Monday, July 05, 2004

Moral Philosophy as if Incentives Really Mattered

Matthew Yglesias makes the following comment in a discourse on Spider-Man 2 (warning: spoilers in Yglesias’s post and the last paragraph of this one):

But as we move forward into modernity, intellectual types lose their faith [in heaven and hell]. But there's still a desire to come up with a moral system that people will want to follow. Hence we start hearing complaints that normative view X or Y is "too challenging" because morality, apparently, is supposed to be easy and it's just not cool for Peter Singer (and others) to go around telling us that it might suck to do the right thing.
The implication is that there’s something facile or illegitimate about criticizing a moral philosophy for being “too challenging.” But even if the difficulty of following moral dictates is not the only relevant factor, surely it’s at least one relevant factor.

I take it as given that the purpose of a moral system is to guide the behavior of actual people. People are not angels; they cannot be expected to follow moral rules purely because they have (allegedly) been justified by religious or philosophical reasoning. Nor are they devils; they will sometimes set aside personal gain for moral reasons. In the real-world middle ground between angels and devils, whether people follow moral rules depends on the persuasiveness of the rules’ justifications, how fully people have been socialized to respect the rules, the degree of temptation they face to break the rules, and the degree of difficulty involved in following the rules. Given the last two factors, it follows that some moral systems may fail to guide the behavior of actual people – or more importantly, fail to guide their behavior in the intended manner – because the rules ask too much. To be more specific, the rules may ask too much incentive-wise, by demanding that people sacrifice too much; and they may ask too much information-wise, by requiring costly or inaccessible knowledge for their concrete application. (Mario Rizzo refers to the latter issue as “the knowledge problem of ethics,” which is analogous to Hayek’s famed knowledge problem of economics.)

Now for the crucial Spider-Man application. When Peter Parker begins to think that being Spider-Man entails giving up everything good in his life (romance, career success, etc.), he starts to become despondent. The physical manifestation of his depression is the temporary loss of his super powers. In short, the excessive moral demands of being a selfless superhero make him less effective as a hero. His powers only return when those he loves most – Aunt Mae and Mary Jane – are directly threatened by Dr. Octopus, and the return of his powers enables him to save the day. The activation of his own loves and desires brings out the best in him. The moral of the first movie, in the words of Uncle Ben, was that with great power comes great responsibility. But I think the moral of the second movie could easily be: if the burden of responsibility becomes too great, it becomes self-defeating.

(See also the comments from Henry Farrell and Brayden King, and Yglesias's favorable response.)

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Sunday, July 04, 2004

July 4th Heresy

Like most libertarians, I like to complain about nanny-state regulations, especially on July 4th. And like most red-blooded Americans, I like to blow stuff up, which makes anti-fireworks regulations especially galling. I’ve noticed at least two libertarian bloggers complaining about anti-fireworks laws, and in my gut, I want to agree with them. If drunken fools blow their hands off, that’s their problem, right?

The problem is that exploding fireworks is not a purely self-regarding action; arguably, it’s not even close. The primary danger – and I realize it’s not a problem everywhere in the country, but it’s definitely a problem in Southern California – is that fireworks can start fires. In dry areas, that can lead to out-of-control conflagrations that destroy hundreds or even thousands of homes, not to mention taxing the efforts of firefighters, filling the sky with black soot, reducing air quality, sometimes shutting down highways and inconveniencing large numbers of people.

I hate to admit it, but I think regulating fireworks, and even implementing an outright ban in especially fire-prone areas, is probably a good idea. Will people flout the regulations, leading to smuggling and black markets? Yes, but I still suspect the gains exceed the losses (though I’m open to evidence showing that my concerns are out of proportion to the problem). We can’t eliminate the risk entirely, but we can at least reduce it substantially.

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Friday, July 02, 2004

Sauce for the Gander

"Guys Gone Wild" is now a reality. Call me crazy, but I'm betting it won't sell as well as "Girls Gone Wild." Interestingly, the marketers admit that they expect sales to come from two main sources: women buying them as gag gifts for friends, and gay men.

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Thursday, July 01, 2004

In Defense of the Wal-Mart Model

At Crooked Timber, Daniel Davies explains why Wal-Mart’s much-vaunted contributions to economic productivity might not be so great after all. I agree with Davies’s fundamental points, which I understand to be (a) that productivity is notoriously different to measure, and (b) that the productivity gains attributed to Wal-Mart have probably been exaggerated. But if the Wal-Mart boosters sometimes overstate their case in its favor, I think Davies overstates the case against. Even his own examples show how Wal-Mart has created value. Let’s take them one at a time:

1. Lower value added retailing = higher productivity! … The issue being that, if the boutiques on King’s Road were to get rid of the dolly assistants, free coffee and assorted perks and bijouterie, and move to a model where they piled the Prada high in fluorescent-lit barns, then they would presumably be able to shift more units at a lower price, at the expense of taking all the joy out of shopping for the Sex-in-the-City crowd. As Brad[1] pointed out in a critical comment on the Kay article, the national statistical agencies try their damndest to make sure that the productivity statistics don’t pick up a decrease in the value-added component of retailing as an increase in productivity, but it’s an intrinsically difficult task.
Granted, it’s a much less pleasant experience to shop at Wal-Mart than to shop in a boutique. If you want an accurate measure of the value added by switching to the warehouse model, you must remember to subtract out the value associated with the forgone ambience. That said, we should notice that lots of people still have the option of shopping at boutiques and choose to shop at Wal-Mart instead. That’s pretty strong evidence of value added for those people, since they could choose to patronize the boutiques if they didn’t perceive a net gain from shopping at Wal-Mart. Simply put, there are some people who are unwilling to pay for the additional amenities of the smaller stores; before Wal-Mart came along, they had to pay for them anyway.
2. Outsourcing distribution costs - to you! … I would contend that there is one particular, systematic mistake [identified by behavioral finance] that people make which is probably of macroeconomics. And it’s a hole in popular psychology which WalMart drives through in a coach-and-four.

That particular psychological quirk is the tendency of people in industrial societies to: a) put an irrationally low valuation on their leisure time, and b) believe that they have more spare time than they actually do. … In any case, as John pointed out a while ago, if you’re spending your “leisure” time driving to an out-of-town megastore, then it’s not leisure in any meaningful sense. If you end up doing more of this than you would, in a fully informed and reflective state, want to, then WalMart has successfully outsourced a proportion of its cost base to you, and the national income statistics and the McKinsey Global Institute will happily collaborate in helping you to fool yourself.
Again, there’s a large grain of truth here. There is a cost, in both time and inconvenience, involved in going to a big-box store on the outskirts of town. That cost ought to be taken into account in assessing Wal-Mart’s value added. But once again, the revealed preferences of actual consumers argue strongly in favor of the notion that, on net, lots of people still prefer the big-box store. Many of Wal-Mart’s customers have lower incomes, and that makes perfect sense: people who earn less per hour have a lower opportunity cost of their time, so they will naturally substitute time expenditures for money expenditures when they can.

Davies resists the revealed preference argument on grounds of behavioral psychology: people’s choices are sometimes afflicted by persistent biases that are inconsistent with pure rational choice. As a result, it is possible that their choices don’t reflect their true preferences. Now, it’s certainly true that people are subject to these biases in certain types of situation, but attributing such biases willy-nilly to any old situation, as Davies does here, is precisely the danger of people taking the behavioral results too seriously. What seems like a bias will sometimes turn out to be a (quasi) rational means of correcting other cognitive biases or dealing with a facet of the situation not apprehended by the observer.

So what countervailing biases might be involved here? One of the most common biases is placing too much value on the present relative to the future. A person with this bias might buy something at the expensive-but-local store, instead of sacrificing a little time now to save money for the future. I do this all the time, when I buy food at the corner market instead of driving an extra 5 minutes to the grocery store. Which bias is dominant in the Wal-Mart situation? Focusing on the undervaluation-of-leisure bias leads to Davies’s implied conclusion: people shop at Wal-Mart too much. Focusing exclusively on the overvaluation-of-the-present bias leads to the conclusion that people don’t shop at Wal-Mart enough. I, for one, would defer to the judgment of the people who have the greatest incentive to correct their biases and get the outcome right: the consumers. Choices may not reveal preferences perfectly, but they’re the best sign we’ve got.

Davies makes a third point, but this post is already way too long, so I’ll respond to that point in a later post.

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Wednesday, June 30, 2004

Terrorist Jokes

I’ve heard very few terrorist jokes since 9/11. I don’t mean that comics and humorists are unwilling to joke about the terrorism; the national funny-bone moratorium ended a couple of months after 9/11, and there’s been plenty of good humor about terrorism since. What I mean is that I’ve heard very few terrorist joke jokes, in the sense of funny stories with punchlines that get passed around mostly by word of mouth, like blonde jokes or lawyer jokes.

But I did hear some terrorist jokes in the late 1970s, during the first wave of Islamic terrorism. I can only remember two of them now. Both of them involved “Aggie terrorists” – you see, I grew up in Texas, and Aggies (Texas A&M students) are the butt of all jokes in Texas. In other parts of the country, it was probably Pollacks, morons, or some other group. What was the first group you heard it took five of to screw in a lightbulb, one to hold the bulb and four to turn the ladder? For me, it was Aggies.

Anyway, here they are. I’m replacing Aggies with morons to achieve more universal appeal:

Q: Did you hear about the moron terrorist who tried to blow up a bus?
A: He burned his lips on the exhaust pipe.

Q: Did you hear about the moron hijacker?
A: Yeah, he tried to hijack a train to Cuba.
Ah, the good old days, when hijackers actually wanted to go somewhere instead of destroy something. It’s almost quaint.

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Fetal Voters, Redux

This post by Amy and these two by Eugene caused me to go back and read more carefully the article that claimed legal abortion may have cost Democrats elections by shrinking their numbers. I commented on the article here, after skimming it and finding the argument superficially plausible. (In my defense, I did say that I hadn’t checked the numerical analysis carefully!) It turns out, on closer inspection, that there are a number of flaws.

First, a lot of the figures about who has had abortions come from survey data, which is notoriously unreliable on questions about personal and potentially embarrassing matters.

Second, the question asked (“As far as you know, has anyone close to you had an abortion?”) doesn’t capture the relevant information even if answered truthfully. In order for the answers to tell us anything about how many Democrats and Republicans are having abortions, we’d have to know people’s propensity to feel “close” to someone of the opposite party.

Third, although it’s certainly true that people tend to “inherit” their political views from their parents, it’s not a 100% correlation. But the author implicitly treats all unborn children of Democrats as guaranteed Democrats, and all unborn children of Republicans as guaranteed Republicans. Taking into account the fact some children do not adopt their parents’ politics would shrink the size of the claimed effect (though not eliminate it).

Fourth, although the author claims to have taken the relatively low voting rates of 18-24 year olds into account, I don’t think he has. Working backward from his numbers, I figure he must have assumed a 47% voting rate for that age group, whereas the actual number (according to this site) is only about 42%. Again, that would tend to shrink the size of the effect (though not eliminate it). The author might respond, however, that it only delays the effect, since eventually the “missing voters” would reach the age ranges with higher voter turnout.

I still think the author’s argument has prima facie plausibility, because the crucial premises (that Democrats have abortions at higher frequency than do Republicans, and that children have a tendency to adopt their parents’ politics) are believable and, if true, lead in fairly straightforward fashion to the conclusion that legal abortion should reduce the number of future Democrats more than the number of future Republicans. But it would take much better statistical analysis to prove that conclusion with any degree of certainty.

Also, I stand by the final point made in my previous post: the phenomenon, if real, does not indict Democrats any more than Republicans. If Democrats diminish their electoral chances by supporting abortion, it follows that Republicans diminish their electoral chances by opposing it.

UPDATE: Alex Tabarrok points out that various factors may offset the alleged reduction in births due to abortion. First, the availability of abortion may just change the timing of births. Second, the abortion option probably increases the frequency of sex and decreases the use of birth control. Both factors would, again, tend to shrink the size of the "missing voter" effect. Alex suggests that, in theory, the effect could even go in the opposite direction.

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Tuesday, June 29, 2004

Sex Discrimination

Justice Breyer’s dissent in the COPA case cites, once again, the famous Miller test for whether expression is “obscene” and thus unprotected by the Constitution. Material is considered obscene if:

”(a) … ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest…;
(b) … the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) … the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
Isn’t it high time the Court finally dumped the Miller test altogether, instead of quibbling over the boundaries of its application? In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor nicely knocks down, or at least bends, prongs (a) and (b). She draws attention to the tyranny of applying local community standards to a global medium, and to the inevitable ambiguity of the term “offensive.” But what I’d most like to see ditched is (c), the notion that protected speech should have “literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” – as though literature, art, politics, and science were the only valuable aspects of human life. Why not sexual value? Is not sex one of the most significant, and most sought after, components of the good life, at least for a huge chunk of humanity? “Religious value” is also missing from the list; but fortunately, religion gets separate First Amendment billing, while sex does not.

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Turnabout Is Fair Play

David Sedaris cracks me up (registration required):

At the close of his reading to promote his latest book, the bestselling “Dress Your Family in Corduroy and Denim,” [David Sedaris] informed the sold-out crowd of 1,800 at UCLA’s Royce Hall that he would offer priority signing – for smokers.

A pack of cigarettes would usher the bearer to the front of the line, which, if it was anything like it’s been around the country, could be at least a four-to-five-hour wait. “You nonsmokers are going to live longer than us anyway,” he explained.

A wave of dubious chuckles rose from the crowd. The laughter gathered steam as Sedaris, installed behind an imposing podium, continued to lay down the rules: “And for those of you smokers who will think about giving your packs to the nonsmokers, I think you should ask yourself: ‘Would he let me smoke in his home?’ The answer is no.”
Heh.

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Monday, June 28, 2004

Brazen Plug for Firefly Movie

Firefly fans, you're in luck: Serenity: The Official Movie Website is now operational.

Full disclosure: The link there is a referral link, through another website, that will earn me points that I can use to get cool Firefly stuff. If you wish to deny me that, you can click through directly here. On the other hand, if you want to help me out, click on these links as well: FireFlyFans.net and http://forums.prospero.com/foxfirefly/start. (Ask me for an invitation to join the Browncoats -- that'll get me points, too.)

Seriously, Firefly was an amazing TV show that Fox treated shabbily and then canceled before it had a chance. Go buy or rent the DVD of the first (and only) season.

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Fetal Voters

First it turns out that legal abortion fights crime by reducing the number of future criminals.

Then it turns out that legal abortion reduces abortion (no, that’s not a typo) by reducing the number of future aborters.

And now it may turn out that legal abortion changes electoral outcomes by reducing the number of future Democrats.

This last is an article by a conservative (originally published in the American Spectator), so naturally the spin is that the Democrats are wrong on the abortion issue and paying for it at the ballot box. I don’t think the Democrats are wrong on abortion, but I think the numerical analysis makes a lot of sense (though I haven’t checked it carefully). If it seems like Democrats are making a strategic error by supporting abortion, notice that the very same argument shows a mirror-image error in Republican strategy. If the Republicans ever succeeded in banning abortion, they would be contributing to the ranks of the Democratic party.

UPDATE: Read my more careful analysis and partial recantation here.

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Oil Dependency

Regarding my post on the Volokh Conspiracy about oil dependency, a reader emailed me the following question:

I was confused by the following excerpt from your guest blog at www.volokh.com:

"Suppose that our goal is to deprive Saudi Arabia and other terrorist-breeding states of oil profits. The proposed policy would decrease the total profits of the oil industry (because of the lower price), but Middle Eastern countries would sell a larger share of it. Put simply, the Middle East would get a larger slice of a smaller pie, with an ambiguous overall effect on profits (at least based on theory alone - better information could possibly allow a more precise prediction). Remember that the next time someone tells you that driving an SUV helps fund the terrorists."

Ok, so I'm almost certainly wrong here given that you are an economist and I haven't taken an economics course in four years, but this doesn't make sense to me. I'm confused by your claim that the effects of decreased demand on Middle Eastern profits would be "ambiguous." If the price were to fall, wouldn't each individual producer be willing to produce less at that given price? Consequently wouldn't every individual producer in the Middle East be producing less at a lower price? Wouldn't this imply lower profits?
A good point, and I can see how my reader was confused. I believe I overstated my case. My essential point was this: that if the price of oil fell, the Middle Eastern producers would be responsible for a larger share of the remaining production, and they would get a larger share of the remaining profits. In that sense, we would be more “beholden” to them than we were before. That doesn’t mean, however, that their profits would actually be larger than before. It just means that the Middle Eastern producers’ profits would fall by less than would the profits of other oil producers.

The reader continues:
The first answer that pops into my mind is that your reasoning has something to do with the increased market power OPEC might have. I'm still a little confused about how this could work to increase profits given a lower oil price.
I was indeed thinking about the increased market power of OPEC. As other producers left the market, OPEC members would have a larger share of the market and thus a greater ability to affect prices. Now, if OPEC held prices too high, then the competing producers would re-enter the market, which means there would still be a natural limit to OPEC’s power. But it could take a long time for alternative producers to reemerge, and in the meantime OPEC could reap short-term profits. Also, knowing that OPEC could let the price drop back down to bankruptcy levels (for the higher-cost producers) as soon as enough of them returned to the market would be a disincentive for them to do so. Higher-cost producers are unlikely to incur the start-up costs unless they think high prices are likely to persist.

Thus, OPEC’s ability to manipulate prices would increase if demand fell, but that would not necessarily translate into reliably higher profits.

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Saturday, June 26, 2004

Back at You

So I've returned to Agoraphilia from my guest stint at the VC, but Neal has decided to move on with his own blog. I've posted a link in the right column, and also in the blog roll. It's really been great having Neal as a co-blogger. I'm glad I can say I played a key role in sucking him into the blogosphere - especially since Ellen says she and Neal used to snicker about my being dorky enough to have my own blog! Someday soon, Ellen, someday soon...

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Friday, June 25, 2004

Thanks, Glen

Thanks, Glen, for inviting (nay, encouraging) me to blog my linguistics-related thoughts at your place, and thanks, Agoraphilia readers, for your comments. I've had enough fun that I'm starting up a blog of my own: Literal-Minded ("linguistic commentary from a guy who takes things too literally"). Stop by sometime!

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Wednesday, June 23, 2004

We've Got to Ramble

Neal and I are guest-blogging at the Volokh Conspiracy for the next three days. I’ve composed a haiku in honor of the occasion:

Nomads of the word
Find homes in many places
But return in time.

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Tuesday, June 22, 2004

Bar Flight, Part 2

When I first discussed the Clear and Sapphire situation, I characterized it as a coordination game, i.e., a game in which the players wish to coordinate their choices. The sides-of-the-road game is the classic example of a coordination game: it doesn’t really matter which side of the road people drive on, so long as all drivers do the same thing. The model applies to bars because people generally want to go where other people go.

However, Ellen made an interesting comment in the comments box: “Reminds me of the star-bellied sneeches [sic] and the plain-bellied sneeches [sic].” Although there are some similarities, this is actually a quite different game. For those who don’t know Dr. Seuss’s parable of racism, the story goes like this: Some Sneetches had stars on their bellies, while other Sneetches did not. The plain-bellied Sneetches wanted to hang out with the star-bellied Sneetches, but the star-bellies excluded them. So the plain-bellies went through Sylvester McMonkey McBean’s Star-On Machine, which gave them stars. Upon discovering this, the star-bellied Sneetches had their stars removed using McBean’s Star-Off Machine. And then the once-plain-but-now-star-bellied Sneetches went through the Star-Off Machine, and then the once-star-but-now-plain-bellied Sneetches went through the Star-On Machine, ad infinitum.

This game is identical to other famous games of game theory, including Matching Pennies and One-Two-Three-Shoot. In all these games, there is one player who wants an outcome in which both players take the same action (the initially plain-bellied Sneetches wanted to blend in), while the other player wants an outcome in which the players take different actions (the initially star-bellied Sneetches didn’t care whether they had stars or not, as long as their bellies differed from those of the initially plain-bellied Sneetches). Unlike the sides-of-the-road game, in which there are two equilibria, in the Sneetches game there is no equilibrium unless the players randomize. Instead, you get a round-and-round chase effect like the one described by Seuss.

So how does all this apply to the bar situation? Suppose there are two kinds of bar customers, the “hip” and the “unhip.” The unhip want to hang with the hip, but the hip do not want to hang with the unhip. The analogy to the Sneetches is straightforward. The hip will colonize bars, thereby attracting the unhip, whose presence eventually drives away the hip, who then colonize another bar, where they are eventually followed by the unhip, ad infinitum.

So now we have two game theoretic representations of the bar situation. Which is correct? Both have plausible characteristics. One the one hand, it is certainly true that people tend to want to coordinate their bar choices, at least with the kind of people they like. On the other hand, it also clearly true that some people seek to avoid other kinds of people (without the other people necessarily feeling the same).

I suspect that a complex combination of both games is going on. Early in the game, a new bar is discovered (or rediscovered) by some fraction of the hip. A coordination game ensues, because hip people want to hang with other hip people. The bar acquires a reputation as a hipster hangout, which is good because it attracts even more hip people, but bad because word eventually gets out to the unhip, transforming the coordination game into a Sneetches game. Once enough unhip people start showing up, the desirability of the bar begins to wane, and some hip people eventually try a new place with fewer hip people but a better hip-to-unhip ratio. A new round of the coordination game follows.

This combined model provides a better explanation than the coordination game alone. The basic story is one of coordination – people want to congregate in the same place. But the Sneetches aspect of the game helps to explain the switching phenomenon I described in the earlier post. The arrival of an undesirable crowd creates instability in an equilibrium that would otherwise be hard to escape.

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Monday, June 21, 2004

Acronymic Acrimony

The college I work for used to be called the “College of Business Administration and Economics,” a.k.a. COBAE (pronounced "co-bay"). Close observers will notice that the acronym doesn’t quite match the words. Why should “of” get representation while “and” does not? I figured the acronym should be either “COBAAE” or “CBAE.” I attributed the use of “COBAE” to its greater ease of pronunciation.

But then the faculty voted a couple of years ago to shorten the college’s name to “College of Business and Economics.” Ah, I thought – finally the COBAE acronym will have become accurate. To my surprise, many people here now refer to the college as COBE. Having subtracted “Administration” from the full title, they subtracted an “A” from the acronym. I see the logic, but I still protest. I’m willing to give nouns privileged treatment (as in CBE) or not (as in COBAE), but I can’t abide the disparate treatment of conjunctions and prepositions. If “of” gets representation, so should “and,” since the new name has rendered the pronunciation issue moot.

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American Decadence and the Marginal Terrorist

The preliminary report of the 9/11 Commission included many disturbing revelations, but there was one detail I found heartening. The following is from the print version of an L.A. Times article from last Thursday (abbreviated version, without the portion below, available online with registration)

The report also revealed that some of the conspirators grew skittish about the plans in the final weeks and days of preparation and may have considered dropping out.

Among the possible defectors was Ziad Samir Jarrah, the suspected pilot of the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, whose frosted hair, taste for Beirut discos and beer drinking apparently caused friction with plot leader [Mohamed] Atta. [emphasis added]

The report indicates that Jarrah reconsidered withdrawing after “an emotional conversation” with [Ramzi] Binalshibh, who “encouraged Jarrah to see the plan through.”
Why is this heartening? Because it indicates that American-style decadence very nearly induced at least one terrorist to abandon his murderous plans. American culture does not always triumph, and it did not triumph here – but it is still, I contend, a force for good in the world. Contrary to the popular all-or-nothing model of the terrorist mind, according to which one is either a terrorist or not, what we see here is the marginal terrorist, who can potentially be turned from terror by the enjoyment of material pleasures. And material pleasures are what America does best.

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Saturday, June 19, 2004

Machine Machines and Number Numbers

I wonder what you’d call a machine whose function was to make automatic teller machines (ATMs). Would it be called an ATM machine? Well, no, of course not, since ATM machine means the same thing as plain old ATM: If you see a sign saying “ATM machine inside” when you enter a grocery store, you will find an ordinary ATM, and you won't find some other kind of machine that has something to do with ATMs.

This kind of redundancy also occurs with acronyms whose final N stands for number. The ones I can think of right now are PIN number, VIN number, and ISBN number. I also recently heard someone talk about an IM message, referring not to a message regarding an instant message, but to an ordinary instant message.

I’ve heard plenty of people (including myself) complain about this careless treatment of acronyms, including a character in the comic strip Jump Start, in the installment from December 17, 2002:

Son: There’s an ATM machine next to the escalators.
Mom: Really? An automated teller machine machine?
Son: Mom, you’re repeating yourself.
Mom: I am?
Son: You said the word “machine” twice.
Mom: You’re the one who called it an “ATM machine.” “Machine” is what the “M” stands for in the acronym “ATM.”
Son: Just enter your PIN number, willya?
Mom: Personal identification number number?
But we must go beyond mere complaining, and ask ourselves, “Why?” OK, OK, we linguists must go beyond mere complaining, etc., but anyway: Why is it that speakers tend to redundantly expand these acronyms? Why don’t we ever hear about AT machines, PI numbers, or I-messages? (Actually, I have heard about the last item, but only in anger-management contexts.) Right now, I don't know, so instead, I’ll ask “When?” When, exactly, are acronyms subject to this kind of expansion? The four data points so far have several things in common:


  1. Phonetic: They all end in a nasal consonant (M or N).
  2. Syntactic: They are all common nouns (not proper nouns, such as FBI).
  3. Semantic: The final letter stands for the “main” noun (which linguists refer to as the head noun). That is, an ATM is a kind of Machine; PINs, VINs, and ISBNs are kinds of Numbers; and an IM is a kind of Message.

So far, then, any combination of these facts could be the magic combination that correlates with a tendency to be redundantly expanded. Let’s check them one by one.

Phonetic: Are there redundantly expanded acronyms ending in letters other than M or N? The closest I can think of is scuba gear, which isn’t quite an example of what we’re looking for (it would be if people called it scuba apparatus). When Dad worked at a refinery, there was a device technically known as the Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit, or FCCU. Does anyone ever call this an FCCU unit? I don’t know; all I know is what Dad and his coworkers called it, which I won’t write here out of respect for the high standards of Glen’s blog. What about OR room, or ER room? I haven’t heard these, but I could imagine them being out there.

Syntactic: Are there redundantly expanded acronyms that are parts of speech other than common nouns? I can’t think of any. You’d better get here PDQ quick sounds pretty bad to me (i.e., even worse than ATM machine, etc.).

Semantic: Are there redundantly expanded acronyms whose head noun is abbreviated by a letter other than the last one? Has anyone ever heard someone talk about the OMB office, or the BLM bureau? For a better comparison, I should find similar acronyms that aren’t proper nouns, though. Let’s see … OK, how about ETA time? I’ve never heard it, but I suppose it could be out there.

My working hypothesis, then, is that redundant acronym expansion (RAE for short; “RAE expansion” for medium) happens only for acronyms that are nouns, and whose head noun is abbreviated by the final letter. I imagine there are further restrictions, too. Even better than being able to say “RAE occurs only under conditions X, Y, and Z,” would be to be able to say, “… and always under these conditions (for speakers who permit RAE).” I’m nowhere near that point, though. Submissions of acronyms that have undergone RAE are welcomed, as are submissions of acronyms that in your personal opinion could not undergo RAE.

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Tuesday, June 15, 2004

Bar Flight

There are two bars near my home in Studio City, CA, one called Clear and the other called Sapphire. They are located within one block of each other, and both aim at approximately the same demographic (single 20- to 30-somethings). When I first visited these bars, just over a year ago, Clear was the undoubted champ. On Friday and Saturday nights, people would line up and wait for an hour or more to get in; and even on weeknights, Clear could still get a respectable crowd. Sapphire, on the other hand, subsisted on Clear’s overflow – the people who got fed up with waiting at the door on weekends. On weeknights, Sapphire was almost deserted.

After frequenting Clear and (occasionally) Sapphire for two or three months, I went on a several-month hiatus. Now I’ve returned to the scene, and a transformation has taken place. Sapphire now dominates, with Clear picking up the scraps. On a weeknight, when Sapphire is about half-full, Clear is a ghost town. On weekends, Sapphire fills up first, with the overflow going to Clear. Sapphire does not usually have a line, though, so Clear’s overflow crowd can be substantial.

What happened? What we have here is a textbook case of network externalities. Network externalities exist when consumers’ satisfaction from a good or service increases with the number of other customers using it. In the case of bars and nightclubs, customers may care about ambience and service, but they care even more about meeting and mingling with other people – especially members of the opposite sex. As a result, customers choosing between two near-equivalent bars will tend to choose the one with the larger crowd, at least up to a point. The result is herding: one bar will attract large numbers, while the other remains largely empty. If people did not care about the actions of other customers, we would expect a more even distribution of customers across locations.

Network externalities set the stage for multiple equilibria. Just as left-side-driving and right-side-driving are both viable equilibria of the sides-of-the-road game, most-people-go-to-Clear and most-people-go-to-Sapphire are both viable equilibria of the choose-your-bar game. Which equilibrium actually occurs can result entirely from random factors (slightly more people happened to visit Clear early on, resulting in a snowball effect leading to Clear’s dominance), or it can result from historical factors (Clear might have opened a short while before Sapphire did).

But what explains the switch from Clear to Sapphire? I surmise that as Studio City became known as something of a Valley hotspot, more and more people found themselves having to wait too long to get into Clear. Eventually, Sapphire was getting enough overflow traffic that it reached the tipping point (another common feature of network externality situations). People realized that, at least on weekends, there would be enough people at both bars to make them worthwhile. Sapphire’s reputation as a place to meet-and-mingle caught up with Clear’s, and the expectations transferred over to the weekdays as well. For some relatively short period of time, people might even have randomized between the two locations, because either place could have had the better crowd on any given night. But that kind of equilibrium is unstable, just as randomizing over left-side-driving and right-side-driving is unstable. Very small differences in choices can tip the balance in favor of one of two extremes. In this case, a small handful of committed Sapphire patrons might have snowballed into the current Sapphire equilibrium.

UPDATE: Read my further analysis here.

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Monday, June 14, 2004

Supreme Court Punts on Pledge Case

Back in March, I observed that the “under God” crowd could only come out on top in the Pledge case by technical knock-out, by having the case vacated on grounds of standing. Well, they got their TKO.

Jacob Levy’s comments are on point: “On the standing question itself I have no view; I like to see stringent standing requirements, but think that they're pretty hard to make sense of in establishment clause cases, since by definition establishment that doesn't also impair free exercise doesn't commit any easily-cognizable harm against any easily-identified individual.” Exactly. In principle, does it really matter that Michael Newdow was not the custodial parent of a child in school? Is he not, like everyone else in our society, affected by the state’s decision to incorporate religious affirmations in the daily rituals of the public schools?

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