates American values but is not *quite* ready to join the jihad – over the edge.

And really, is it that difficult to “envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001”? I’ll give Bush the benefit of a doubt and assume he meant more *new* terror, since otherwise just one more dead body would do the trick. Still, the rest of us have spent the 17 months since 9/11 thinking of much worse things that could happen: suitcase nukes, smallpox attacks, etc. Moreover, terrorist attacks need not be as spectacular as 9/11 to have a cumulative effect just as horrific. We are more likely to suffer death by a thousand cuts than by a single sword thrust. And this fact, again, puts a premium on thinking at the margin: the question is not whether there will be a terrorist attack, but how many. Every action we take in the war on terror must therefore be weighed in marginal terms: will the marginal benefit from deterrence outweigh the marginal cost from widening the pool of potential terrorists?

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Wednesday, March 05, 2003

Conservation of What?

Brad DeLong has some excellent comments on why conservatives are not reliable defenders of liberty. He doesn’t spend any time explaining why modern liberals are also lousy at defending liberty -- but hey, there are only 24 hours in a day. I especially liked his statement of the four pillars of conservatism:
Of course conservatism is not a reliable friend of human liberty. Conservatism is a combination of four currents: "change is bad," "things were better when my grandfather was a boy," "what our ancestors have handed down to use [sic] may be false, but we shouldn't inquire into it because it is useful," and "I've got mine, Jack, and the lower orders need to be more respectful." These are not the soil in which the tree of liberty grows.
DeLong also offers a reasonable explanation for why conservatives do strike the occasional blow for liberty: “to the extent that American conservatism is a friend to liberty, it is because it is American--not because it is conservative.” Dead on.

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Monday, March 03, 2003

Legal Feeding Frenzy

This Sacramento Bee article reports that the California Attorney General is suing a Beverly Hills law firm for filing thousands of frivolous lawsuits in order to extort money from auto repair shops, restaurants, and other small businesses. Yes, you can go back and read that sentence again. I’ll put it differently: A lawyer is suing a law firm for filing too many bogus lawsuits.

Part of me rejoices, as so many lawsuits are indeed frivolous, yet their frivolity doesn’t save the victims from having to pay through the nose. As the article points out, many small business owners agree to out-of-court settlements just to avoid the costly legal meat grinder. But I also have to wonder: are lawsuits the solution to the lawsuit problem? Or shouldn’t we instead be scrutinizing the overbroad laws and legal doctrines that allow these lawsuits to be halfway viable in the first place?

In any case, I wonder if the California Attorney General will next turn his sights on the nuisance lawsuits lodged by numerous city and country governments (including Los Angeles and San Francisco, among many others) against gun manufacturers, under the dubious legal theory that gun makers are responsible for the voluntary acts of gun-using criminals. After all, the anti-gun orchestrators of the lawsuits have admitted that they hope to bury the gun manufacturers under a legal burden too large to bear *even if they win*. I’m no lawyer, but that sounds a lot like extortion to me.

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Sunday, March 02, 2003

Everyone Expects the Spammish Repitition

Julian observes that spam scams, however ridiculously implausible they may seem to intelligent readers, must nevertheless be successful, as otherwise they would not persist. Clearly, there must be enough really gullible people out there to make the scams profitable for the perpetrators.

Now, I don’t often defend the proposition that people aren’t as stupid as you think, because so very often they turn out to be stupider. But in this case, I’m willing to offer a small bit of evidence in support of the common man’s BS detector. Y’see, it’s incredibly cheap to send mass emails – pretty darn close to zero at the margin. And that means spammers can tolerate astoundingly low response rates simply because they spam so many people. According to the “Spam Queen” interviewed in this Wall Street Journal article, some spam projects can break even with a response rate as low as 0.001% – in other words, as low as one person in 100,000. Of course, the breakeven response rate depends on how much each sucker gets soaked for, so the response rate needed to create a profit could be higher (or lower) than this one. But I’d be happy knowing only one person in a thousand is dumb enough to fall for spam scams.

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Friday, February 28, 2003

Irksome Expressions and Turns of Phrase #3

“This is the best [item in some category] since [another item in the same category released as recently as last year].” If you’re trying to make a strong statement about something, this is not how to do it. “Daredevil is the best superhero movie since Spider-man” -- given that Spider-man was released just a few months earlier, what does that really tell me, aside from the subtle implication that Spider-man was better? “This is the best superhero movie since Superman” -- now *that’s* a compliment (even if you, like me, didn’t think much of Superman) simply because Superman was made so long ago.

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Thursday, February 27, 2003

More on Healthcare for the Intemperate

Mark responds in an update to his original post to my response below, saying: “[Glen’s] answer -- essentially, the creation of a special underwriting category for alcohol and drug abusers, who would pay higher insurance rates than the more abstemious -- makes sense, as most libertarian solutions do, if you abstract from a few facts.” Allow me to respond to those facts one at a time:

“Much health insurance is bought by employers for employees, rather than individually.” This is indeed a fact – one created almost entirely by the current tax code, which effectively gives a tax break on insurance only if you buy it through your employer. A sensible tax code would treat all health expenditures equally, thus removing the perverse incentive to tie your health insurance to your employment. But even if we take that as given, the fact that health insurance is typically attached to employment and sold in packages does have an upside, which is that it ameliorates the adverse selection problem. (Adverse selection is only an issue if the low-risk folk can opt out and the high-risk people can opt in, thus biasing the insurance pool.)

“Being an alcohol or drug abuser isn't (1) a simple yes-or-no; (2) a stable condition over time; or (3) an easily observable condition; the usual diagnostic approach is asking the person involved, which isn't going to work very well if the consequence of saying "yes" is having to pay higher insurance rates.” There do exist other means of diagnosis, including medical tests. They are not perfect, but nothing ever is. Moreover, premiums are adjusted based on medical history. Someone with a history of conditions correlated with alcohol abuse will see rising premiums. The fact that alcohol or drug abuse isn’t a simple yes/no proposition with a constant answer over time makes things more complex, but not intractable; being a “bad driver” is not a simple yes/no proposition either, but auto insurance companies are remarkably skilled at observing its correlates.

“Someone who isn't clinically diagnosable as an alcohol abuser can still wrap his car around a tree.” Since the whole problem Mark raised had to do with the failure of doctors to perform the tests they *do* have available, I don’t see how this is relevant. If the condition is not clinically diagnosable, then unperformed tests are beside the point. Now, it’s true that there could be an adverse selection problem here (the drunk drivers are more likely to buy health insurance that covers their drunk-driving accidents), but there are potential solutions. Here’s one that comes to mind: Insurance companies could offer a policy that will cover your auto-related injuries only if you are tested at the hospital for alcohol and the test comes back negative (or within certain parameters). Those who drive responsibly will happily sign onto this agreement. Those who don’t will have to pay a higher premium for a policy without this provision.

“Having all the drunks and drug abusers uninsured -- the likely consequence of charging them the expected-value cost of their health insurance -- means that the rest of us wind up paying for their care through the unpaid care accounts kept by hospitals and passed through to insurers, unless we're willing to have them die in the streets. The whole logic of treating medical care as an ordinary commodity falls apart once you say, ‘No, we're not prepared to have people who can't pay for care die for want of care.’” First, let’s recognize that, if it’s really true that drunks and drug abusers are unable to afford the expected value of their health insurance, it means these chaps are creating greater healthcare costs than they can afford. Are these people who deserve a public subsidy? I’ll happily concede that if you reject free-market policies in some respects, other free-market policies may not work very well, either. If we say that we’ll provide free or subsidized healthcare to people, *regardless of their poor choices and stupid behavior*, then the natural consequence is that we all end up paying through the nose. It’s not just that we pay for others’ healthcare – it’s that the costs will be inflated because people will choose to engage in even more irresponsible behavior (the moral hazard problem).

The next step, of course, is that the high costs imposed on the rest of us will be used to justify the abridgment of personal freedom and the regulation of lifestyle choices. When users of drugs and alcohol (and motorcycle riders, and high-impact sports participants, and those engaging in high-risk sexual acts) are held responsible for the consequences of their own choices, then their choices need not be any of the public’s business. But the liberal attitude that treats healthcare as a right creates a powerful incentive for the government to intervene. (As an aside, I think this is the primary reason that so many liberals, a group that libertarians used to agree with on issues of personal choice, are now drifting to the authoritarian camp by supporting legislation and/or litigation to control smoking, consumption of fast food, etc.)

In any case, the problem of “the rest of us wind[ing] up paying” follows from *any* position that accepts Mark’s premise that people deserve healthcare no matter what. If we have socialized medicine, then we all pay, plus we get moral hazard. If we have publicly funded ERs and clinics that must treat all comers (even when they’re not insured), then we all pay, again with moral hazard. If we force private insurers to cover all medical expenditures regardless of cause, then we all pay, plus we get adverse selection. If we use tax funds to subsidize the purchase of health insurance for all, then we all pay, plus moral hazard again. Does Mark have in mind some system in which we do not all pay? The only one I can think of is the one I propose and Mark rejects.

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Political Economy of the Drug-Induced Stupor

Mark Kleiman, provocative as usual, blogs about laws in 38 states that permit health insurance companies to deny claims for medical care necessitated by the abuse of drugs or alcohol. As a result of these laws, trauma center docs routinely avoid testing for alcohol or drugs for fear of not getting their insurance reimbursements. This is unfortunate because a very large volume of medical problems are drug- or alcohol-related, and just a little bit of medical attention to the matter could (supposedly) induce the abusers to alter their behavior and reduce their health costs.

I’m with Mark right up 'til the end, when he suddenly chucks the gauntlet at libertarians: “Go ahead. Tell me how the market is going to solve this one, in the face of the obvious adverse-selection problem: being the one insurance company that offers coverage for drinking-induced accidents is going to be a marketing advantage for drunks, who are lousy health care risks.”

Well, let’s see. First of all, we libertarians oppose laws that grant special interests the right to renege on their contracts – such as, for instance, the 38 state laws in question here. A non-libertarian might reply that these laws merely “permit” the health insurance companies to deny certain claims, so these are actually libertarian laws. I don’t have the text of the laws in front of me, but generally, special interests don’t have to lobby for new laws to permit them to do things they are already entitled to do by the basic principles of freedom of contract. If the insurance companies wanted to deny claims for alcohol-induced conditions, they could just write that into their contracts. But that is not what they want to do. They want to write contracts that *appear* to cover conditions they actually do not, and they want to assure that their competitors can’t undercut them by offering some customers a better deal. That is what I highly suspect these laws are intended to accomplish: regardless of what your health insurance policy *says* it will cover, *in fact* it does not cover alcohol-induced conditions. Repealing these laws would mark a (partial) return to the traditional law of contract, whereby parties are actually held to their promises.

Second, if these laws were repealed, there is every reason to think the market would be able to deal with the problem of drug- and alcohol-related health problems. Mark cites the adverse selection problem, but keep in mind that adverse selection is a problem of asymmetric information: if the insurance company cannot tell the difference between customers with different degrees of risk, it will have to charge them the same premium, and that premium will be most attractive to the higher-risk customers. But if the insurance company *can* tell the difference (say, through medical testing), or if it can identify factors correlated to the difference (such as medical background, previous conditions, etc.), then it can charge differential premiums that take into account the different degrees of risk. If "the one insurance company that offers coverage for drinking-induced accidents" attracts more drunks, then it will charge a higher premium than the other health insurance companies, just like auto insurance companies that specialize in insuring people with lousy driving records. Yes, that means alcohol and drug users will have to pay more for health insurance – and that’s exactly as it should be. The alternative approach, which contends that people should have to pay the same amount regardless of their health or behavior, leads to both adverse selection (as the low-risk customers opt out of the insurance pool) and moral hazard (as the abusers realize their bad behavior is being partially subsidized by the rest of us).

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Wednesday, February 26, 2003

The Word Mint

Thanks to Chuck for drawing my attention to a truly excellent website: The Word Spy, which documents recently coined words and phrases, as well as old ones enjoying a renaissance or transformation of meaning. Among the recent entries: "snob hit," "stunt programming," and "wife acceptance factor." If you're a logophile, this site's for you.

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Dogged by Racism

For some reason, I was fascinated by this Slate article that asks the question, "Can a dog be racist?"

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Return of Bride of Reductio Creep

As though to prove the point I made below (“Bride of Reductio Creep”), Ronald Bailey of Reason offers another example of the “bad ideas never die” syndrome. Bailey’s bottom line: “[N]o proposed regulation ever dies—its proponents just lie in wait for another crisis to justify ramming it down the throats of a temporarily alarmed populace. Thus do our liberties erode imperceptibly over time.”

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Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Bride of Reductio Creep

There must be a (shorter) name for this phenomenon: every bad idea eventually comes to pass. This is related, of course, to the problem of reductio creep, but it’s somewhat different. The problem here is that slaying a demon once is never enough -- you have to keep slaying the same demon over and over again, and eventually you’ll have a bad day and lose.

Exhibit A. If you thought you’d heard the last of “universal healthcare” back in 1994, when Clintoncare met its demise, you were mistaken. According to this L.A. Times article, Democrats intend to pound that old drum loudly in the 2004 presidential race.

Exhibit B. Did you breathe a sigh of relief when a judge struck down the lawsuit launched by fat people against McDonald’s? Well, it’s time to inhale again. According to this Sacramento Bee article, the plaintiffs have modified and refiled the case. And even if this case ultimately fails, it won’t be the last; the lawyers leading the charge are considering a variety of legal strategies, including “suing school boards for entering contracts with fast food and soft drink manufacturers; suing the milk industry for milk mustache ads that don't disclose the benefits of skim milk; and suing the pork industry for portraying ‘The Other White Meat’ as healthy.”

And it’s worked before: “It took hundreds of cases, starting in the 1950s, before tobacco lawsuits brought by smokers finally went to trial, and another hundred cases to finally win, [tobacco-litigation veteran John] Banzhaf said. But by the end of the 1990s, with public opinion against them, the industry agreed to a massive settlement, paying billions of dollars to states that had sued to recover tobaccorelated [sic] health costs.”

Bad ideas just keep coming back, until eventually they win. This process needs a name. I’m thinking “Voorhees Syndrome” (after Jason Voorhees of “Friday the 13th” fame), or perhaps “Terminator Syndrome” (I’ll be back!). Or maybe somebody’s already come up with a better name -- Julian coined “reductio creep” months before I tried to name it.

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Monday, February 24, 2003

Irksome Expressions and Turns of Phrase #2

“Have a safe and happy holiday!” I’ll bet people under the age of 20 think this is the standard form of well-wishing before a vacation. But I remember the good old days when people said, “Have a great holiday!” The word “safe” appeared about the same time monkey bars over 5 feet tall disappeared from the nation’s playgrounds (along with the asphalt, which I don’t miss quite as much). For a while, “safe and happy” appeared only on elementary school bulletin boards, but now I actually hear people utter this in conversation with peers. If this keeps up, people will soon be wishing you a “tasty and nutritious meal” instead of a “nice lunch.”

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Irksome Expressions and Turns of Phrase #1

“I don’t care if you’re black, white, yellow, blue, or green with purple polka dots!” As an expression of non-racism, statements like this leave me cold. First, it comes off as defensive. Second, it makes you wonder if the speaker couldn’t think of any actual races, other than black and white, and so just started naming colors.

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Thursday, February 20, 2003

Hoist By Own Petard (HBOP) Department

So current members of Congress are actually taking classes to learn about the requirements of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law – yes, the very law that these same Congresscritters passed last year. Many of them have been surprised to find out what kind of monster they actually passed. Radley Balko has some choice commentary. I think this is the best thing to happen since Bill Clinton signed a sexual harassment law that allowed defendants to be interrogated about their previous sexual history – and ended up being grilled about his own.

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Faith, Hope, and Charity

I enjoyed this article from the Acton Institute on the virtues of private charity over government welfare. I particularly liked the following rebuttal of the notion that private charity is discriminatory: “Deliberately confusing discretion with discrimination is a subtle form of demagoguery, attempting to change the subject from serving the poor to political posturing.”

There are good reasons to be suspicious of Bush’s “faith-based initiative” plan to distribute government funds through private charities. Among them is the very real possibility that state funding will gradually erode those aspects of the private charities that make them most effective, including their willingness to demand good behavior from their poor clients as a condition for further assistance. But note that direct state funding is *not* the aspect of Bush’s faith-based initiative defended in this article. The proposal here is to allow greater tax deductions for contributions to charity and to allow tax-free charitable gifts to be made from personal IRA’s.

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Wednesday, February 19, 2003

Fishy Figures

Chatterbox at Slate is fascinated by this New York Times article, which claims to show that -- once all forms of taxation are taken into account -- all income groups in this country pay approximately the same average tax rate. I won't take issue with that claim, because it might well be true; after all, Social Security and other payroll taxes are well known to be regressive, as are excise taxes aimed at products disproportionately consumed by the poor (such as liquor and tobacco).

What's been bothering me, though, is this chart attached to the article, which purports to show the average tax rates for all income quintiles. Notice that the very highest percentage is still only 19%, implying that nobody in this country -- neither the rich nor the poor nor the middle class -- pays more than a fifth of their income in taxes of any form to any government. Now, that sounds awful fishy to me, because the usual estimates run at least into the low thirties. According to the Tax Foundation, Tax Freedom Day in 2002 fell on April 27 last year, because Americans paid 32.1% of their income to federal, state, or local government. (April 27 is just about 32% of the way through the year, you see.)

What could explain the discrepancy? I must confess that I've failed to nail down the answer. I figure it has something to do with different sources of data; the NYT graph draws on the BLS's Consumer Expenditure Survey, while the Tax Foundation's figures come from the BEA's National Income and Product Accounts. Also, they are probably using different notions of what constitutes "income." The Tax Foundation uses Net National Product to calculate Tax Freedom Day. I have no idea what the NYT article used, but for it to have produced lower average tax rates, it would have to have employed a broader definition of income. But NNP is already pretty broad (broader than, for instance, Net Income or Personal Income, two other figures provided by the NIPA). GNP and GDP are larger, but not, I think, enough larger to justify the substantial difference in implied tax rates.

The discrepancy might have something to do with exclusion/inclusion of taxes on business. But in order for the NYT's figures to result in lower average tax rates, they would have to rely on a *narrower* definition of taxes -- and that doesn't make sense, because the whole point of the article was to discuss the burden of taxes from the most inclusive standpoint possible, taking into account all forms of double taxation. The chart's subtitle starts with, "Taking all types of government taxes into consideration…," implying an inclusive approach. Including sales taxes, property taxes, sin taxes, etc., while leaving out business taxes would be disingenuous at best.

So I'm still stumped on finding an explanation for the discrepancy. I will say this: something is mighty strange about the Consumer Expenditure Survey's results. For instance, this table indicates that the average survey respondent had pre-tax income of $47,507 and after-tax income of $44,587, implying a tax rate of only 6.2%. Even in the richest quintile, the table implies only an 8.7% tax rate. As that short dude in "The Princess Bride" would have said, "Inconceivable!" (Of course, he eventually found that word didn't mean quite what he thought it meant.)

Like most disputes of this nature, I imagine this all comes down to a matter of definition. Most likely, it has something to do with the exclusion/inclusion of certain types of tax, plus some bizarre definition(s) of income, plus the unavoidable weirdness that comes from any survey-based data. But damned if I can pin it down. As I've wasted far more time thinking about this than I can afford, I'm posting it here in the hope that someone else will figure it out.

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Monday, February 17, 2003

Roundup

To make up for my lack of bloggic inspiration over the last few days, I thought I’d post links to the best of recent posts on other people’s blogs.

Julian gives another characteristically dense (as in thick with insight, not thick-headed) defense of key libertarian ideas; specifically, the distinction between “the good” and “the right,” and the virtue of simplicity in moral and legal rules.

Amy’s really been on the job lately, making a series of great posts over the last couple of weeks. Here are two longish-but-worth-it samples: a discussion of how the loss of personal responsibility leads to regulation of personal lifestyles by way of moral hazard, and a compilation of evidence of feminism hijacked by feminists. I also liked her snarky letter of recommendation for a creationist.

Juan Non-Volokh of the Volokh Conspiracy explains why reducing the number of SUV’s on the road would probably not reduce our reliance on oil from the Middle East -- indeed, it would probably increase it. The short version: the first oil wells to shut down are the highest cost oil wells. Guess what: the highest cost oil wells are located in the United States, North Sea, etc., not the Middle East.

Finally, here is a great list of insults and brickbats from One Girl’s Life. My favorite: "How about never? Is never good for you?" Thanks to Mark Kleiman for the pointer.

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You Know You Live in an Autocracy When...

...the current president's birthday is a cause for nationwide celebrations.

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