I’ve been a long-time proponent of allowing a market in baby-selling -- or more accurately, the sale of parental rights -- as an alternative to the current adoption system. Under the current system, mothers are allowed to give their parental rights away for free, but they are not allowed to sell them for any price above zero. Like any price ceiling, this prohibition creates a shortage: too many willing adoptive parents and too few available babies. Letting the price rise to a market-clearing level would increase the number of babies available, by inducing more women to carry babies to term instead of aborting them, and also by inducing some “marginal” parents (i.e., parents who are just barely willing to keep a baby instead of giving it up for adoption) to opt for paid adoption instead. The result would be more satisfied adoptive parents, better cared for children, and wealthier birth mothers. For the complete case in favor of baby-selling, read this excellent article by Don Boudreaux.
However, a potential problem with the free market in adoptions recently occurred to me. It’s not a bad enough problem to overcome the arguments in favor (for reasons I’ll explain below), but it does present an interesting question about the power of markets to overcome bargaining problems. The problem arises from the fact that both birth mothers and birth fathers have a legal right to prevent an adoption. That means any potential buyer would need to buy off both parents before the sale could be complete. This situation creates a potential hold-out problem, since each of them would like as large a share of the gains from trade as possible. Fathers who under the current system have no interest in their offspring might, in a market system, suddenly take an interest for the sake of getting a share of the proceeds.
If both parents bargained hard enough, we could easily imagine some potential sales getting thwarted by the excessive demands of the mother and father. But set that difficulty aside, and assume there is some automatic division of the proceeds (arrived at through private negotiations or perhaps by fiat). Say the father automatically gets X% of the baby’s price. The problem is that the pregnant mother choosing between an abortion and carrying the baby to term would face a positive externality: she would bear the full cost of carrying the baby to term, but would only get (1-X)% of the benefits. At the margin, this would deter some pregnant women from having the baby at all, even if doing so would be efficient. If the full benefit is B, and the cost is C, this occurs whenever B > C > (1-X)B. As a result, an inefficiently small number of babies would be born and brought to market.
Now, presumably there’s a Coasean solution to this problem, as with any externality problem. When the mother chooses not to carry the baby to term, the father also loses whatever share of the payment he might have received. Realizing this, the father could offer the mother some inducement, presumably a larger share of the baby’s price, to induce her to give birth after all. The size of the inducement would be a function of the difference between the costs (C) and the benefits (B); the larger the difference, the greater would be the necessary inducement. In the marginal case, when B is just barely larger than C, the father would have to offer the mother almost the entire price and accept a negligible payment for himself. The problem here, as with any Coasean solution, is that transaction costs may be too high. Reaching an agreement over the size of the necessary inducement could be a costly process, in some cases costly enough to overcome the net gains from the agreement itself. Thus, while bargaining between the mother and father could reduce the size of the problem, it could not eliminate it: the number of babies born and brought to market would still be inefficiently low.
I’m still cogitating about this issue, so there may be some market solution that I haven’t considered. In any case, even if this potential problem is real, it’s hard to imagine that the result would be worse than the status quo, where the price that a mother legally can be paid is held down to zero (or actually, to the amount needed to pay for medical expenses and the like). Even if the price paid to the mother on the free market were not as high as it would need to be to induce all desirable births, it would still be higher than the price in the current system.
Wednesday, December 03, 2003
It’s My Baby and I’ll Sell If I Want To
Friday, November 28, 2003
Cloning versus Adoption?
Brian Weatherson of Crooked Timber links to a paper by Stephen Coleman defending reproductive cloning against its critics. One such critic, David James, argues that adoption provides a viable alternative to all reproductive technologies (including cloning, fertility drugs, and in vitro fertilization). Coleman offers the following rebuttal:
The problem unique to adoption is that these cases involve an existing child, and in most cases, existing parents. In the words of Barbara Katz Rothman “For every pair of welcoming arms, there is a pair of empty arms. For every baby taken in, there is a baby given up”. The vast majority of mothers do not relinquish children for adoption because they want to, but rather because they are forced to through poverty. They are not unwilling to care for the child, they are simply unable. This is especially the case with international adoption. Virtually all the children adopted internationally come from economically or politically oppressed areas. Probably only the orphans from these areas can really be classed as “unwanted”. Even within the USA, one study found that 69% of parents giving children up for adoption cited external pressures, including financial constraints, as the primary reason for surrender. Given these problems, adoption hardly looks the glowing alternative to reproductive technology that James suggests.Much as I’m in favor of cloning, I fail to see how the above even begins to constitute an argument against adoption. In fact, I think it strengthens James’s case. While the decision to give up a child for adoption is undoubtedly a wrenching one for biological parents, the existence of willing adoptive parents does not make the biological parents worse off in any way. It merely provides them with one more option. Suppose there’s a poor woman who has just given birth to a baby, and someone with better finances offers to adopt it. Does that offer somehow make her poorer? Of course not. She can still choose to keep the baby, with all the hardship that would entail; the potential adopter has merely provided her with another route, which she is free to accept or reject. Her position is still unenviable (who wants to be poor?), but no worse – and arguably better – than it would be if adoption were ruled out.
And the same goes for anything that increases the size or quality of the pool of potential adoptive parents, and contrariwise for anything that diminishes the pool. So despite my support for cloning, I have to admit there’s something to the adoption argument. If the possibility of cloning substantially reduces the number of willing adoptive parents, both the children who could have been adopted and their biological parents may end up worse off.
It is true that the choice between keeping a baby and giving it up for adoption can cause a great deal of anxiety for the biological mother. Foreclosing the adoption route would eliminate any anxiety associated with making the choice. Instead of facing this agonizing decision, the mother would have no option but to keep the baby. But adoption will always be an option, whether or not reproductive technologies are available, so there’s no avoiding either the choice or the anxiety. And besides, I think it’s a good thing for a biological mother to ask herself, in all seriousness, whether she is ready to raise a child. Raising a child takes time, effort, and (yes) money; if biological parents don’t have all of these things to offer, then for the sake of the children they should at least consider adoption.
However, as James and Coleman both recognize, the adoption argument is hardly unique to cloning; it applies to any other technology that improves the ability of potential parents to have non-adoptive children. I’d be curious to know whether the advent of fertility drugs and in vitro fertilization substantially reduced the number of people seeking to adopt children. I strongly suspect that the effect of cloning would be smaller, given most people’s likely preference to have children genetically similar but not identical to themselves. (I personally would prefer a genetically related child to an adopted child, but I’d prefer an adopted child to a genetically identical child.) In any case, we would have to weigh the cost of fewer adoptions against the gain from better satisfying the preferences of parents who would prefer genetically identical to adopted children. If some people are so focused on genetics that they’d prefer clones of themselves to adopted children, they are hardly the ideal adoptive parents.
Tuesday, November 25, 2003
Dating for Game Theorists
This is the funniest damn thing I’ve seen in a long time. That guy in the cartoon could be me, if I didn’t shave and dressed like a slob. Link courtesy of Language Log (hey Neal, how come you didn’t tell me linguists used game theory, too?). For more on rational-choice mating-and-dating, see here and here and here.
Monday, November 24, 2003
The Anal Film Critic: Legally Blonde, Deaf, and Dumb
And as long as I’m giving belated film reviews, I might as well grouse about “Legally Blonde 2: Red, White, and Blonde,” which I saw on the airplane while returning from a conference. I had been avoiding this movie because I figured I would certainly be irritated by its politics. (I don’t generally dodge viewpoints I disagree with, but rarely do I seek them out as entertainment, unless I will get my own turn to speak.) Presented with the chance to see it for free, I figured I’d give it a chance.
The premise of the film is that Elle Woods, airhead and Harvard Law graduate, goes to Washington and tries to pass a law banning the testing of cosmetics on animals. She begins this quest after discovering that her pet Chihuahua’s mother is a test animal. (Question: Are dogs really used as test animals with any frequency? I thought they used rabbits, mice, rats, and chimps most often.) Now, what I expected to see in the movie was a strongly biased case against animal testing: lots of arguments about the alleged inefficacy of such testing, with virtually no representation of the other side. But what I saw was arguably worse. While the movie presents very little resembling an “argument” at all for either side, the handful of quasi-arguments presented are all on the pro-testing side. Several representatives and scientists make at least superficially persuasive statements in defense of testing, all of them left unaddressed by the test-banners. So what carried the day for the anti-testing side? Pure emotional appeal, based on the cute furriness of the subjects. Elle’s cute wittle doggie sticks its head out of a bag and barks, and all the congresscritters melt. (That’s the short version. If you’re a glutton for punishment, watch the whole thing for all the schmaltzy details.)
In short, we are not to judge the wisdom of an animal-testing ban on the basis of clearheaded discussion and scientific facts. Rational argument be damned -- it’s all about the warm fuzzies.
Saturday, November 22, 2003
Anarchy, State, and The Matrix
I saw the third installment of the Matrix during its opening weekend, and I’m going to depart from the conventional wisdom by recommending it. Before watching it, I rented and re-watched the second installment (“Matrix Reloaded”), rewinding as necessary to make sure I understood the confusing bits. Then I viewed “Matrix Revolutions” in the theater and thoroughly enjoyed it. The key is to regard the two movies as one continuous story. WARNING: There are spoilers in the remainder of this post, so don’t continue reading if you haven’t seen the movie yet (and intend to see it).
The original “Matrix” raised a number of interesting philosophical questions, most of which “Reloaded” seemed either to ignore or to confuse. But “Revolutions” brings the philosophical questions back to the fore. The most intriguing question, to me at least, is whether deliberately living in the Matrix can be a valid lifestyle choice. In the original movie, Cipher (Joe Pantoliano) decides that he actually prefers the Matrix to the ugly real world, and he makes a deal with the machines to let him re-enter the Matrix (with his memory suitably wiped, so he won’t realize his reality is only virtual). Readers of Robert Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” will recognize this as a variant of Nozick’s experience-machine thought experiment: would you choose to allow yourself to be hooked up to a machine that would create the mental experience of a blissfully fulfilling life? If your answer is “no” because you’d want to believe that your life and accomplishments were real, or some similar objection, then suitably modify the thought experiment to make that the case (“your memory of having made this choice will be wiped, and the machine will create the belief that you’re living in a real world and your accomplishments are your own”).
The purpose of the thought experiment is to demonstrate an alleged flaw in utilitarianism. If, as utilitarianism posits, happiness is the sole criterion for goodness, then you would indeed choose to get hooked to the experience machine. The fact that most people have an instinctive aversion to the idea of being on an experience machine (or living in the Matrix) is, supposedly, evidence of something wrong with utilitarianism. Any person who would choose to live in the Matrix, like Cipher, must have something wrong with him. Cipher’s deficient character is further evidenced by his willingness to sacrifice Morpheus, Neo, and the other members of the Nebuchadnezzar crew.
And that’s where the philosophy rests – until “Matrix Revolutions.” Between “Reloaded” and “Revolutions,” we discover that the Oracle (previously an unalloyed friend of the free humans) is in quasi-cahoots with the Architect who designed the Matrix. When the Architect discovered that he could not design a Matrix that 100% of all human beings would accept, the Oracle provided him with a means of dealing with the problem. In each generation, a fraction of humans who reject the reality of the Matrix are allowed to escape into the real world, where they join the other free humans in the city of Zion. At some point in the movie, either the Oracle or the Architect (can’t recall which) indicates that every human in the Matrix has, either consciously or subconsciously, chosen to accept the Matrix’s programming. Most people – upwards of 99% – are sheep who willingly accept the virtual reality. Those who reject it are allowed to leave, in the manner of Neo and Trinity. (Periodically, the free human population gets too large, and the machines come to destroy Zion. Carnage ensues, and only ends when the Messiah-like Neo arranges a truce, and the cycle begins once more. But that’s not crucial for the question I’m addressing here.) At the end of “Revolutions,” the Oracle makes sure that the Architect will continue to allow the program-rejecting humans to escape the Matrix.
In contrast to the narrow conception of free will in “The Matrix,” whereby people are only truly free if they live in the real world, we have a broader conception: everyone has the freedom to live in the real world or to stay in the Matrix. True, for the people inside the Matrix, it is a subconscious kind of free will – but they choose nonetheless. Indeed, the presence of choice is the Achilles’ heel of the Matrix, which the Oracle solves by instituting a right of exit.
And in this choosing between different ideas of the good life, we find another connection to the philosophy of Nozick, born of another of his thought experiments: the concept of “little utopias.” Nozick’s idea of the good society is a system in which people can choose what kind of communities they wish to live in, subject to no overarching rule but a right to vote with your feet. The “little utopias” vision finesses the seeming conflict between freedom and the desire of (at least many) people to submit to the controls of religions, creeds, cultures, and governments. In the Nozickian vision, you have the right and the freedom to choose which controls to subject yourself to. And that is, in key respects, the same vision presented at the end of the Matrix saga: you can choose which world to live in, the real world or the virtual. But the latter of those two worlds is one that Nozick himself surmised that most people would intuitively reject: living in the experience machine. And is that so wrong?
Wednesday, November 12, 2003
Markets and Sex Selection
Chris Bertram at Crooked Timber responds to a British agency’s recommendation that sex selection (i.e., parents deliberately using genetic screening or other devices to assure the sex of choice for their children) ought to be banned. Bertram’s reaction is dead-on:
The HFEA [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority] is arguing (and the Secretary of State is agreeing) that acts should be prohibited where a majority opposes them unless permitting those acts would have definite benefits for society at large. But this is to get the burden of proof completely the wrong way round. Whatever majorities think about some aspect of individual conduct, in a liberal society it has to be clearly demonstrable that an action would be harmful if prohibition is to be justified. No such justification has been produced.Exactly. Moreover, I’m curious as to what the alleged harms might be. Setting aside the mere desire to avoid “playing God” (whatever that means), I’m guessing the aversion to sex selection is driven by fear of the Chinese syndrome. In China, parents strongly favor male over female children, resulting in a high male-to-female ratio that has (supposedly) been the source of various social problems. But is there any basis for thinking a similar effect could occur in the U.K., or other industrialized Western nations? Setting aside the cultural differences, at least two other factors set China apart: First, the “one-child” policy makes parents choose between male and female children instead of having both. Second, much of China is still underdeveloped and rural, and in that context, children are typically valued primarily as farm hands.
In any case, I wonder if there could be a market solution to a hypothetical shortage of women, if one actually occurred. In market systems, when a valuable asset becomes scarce, its price (unless constrained) tends to rise, thereby attracting more supply to the market. Relatively abundant assets get lower prices. Now, the mating market differs in important ways from other markets, not the least of which is the apparent absence of prices. Still, there are other forms of compensation. If parents care at all about their children’s future welfare, they will consider their children’s likely mating prospects. If women are in short supply, prospective parents choosing the sex of their child will know that a male child has a greater chance of not getting a mate, and thus a greater chance of having a less than fulfilling life. A female child, on the hand, would have greater options and the ability to pick and choose among potential suitors. If the disparity were great enough, grown female children might even be able to command “reverse dowries” for the support of their families.
Arguably, there could be an externality problem that thwarts the market solution. Parents who choose to have a female child would create benefits for all potential future suitors. Of course, competition among males would tend to transfer such benefits to the female side of the market if females are in short supply. But if the female child had the right to choose her mate without demanding compensation for her parents, then the daughter could capture all the benefits created by her parents’ choice. For those benefits to be experienced by the parents, they must feel some satisfaction from their daughter’s happiness. Without such familial attachments, they lack a strong incentive to have female children, and thus the market solution doesn’t work as well. Still, I think my argument indicates a natural limit to the extent of sex selection, because eventually the higher returns to female children would induce sex selection in the opposite direction.
Tuesday, November 11, 2003
Backwards Induction and the Death Penalty
The logic-and-decision-theory puzzles that have been getting some attention in the blogosphere lately (from me, for example) reminded me of this story told to me by Jim Dow -- yes, the same Jim Dow who posts on this blog sometimes. But I’m sure he won’t mind my stealing his story (especially since he didn’t make it up anyhow).
An economist was sentenced to die within the next seven days. He was not told his day of execution, but he was informed by the King that whichever day it was, the economist would be surprised when it happened. Noting that the current day was Sunday, the economist thought to himself, “Well, I definitely can’t be executed next Sunday, because if I haven’t been executed by Saturday, I’ll know that Sunday is my execution day, and thus I won’t be surprised. And I can’t be executed on Saturday, either, because if I haven’t been executed by Friday, I’ll know that Saturday is my execution day (Sunday already having been eliminated), and thus I won’t be surprised.” Proceeding along these lines, he reasoned that he couldn’t be executed on Thursday, Wednesday, Tuesday, or Monday, either. He therefore concluded, happily, that he would not be executed at all.
On Monday morning, to his great surprise, he was executed.
Monday, November 10, 2003
Labors of Love
A couple of recent posts by Jane Galt and Amy Phillips got me thinking about the division of labor within the household. Jane and Amy both note that women still tend to do the lion’s share of housework, despite the fact that many of them have full-time careers, but both also – admirably – regard the problem as an interpersonal, not a social or political, one. Says Jane:
The fact is, the people doing most of the child care and housework in this country are women (even though, I must point out, many of them also work as many hours as their husbands). I don't want to argue about why this is, for there are enough couples in the country fighting about who does the housework; I see no net benefit from bringing more people into the argument by raising quarreling about chores to the level of a Pressing Social Problem.That is the right perspective, I think. But at the potential risk of my future mating life, I have to wonder: is there any reason to regard this as a problem at all?
The way I figure it, the division of cleaning duties in a household is essentially a bargaining game, akin to the division of a pie or (to take a particularly current example) the division of revenues between management and labor. One of the most robust conclusions of economic bargaining theory is that the division of duties, or shares of rewards, in such a situation is a function of the parties’ “threat points.” Put simply, your threat point is how well off you’d be if you didn’t bargain at all, thus preventing an agreement. The better is your threat point, the larger will be your share of the bargaining gains.
And in the case of household chores, there’s a darn good reason to think that men have a better threat point: men typically have a higher tolerance for filth. Amy puts it best: “[I]n my experience, women almost always notice when things are dirty and decide to clean them about a week before it occurs to the men in their lives that maybe something is dirty…” Exactly. When it comes to the cleanliness-leisure tradeoff, men apparently tend to place greater weight on leisure than women. We should therefore not be surprised to see a division of duties that places a larger share of cleaning duties on women, even if men and women have exactly equal bargaining power.
One could argue that men’s greater tolerance for filth actually gives them greater bargaining power. That would not be consistent with the terminology in the bargaining literature, but it is consistent with the vernacular. But it doesn’t vitiate my point. Men’s bargaining power, such as it is, comes not from legal privileges or monopoly power – it comes simply from their preferences. If men are willing to tolerate more filth, their net gains from an agreement equally dividing household duties would actually be smaller than women’s net gains from that agreement. The unequal division of duties that prevails in many households arguably represents an equal division of the net gains from household cleaning, given the lower marginal value of cleanliness to men.
All of the above is a relatively straightforward application of bargaining theory. The more difficult question, to which I don’t claim to know the answer, is the degree to which “linking” of seemingly distinct household bargaining games can change the results. To wit: can women effectively link chores to sex, by threatening to withhold sex when chores haven’t been done? If so, then the threat point may shift in a manner that (if popular stereotypes about tastes for sex are correct) disproportionately affects men, allowing women to shift a greater share of duties onto their partners. The difficult theoretical question here is whether the threatened linkage is credible, given that women, too, have been known to enjoy sex from time to time.
Saturday, November 08, 2003
Free Bazaar Economics
Democracy, schmemocracy. If we really wanted to do the Iraqi people a favor, we would do this. Read the whole thing.
Friday, November 07, 2003
Exploited by Subsidies
On Monday, the CSUN Economics Association and the CSUN Associated Students (i.e., student government association) had a public debate on the subject of the recent tuition increase. Up until recently, CSU students had paid about $1500 per semester in tuition, but recently the tuition was hiked to about $2000 in light of the state’s budget troubles. Naturally, this angered a lot of students, and only students from the Econ Association were willing to defend it.
My intention here is not to disparage any of the participants, because all of them did a credible job of defending their positions, especially once you handicap them for their lack of experience (only one student was a seasoned debater). But when it came to the substance of the debate, I could hardly listen to the AS students without wincing at their raw sense of entitlement. As far as they – and apparently many students in the audience – were concerned, they were owed an education by the state, regardless of the cost. Both AS speakers threw out the word “exploitation” repeatedly as a description of the fee increase.
The CSU system costs more than $6000 per student per year to run. And that’s considering only variable costs for the present year; if you include capital costs, the figure rises to as much as $10,000 per student per year. During the Q&A period, I pointed out that taxpayers were giving CSU students a big fat present of at least $6000 a year, and I asked the lead AS speaker to explain by what logic that made her “exploited.” Her response was essentially, “I don’t think of it that way. I think exploitation is out there, and I’m just getting what I deserve back from the system.” (I’m paraphrasing, but that was definitely the gist.) When I asked how low the price would have to be in order for her not to be exploited, she and her partner said that $0 sounded reasonable to them. Much of the audience appeared to agree.
This attitude of entitlement is, I think, one of the best arguments against state subsidization of higher education or anything else. Once people start receiving handouts from the state, they begin to think of the handout as their property. If public university students were actually grateful for the gifts they receive, I would feel happier about the system. But if the attitudes expressed at Monday’s debate are any sign, they are not grateful – they are indignant that the gifts are not even more munificent. It was enough to make me shudder.
But I’ll give the AS students this much: at least they realize the state is spending money on them. Many students apparently do not. One department chair in the business school told me that many students try to justify dropping their classes by saying, “I paid for the class, why can’t I drop it?” The problem, of course, is that they didn’t pay for it; the taxpayers did. When students register for classes and drop them later, they waste resources and deprive other students of the opportunities they could have provided. And for every student who registers and then tries to drop, there are three others (a conservative estimate) who register but make no effort to gain anything from the course. They just show up (sometimes) and expect to get a grade, typically an A or B, whether or not they actually learn anything. And therein lies the problem: people often fail to appreciate what they don’t have to pay for.
(For more on the cost of higher education to taxpayers, read this op-ed by Neal McCluskey of Cato.)
Wednesday, November 05, 2003
The Devil in the Details
Chris Bertram of Crooked Timber poses the following little gem of a thought problem:
You are in hell and facing an eternity of torment, but the devil offers you a way out, which you can take once and only once at any time from now on. Today, if you ask him to, the devil will toss a fair coin once and if it comes up heads you are free (but if tails then you face eternal torment with no possibility of reprieve). You don’t have to play today, though, because tomorrow the devil will make the deal slightly more favourable to you (and you know this): he’ll toss the coin twice but just one head will free you. The day after, the offer will improve further: 3 tosses with just one head needed. And so on (4 tosses, 5 tosses, ….1000 tosses …) for the rest of time if needed. So, given that the devil will give you better odds on every day after this one, but that you want to escape from hell some time, when should accept his offer?I briefly thought this problem was going to be a paradox with no answer. But then I proved to myself that there is, in fact, a definite answer, so long as one discounts the future relative to the present, as human beings generally do. (More on that below.)
Suppose that d is your one-day discount rate, which tells you how much you value utility tomorrow relative to utility today. E.g., if d = 0.95, then tomorrow’s happiness is worth 95% of today’s happiness, from today’s perspective. Then if the following condition holds, you should take the bet on day N rather than waiting one more day:
(0.5)^N < (1 – d)/(1 – 0.5d)(Here's the proof, if you really want it.) For instance, if d = .95, then the right-hand side of the condition is 0.095. On day 1, the left-hand side is 0.5, which is greater than 0.095, so you wait. On day 2, the left-hand side is 0.25, which is greater than 0.095, so you still wait. On day 3, the left-hand side is 0.125, so you still wait. But on day 4, the left-hand side is 0.0625, which is less than 0.095. Therefore, you should take the bet on the fourth day.
The more you value the future, the longer you should wait. If d = 0.99, then you should wait until day 6. If d = 0.999, you should wait until day 9. If d = 0.9999, you should wait until day 13.
Tyler Cowen, admitting he hasn’t gone through the math, guesses that you’d wait a very, very long (possibly infinite) time. But as you can see from the above, even if your valuation of the future is extremely close (0.9999) to your valuation of the present, you’d still take the bet within a couple of weeks. One of the commenters on Chris Bertram’s original post says, “The rational answer to this question is obviously that it depends on your discount factor, your relative utility for being in hell or not, and the extent to which you trust the devil.” But it turns out that your relative utility for being in hell or not – i.e., the disutility of torment – actually doesn’t matter. (I was surprised by this; the parameter representing how bad hell is canceled out of my calculations.)
There is a way to squeeze a paradox into the problem. If you do not discount the future at all relative to the present, then the condition above never holds, meaning you’d stay in hell forever. This outcome is mentioned by a couple of Chris’s commenters, and one notes that this is allegedly a paradox of rational choice: “The punch line was that if you were completely rational in the economic sense of the term – maximizing your expected utility – you’d spend forever in hell.” But it seems to me that this is not really a paradox brought on by rational choice, but by the general weirdness of infinity. In the calculations that produce the condition above, you have to divide by (1 – d) at some point, which means dividing by zero if you don’t discount the future. So you can’t really use the condition above. When you look at the original comparisons that led to the condition, it turns out that you get infinite terms on both sides, meaning that you’re indifferent between taking the bet and waiting at any point in time. This happens because no matter what you do, there’s a chance you’ll be in hell forever, and that’s an infinite amount of suffering. The probabilities don’t matter, because anything times infinity is still infinity. In any case, the correct conclusion is not that the rational non-discounter must remain in hell forever, but that he’s indifferent between doing so and taking the bet.
Tuesday, November 04, 2003
Swimming with Sharks
This is truly a tragic story:
The water was clear and there was no indication of danger when a 13-year-old surfing star went out on the waves with her best friend and her friend's father.Gruesome. But take heart: if they find that shark, I'll bet they sue the hell out of it.
But while Bethany Hamilton was lying on her board off Kauai's North Shore, a shark bit once and then disappeared, taking off her left arm just below the shoulder.
Monday, November 03, 2003
Explain This to Me
A hectic schedule and blogger’s block joined forces to make me neglect Agoraphilia for most of the last week. But a number of things have yanked my chain in the last couple of days, so the block has vanished.
For now, I’ll limit myself to a minor TV-related complaint. I understand the value of broadcasting movies in the widescreen format. The usual pan-and-scan format cuts off the edges of the picture, and I would rather tolerate the black strips on the top and bottom of the TV screen in order to see everything I would have seen in the theater.
But can anyone explain to me why some TV shows are broadcast in widescreen format? “Angel” is regularly filmed in widescreen, and some other shows like “ER” run special episodes in widescreen. They even advertise this like it’s a benefit, as though the viewer is getting something extra. But in fact, the viewer is getting less. These shows are not originally filmed for the big screen. The directors could choose to film them in a way that fills the whole TV screen. Instead, they give us big black strips without any compensating gain. What a gyp!
Monday, October 27, 2003
Smoke Signals
I was supposed to have office hours from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. this afternoon. But by around 4:00 p.m., my office had started to smell like a backyard barbecue. No kidding – my eyes were actually starting to smart. I decided to cancel office hours and get out of dodge. About a half hour later, the university president canceled evening classes. (I don’t think that the university buildings are actually threatened by the fires, but the smoky air just isn’t healthy for breathing.)
Thursday, October 23, 2003
Levy Me Alone List
A reader pointed me to this article on the Do Not Call list by Bob Levy of the Cato Institute, suggesting that it might change my mind on the subject. Cato is noble organization, of course, and it has many fine people on its staff, Levy among them. But I think his logic in the article is strained, as has been the logic of other libertarian DNC-opponents.
Just to be clear about my own position: (1) I think the DNC list is consistent with libertarian principles, but not required by them. Other mechanisms, including some private ones, might be superior. (2) I also think that a federal DNC list is acceptable under federalist principles, because interstate commerce is clearly involved. The Constitution’s commerce clause has been much abused, but I don’t think the DNC is such an abuse. (3) I think that if we have a DNC list, it should not exempt political and charitable callers. There should either be one list with all types of telemarketers, or more than one list so the phone-owner can choose. That said, I think some protection is better than no protection, so even the list-with-a-loophole would be acceptable.
And now for a friendly fisking of Levy’s article. I say friendly because, again, I respect Levy and usually agree with him. (Note: this is not a complete fisking, because I am leaving out some passages of the article.)
But constitutional rights cannot be overridden by temporal majorities – not 51 percent of the people or even 91 percent of the people. And the court has the final word when it comes to the Constitution. A federal judge in Denver already has held that no-call prohibitions on telemarketers – with exemptions for calls that are arguably more intrusive, like those from charities, polling organizations, and (you guessed it) politicians – violate the First Amendment. Speech may not be suppressed based on its content, said the judge.So the judge’s decision was based on the differential treatment of two different types of call. That means, presumably, that a no-loophole DNC list would fit the bill. Thus, it’s overreaching to say that a DNC list is in principle a violation of constitutional freedom of speech as interpreted by the courts. Yet that is the clear implication of the article: that the DNC list should be scrapped, not amended to close the loophole.
But stepping away from current constitutional interpretation, let’s take this from the libertarian standpoint. Speech rights are ultimately property rights; you don’t have a right to give a speech on my front lawn if I don’t want you to. Telemarketers don’t have a right to ring your telephone if you’ve given them advance warning not to. Seen from this standpoint, allowing political and charitable callers to continue calling you over your clear objections means allowing them to violate your rights. In other words, the discriminatory DNC protects you against some property violations, while allowing others to continue. It’s pretty bizarre to hear a libertarian arguing that the ability of some people to violate your rights justifies allowing others to violate your rights as well!
[T]he Court's distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech has never been coherent. When someone advertises a political book, promotes a paid political event, or markets merchandise in support of a political cause, the commercial and political implications are inextricably entwined. It's time for an overhaul of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. Our Constitution protects Klan speech, flag burning, even "gangsta" rap. Surely the right of companies to provide information about their products is no less worth protecting.On this point, Levy and I agree. But just as Klansmen don’t have a right to ring your doorbell repeatedly after you’ve told them to get off your property, telemarketers don’t have a right to ring your phone repeatedly after you’ve told them to stop.
No-call may be a great idea – but only if the arrangements are controlled by private contract and not by government regulation. A phone customer does not own the lines coming into his home, so he may not restrict their use.This would be a plausible argument if the phone company had required me to agree, in my terms of service, to allow calls from telemarketers. But I have signed no such agreement, nor did the phone company ask me to. Similarly, my landlord didn’t include a term in my apartment lease forbidding me from putting a “no soliciting” sign on my door. In both cases, I am the renter of someone else’s asset (apartment or phone lines), and so long as my rental agreement doesn’t say otherwise, I can decide how the asset will be used.
Besides, I don’t need the phone lines to make my argument. To make a completed call into my home, telemarketers need to use both the phone lines and my phone. I own my phone, and therefore I can say who can access it.
Once a call enters his house, the customer has a remedy: Hang up. That's not much different than radio or TV. If you don't want to see a commercial, turn off the TV or switch channels. Your ownership of the television doesn't give you the right to prevent advertisers from broadcasting into your living room. Similarly, your ownership of a phone doesn't mean you can suppress usage of incoming lines. If you would rather eat dinner uninterrupted, just turn off the ringer. You can even use caller ID or record your messages and return them selectively.My radio and TV don’t turn on at random intervals, sometimes early in the morning when I’m trying to sleep, and then stay on until I turn them off again. By the time you can hang-up on a telemarketer, the damage has already been done: you’ve been disturbed. Now, it’s true that I can turn off my phone’s ringer, but doing so blocks all calls, including (say) an emergency call from a friend or relative who’s in the hospital or having car trouble.
The analogy between turning off your TV and turning off your phone is false. A broadcaster’s transmissions don’t “activate” my TV in the same manner that a telemarketer’s calls “activate” my phone. By turning off my TV or changing the channel, I can keep out specific programs at specific times from specific sources; by turning off my ringer, I keep out all calls, wanted or unwanted, mundane or emergency.
The analogy between EMS transmissions and phone lines is also false, because (as noted earlier), even if the phone company owns the phone lines, the phone company has effectively given me renter’s rights over them. I do not, on the other hand, have any ownership claim over frequency bands on the EMS. And again, even if my phone line argument fails, I still have ownership over my phone.
The lines coming into a home are either owned by a private carrier (like Cox or Comcast or Time Warner) or by a common carrier (like BellSouth, Verizon, Quest or SBC). If the lines are owned by a private carrier, the user's contract will control whether and how calls are screened. Almost all private carriers have call-blocking technology. Naturally, carriers would be liable for breach of contract.See comments above on phone lines. Yes, I could contract with my phone company to block calls, just as I could contract with my landlord to hire security guards to keep out burglars. That doesn’t mean that I can’t also call the cops if someone burgles my apartment.
But if the lines are owned by a common carrier, then government dictates the rules. Indeed, government has placed limits on the ability of common carriers to police their own networks, which must be available to serve all comers. Longer term, the solution is to get rid of the common carrier model and substitute private carriers so the market, rather than government, regulates access.I agree with Levy on this point. But even under such a regime, if my contract with my carrier did not specify otherwise, I could still employ public means of protecting my property rights.
Proponents of no-call point to the Supreme Court's 1970 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department decision. The Court upheld the constitutionality of a scheme whereby each mail recipient could direct advertisers to exclude the recipient from unwanted mailings. But the Post Office is different. First, it's a monopoly and, therefore, affords no opportunity for competitive privacy models.The Post Office’s monopoly status does make a stronger case, but it’s not necessary for the argument. The existence of a competitive rental housing market doesn’t refute my argument above about calling the cops to catch burglars.
Second, mailboxes can't be turned off the way that phone ringers, radios, and televisions can. Without mail blocking, senders can trespass on recipients' property.Well, you could refuse to sort your mail and just dump it all into the garbage, but that would mean losing your desired mail as well. Similarly, if you turn off your ringer, you keep out the unwanted calls only by keeping out the wanted calls.
Third, the Post Office scheme allows recipients to choose which particular senders to exclude. Neither Congress nor a government agency categorizes senders in a manner that requires blanket exclusion or blanket access.The DNC list does not give “blanket access” to callers if you don’t put your name on the list. The DNC list merely give you the option of blanket exclusion. If you choose not to use the list, you can still instruct specific telemarketers to remove you from their lists. (And they are required by law to do so – does Levy oppose that law as well?)
Wednesday, October 22, 2003
Rear Viewpoints
If you read the Volokh Conspiracy, you know they've been having a mini-debate on bumper stickers, Jesus fish, and Darwin fish. Click here for the latest. But for once, I can say I got there before the VC; see my previous posts here and here.
Tuesday, October 21, 2003
Cream Mixing (or, The Fable of the B's, C's, and D's)
Alex expands on the point I made below, that public schools also “cream skim” by creating Honors tracks and magnet schools. Among other things, Alex notes:
More generally, the argument in the peer-effects literature is that we shouldn't let smart kids escape the public school system because their presence gives dumb kids a positive externality. I detest this argument. Children are not pawns to be moved about to satisfy the desires of some grand master. A decent school system treats children as ends in themselves.Characterizing the benefit of smart kids to dumb kids as a “positive externality” raises an interesting point. Let’s suppose it’s true that the presence of smart kids really does improve the educational performance of the dumb kids. The primary lesson of the Coase Theorem is that externalities can often be internalized through market transactions. Thus, to use one famous example, the fact that honey bees provide positive externalities to apple orchards (by pollinating apple blossoms) does not mean there will necessarily be an inefficiently low level of beekeeping. Why not? Because the owners of apple orchards can pay the beekeepers to release bees in their orchards. And indeed, this is exactly what happens, according to a 1973 article (“The Fable of the Bees”) by Steven Cheung.
What is the analogous arrangement in schooling? Scholarships, of course. Lower-ranked colleges regularly make sweet offers to good students to lure them away from higher-ranked schools, because such students are likely to raise the school’s prestige and make larger contributions as alumni. The non-scholarship students benefit from both effects. If it’s really the case that smart students create positive “peer effects” externalities, there’s every reason to believe that private schools in a voucher system would find ways to achieve the optimal mix. And they would do so without treating the best students as merely means to an end, because they would have to reward such students for their beneficial choices.
Saturday, October 18, 2003
Evaluating School Choice
A recent study of Chile’s school choice program, which purports to show no significant improvement in student performance under the program, has touched off another round of Alex and Tyler’s mini-debate on educational vouchers (see here, here, here, and here). Like Alex, I continue to think that vouchers are a good idea. One study of one foreign country’s school choice program – in the context of other studies showing better results elsewhere – is not sufficient to make me a pessimist.
But what if it turned out that school choice programs (to clarify, vouchers are just one mechanism for implementing school choice) were not really effective in improving student test scores and other measures of performance? Would that necessarily mean school choice is a bad idea? I think not, for three reasons.
First, even if school choice delivered no improvement in performance, it might deliver the same level of performance at lower cost. I only skimmed the report on Chile, but I found no reference at all to the cost of education.
Second, there are reasons to favor school choice other than cost and performance, one of which is the value of choice in itself. Standardized performance measures cannot capture the value to students and their families of being able to get the kind of education they want. As I argued in one of the first posts on this blog, school choice has the potential to defuse a number of policy conflicts that result from the one-size-fits-all character of public education: bilingual education vs. immersion, prayer vs. no prayer, single-sex vs. coeducation, and so on. Even if all private schools performed equally on measures of basic skills, they could be producing greater value as perceived by the actual consumers.
Third, we should be skeptical about performance as measured by average or median scores on standardized tests, repetition rates, and drop-out rates (as in the Chilean study). Measures like these are unlikely to capture changes in the performance of the very best students. Median scores are completely unaffected by improvements in the performance of students at the top end of the scale. Average scores are affected, but possibly not much, because standardized tests typically cover basic skills that the very best students are likely to understand well anyway. (Taking calculus in high school was valuable to me, but it probably had little effect on my standardized test scores, because calculus is not a topic covered on those tests.) Repeat and drop-out rates have little to do with the best students, who are inclined to finish high school on time whether there’s choice or not. Yet the top students could be among the greatest beneficiaries of school choice, because they can attend schools that specialize in providing upper-level courses in the areas in which students are most motivated.
As a corollary to this point, we should also be skeptical of the claim that the “cream-skimming” apparently practiced by private schools in Chile (according to the study) is necessarily a bad thing. There are virtues to separating students according to their ability, and some of those virtues will not be picked up in the standard measures. (The cream-skimming in Chile seems to be related to socioeconomic status, but the authors themselves used socioeconomic status as a proxy for ability, and they do not try to separate the effects.) Public school systems often have Honors tracks and magnet schools, and while these programs have their critics, I have never heard them referred to as “cream-skimming.” The fact that the ability-level tracking might occur across schools, rather than within them, under a school choice program is hardly a compelling argument against school choice.
Thursday, October 16, 2003
Tragedies
On the front page of today's L.A. Times, the lead headline was "3 Americans Die in Bomb Attack in Gaza." Next to it was a large picture of a woman crying. I assumed she must be a relative of one of the dead, until I saw...
... she was wearing a "Cubs" cap.
Lawyer Humor
Here's a nice legal-linguistic one-liner, via my brother:
Did you hear the one about the jurisprudence fetishist who got off on a technicality?
The Schmo Must Go On
In the context of popular culture, I’ve heard post-modernism defined (or characterized) as the quality of being relentlessly self-referential. If that’s so, then I can think of no better example of post-modern television than “Joe Schmo,” Spike TV’s reality-show spoof.
The premise, in case you haven’t heard, is that a regular guy named Matt Gould has been led to believe that he is participating in a reality show called “Lap of Luxury,” in which nine contestants living in a luxurious house vote each out one-by-one, “Survivor”-style, to win a prize of $100,000. But in reality (heh), all the other contestants are actually actors; Matt is the only person on the set who isn’t in on the joke.
Here’s the key question: Is this reality TV or not? On the one hand, the whole point is that it’s a scam, not reality: everyone’s an actor, everything’s been planned, just one guy is the patsy. But the patsy’s actions can’t be scripted, and his presence creates an unavoidable element of unpredictability. For Matt, this clearly is a reality show, and that will continue to be true even once the truth is revealed. Moreover, while the other “participants” have scripts to follow, they also have to ad-lib and roll with the punches in response to Matt’s choices. They are constantly on the spot, responding to the unexpected, sometimes trying to cover up their own laughter. In one physical challenge, some actor/participants were unable to complete the challenge as required to assure that the planned person “won” immunity in the next vote. The other actor/participants had to alter their behavior (such as by faking errors) to keep the scheduled plot on track.
And here’s where things get truly self-referential. This is a reality show about a reality show. We are not just observing Matt’s trials and witnessing Matt’s commentaries; we also get to hear the commentaries of the actors, producers, and crew about the difficulty of maintaining the charade. In some segments, we see split-screens, one showing Matt’s activities “on camera,” two others showing actor/participants laughing into their fists, and another showing the crew members in the control room watching those very events on camera. We see them gasp and bite their nails when it looks like Matt might catch on to the scam. This is not just reality TV -- it is reality TV caught in a hall of mirrors. M. C. Escher might have been impressed.
Consider this. The show is intended to ridicule the extremes of other reality shows, yet the extreme moments are engaging for precisely the same reasons as those they lampoon. The contestants participate in a series of (rigged) contests, and each one is a ludicrous over-the-top version of similar contests in other programs. On “Survivor” and “Fear Factor,” contestants are asked to eat an endless variety of revolting plants and animals. On “Joe Schmo,” Matt is asked to eat… a steaming dog turd. In another contest, contestants jump into a swimming pool to create splashes large enough to wet down the T-shirts of models, thereby revealing the messages (and blurred-out nipples) underneath. A contest like this is, ostensibly, a spoof of the voyeurism of other reality shows (e.g., strip trivia contests on “Dog Eat Dog”). And sure, there is commentary here, but there’s also bare skin. It’s no mistake that “Schmo” is broadcast on Spike TV, “the first network for men.”
After this much discussion, you might get the impression I think “Schmo” is good television. Well, it’s not. But in a way, that’s the whole point. “Schmo” succeeds by taking what is bad in other reality programs and making it worse. If you find the show’s silliness or vulgarity enjoyable on its own, great; if you don’t, the producers can claim they are mocking the silliness and vulgarity of reality TV. And in so doing, they also mock themselves.
Yep, I’ll be tuning in next week for the season finale.
Friday, October 10, 2003
SAT Scores: The Mystery Continues
(See previous posts here and here.)
Dad tells me that one of his colleagues (who is about his age) distinctly remembers having gotten SAT scores that did not end in zero. This raises again the possibility that, at some point in its history, the scoring of the SAT changed; prior to that time, it was possible to get a score that was not a multiple of ten. But I still have not found any confirmation of this hypothesis. I sent an email to College Board (administrator of the SAT) asking whether there had ever been a scoring change of this nature, but they haven’t gotten back to me. Until further notice, I withdraw the claim that people who remember getting SAT scores not ending in zero are either lying or forgetful. If anyone out there knows the truth on this matter, or has further evidence, please let me know!
UPDATE: Mystery solved! Check the comments section for the story, which Andrew managed to find on the College Board site even though I couldn't.
Wednesday, October 08, 2003
Recall Debrief
“May you live in interesting times,” the old saying goes, and indeed we do. I can’t say my vote today [by the time this post goes up, yesterday] was decisive – it never is – but I can at least say it was the most entertaining vote I ever cast.
Just a couple of quick observations in re the recall vote. First, on the news the newscasters were comparing the percentage of voters who said “no” on the recall vote to the percentage who voted “Schwarzenegger” on the replacement vote, in order to see whether Arnold had “received a mandate.” If you understand the recall process, this is clearly nonsense because the numbers could overlap. It’s entirely possible that some people voted to keep Davis and to make Arnold his replacement if Davis were kicked out. It would therefore be incorrect to conclude that all of the 51% [most recent number I’ve seen] who pushed the “Arnold” button actually favored Arnold over Davis.
Second, MSNBC’s use of the exit polls is a tad misleading. In order to make it sound like even liberals and Democrats preferred Arnold, they observe that “More than two-thirds described themselves as moderate or liberal, but they still passed over the moderate Democratic lieutenant governor.” And later, they state that “even though 69 percent of voters described themselves as moderate or liberal, the voters of California told two quintessential moderate-liberal Democrats — Davis and Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante — to take a hike.” But hold on a minute – how many of that “more than two-thirds” were moderates, and how many were liberals? Moderates, after all, can be lumped with either conservatives or liberals, depending on how you want to spin the data. On CNN.com, you can find the full break-down: 32% of the voters called themselves “very liberal” or “somewhat liberal,” 37% called themselves “moderate,” and the remaining 31% called themselves “very conservative” or “somewhat conservative.” So MSNBC could just as easily have noted that more than two-thirds of the voters described themselves as moderate or conservative. (It is true, however, that liberals were less inclined to oppose the recall than conservatives were to favor it: 74% of liberals voted no, while 89% of conservatives voted yes. Also, 57% of moderates voted yes.)
Sunday, October 05, 2003
The Glass Half Full
Tyler Cowen praises a book by Alan MacFarlane and Gerry Martin, which documents the importance of glass in the development of human science and technology. I have little doubt that glass is as supremely important as the authors suggest. But, not having read the book, I wonder whether the authors pay sufficient attention to the question of alternative history: what other discoveries might have been made in the absence of glass?
It’s common for people to make grand statements about the role of railroads in the growth of the American economy – that they drastically lowered the cost of transporting agricultural and industrial goods, that they made possible the settling of the American West, that they transformed managerial techniques, and so on. Much of this is true. But as economic historian Robert Fogel observed, the American economy without railroads would not have sat still, or just continued in its old tracks. Fogel figured that, without railroads, people would have built many more canals (and made more use of wagons as well). He used topographical maps to surmised where canals would have been built in an America without railroads. He eventually concluded that the American economy would have done almost as well with railroads as without them.
Other economists have disputed Fogel’s analysis, and there is much to dispute. But his basic analytical framework is clearly correct: you have to ask how people would have applied their motivation and ingenuity in a world without the technology in question. Maybe the would have come up with new technologies, or extended the use of old ones. Again, I haven’t read MacFarlane and Martin’s book. Tyler says the authors are “properly subtle and qualify their thesis in the required ways.” Maybe this is what he means.
Friday, October 03, 2003
Don't Call of Cthulhu
The Don’t Call debate has reared its ugly head once again. The latest manifestation is a brouhaha about freedom of speech (rather than regulation of commerce). The argument here is better, I think, and that’s probably why a couple of federal judges have bought it. The essence of the challenge is that the DNC list improperly discriminates against commercial speech. As Jacob Sullum notes, the DNC list prevents the purveyors of most products and services from calling those who ask not to be called, but leaves a gaping loophole for equally annoying calls from charitable solicitors, political groups, and pollsters.
I find the free-speech argument intriguing but ultimately unpersuasive. The libertarian understanding of free speech rights is that they are just another species of property right. No one has a right to give a speech on your front lawn if you don’t want to listen; no one has a right to publish an op-ed in your newsletter if you don’t want to publish it. But oddly, Sullum (a libertarian) musters a straight-up free speech argument: “Once you think of telemarketing as a form of speech that people are free to accept or reject—in contrast with, say, an assault or a burglary—you have to wonder whether the government has any business trying to stop it in the first place.” But why should we think of it that way? If telemarketing is unlike assault and burglary, it is very much like trespassing or breaking and entering. If I’ve told you in advance that I don’t want you on my property, and you do it anyway, that’s a violation of my property rights. The same goes for making my phone ring if I’ve told you not to call me. (And that’s true even if I have decided to allow other people to call me, just as I can allow some people into my dining room while barring others.)
The better speech-based argument against the DNC list is that it unfairly discriminates between commercial and non-commercial speech. Most libertarians (myself included) think the commercial speech doctrine – which gives commercial communication second-class First Amendment status – is wrong-headed. But if you take the libertarian speech-rights-as-property-rights position, then it’s apparent that the DNC list would be perfectly fine if you could prevent both commercial and non-commercial soliciting. In either case, the government would just be helping you to enforce your property rights. By leaving a loophole for non-commercial speech, the government essentially said, “We’ll help you protect yourself against undesired commercial intrusions into your home, but you’ll have to defend yourself against undesired non-commercial intrusions.”
Why should the government make that distinction? Well, it shouldn’t. But I’d rather have some protection than no protection at all. When commercial telemarketers claim their free speech rights are being violated, they are effectively saying, “Hey, other people get to trespass – we should be able to trespass, too!” That argument doesn’t fly, because they had no fundamental right to trespass in the first place.
P.S. Apologies to H. P. Lovecraft fans for not weaving Cthulhu references throughout the post.
SAT Scores, cont.
In case you missed it: my Dad posted a reply to my post about the SAT in the comments box. In his words, "Since its inception, SAT scores have always been multiples of 10. Therefore, anybody who says that he made something like 1206 or 1355 is either lying or has a faulty memory." People in the lying-or-forgetful category include GWB, Al Gore, Ben Stein, and Bill Bradley. Since my Dad is in the same generation as GWB and Al Gore, I'm trusting his accuracy on the matter of whether it was possible at the time to get a non-multiple-of-10 score.
In a related matter, Dad notes that SAT scoring did change in 1995, but not in a way that affected the multiples-of-10 issue. The "recentering" of 1995 was designed to "correct" for the gradual decline in SAT scores that began in the 1960s. The result is that pre-1995 and post-1995 scores are not strictly comparable; the post-1995 scores are (at least for the upper end of the range) higher. For more details, read Dad's comment.
One last complaint. Am I the only one who's tired of people referring to the "SATs," plural? My understanding is that the SAT is conceived as one test with multiple parts, not multiple tests.
Thursday, October 02, 2003
Blind Man's Bluff
If you dig casual game theory, read Andrew Chamberlain’s game theoretic analysis of opening and closing your window blinds. I couldn’t help but add another layer of complexity in a couple of messages in his comments box. One additional comment: wonder why Andrew didn’t identify his dilemma as an example of the classic game of “Chicken"? (Thanks to Julian for the pointer.)
Wednesday, October 01, 2003
And Yet More Rational Curmudgeonry
Here is yet another theory about why people tend to become resistant to change as they age (go here for my first theory, and here for Jim’s). This one relies on the desire of rational people to conserve their limited mental space and time. If one has only a finite amount of mental resources to spend in thinking about stuff, it’s rational to allocate less time to those subjects on which new information or discussion is unlikely to generate change.
Consider, for example, my attitude about communism. I have been told once or twice that I am “closed-minded” about communism (and certain other subjects) because I’m resistant to having debates on the matter -- I reject the viability of communism out of hand. But when I was a freshman in college, I had many long discussions with communists and their leftist allies. I considered communism, and rejected it. I considered it again, and rejected it. I considered it a dozen more times, and rejected it. After a sufficient number of iterations, I began to doubt I would hear any argument that I hadn’t already found wanting. It’s difficult to imagine, at this point in my life, that any new debate on communism will bring me any great new insights. While I admit there’s some non-zero probability of a new argument or piece of evidence that changes my mind, the probability is small, and thus the expected return from my mental investment is tiny relative to the expected return from a debate on (say) intellectual property, a subject on which I remain ambivalent. I have only so much time and mental energy to expend thinking about such questions; why would I waste time on one where the effort expended is unlikely to make a difference? If that makes me closed-minded, then I contend that I am rationally closed-minded.
If other people are like me in this regard, then people will tend to become more set in their views as time passes. For most of us, there are diminishing returns to added investment in any given subject area. (An exception is the academic whose initial investments in thinking and learning about a particular subject allow him to create a “gravy train” of publications with extensions and applications of his ideas.) If we’re talking about politics and economics, the effect should be especially pronounced among people who (unlike me) find such topics incredibly boring. When the psychic benefits of thinking about something are small, the mind rationally closes on that subject after a smaller amount of mental effort, thereby leaving more time for thinking about sports, women, beer, and so on.
More Rational Curmudgeonry
As Glen mentions below, it does seem that people become less flexible as they get older. One reason might be Bayesian updating. An alternate reason is that often skills are specific to a certain task or way of doing things, and each new skill is costly to acquire. Most people have made a substantial investment learning to do things one way. If a better way comes along, it may be optimal to stick with the old not-quite-as-good way and not pay the cost of learning something new. A young person faces the same cost (learning to do it) either way, and so might as well pick the new way.
Magnifying this effect is that the benefits of learning something new are lower the older you get. There is less time to get a payoff from new knowledge. Why learn the latest computer software for your job when retirement is three years away?
This is one reason that intellectual revolutions are often led by the young. Older scholars have skills invested in the established paradigm which gives them an advantage as long as that paradigm is dominant. They understand it better and are better at applying it. Furthermore, they would have to learn a new way of thinking about things, and why learn the latest theory when retirement is three years away?
Tuesday, September 30, 2003
Department of Duh
Turns out that aging really does cause cancer. Just in case you hadn't guessed that already. Apparently it has something to do with an increase in genetic instability that occurs as one approaches middle age.
Monday, September 29, 2003
SAT Scores
This Time.com feature shows the self-reported test scores of several famous people. Now, my SAT score was a multiple of 10, and so was everybody else's SAT score I can remember seeing or hearing. But several of the celebrities in the feature, including both George W. Bush and Al Gore, report numbers that are not multiples of ten (1206 and 1355 for George and Al, respectively). Any idea what's going on here? Is it just a coincidence that I've only seen scores that are multiples of 10? Did they change the scoring system at some point in time, so that people who took the test before a certain date could get scores that were not multiples of 10? Or should we conclude that these folks have faulty memories?
BTW, make sure you check out J.Lo's score. Very funny.
The Rational Curmudgeon
Why do people become more set in their ways (or more conservative, in the non-political sense of the term) as they get older? I think the popular explanation is the “rusty brain” theory: people’s minds just start to get crusty and hard to move as time passes, like rusty machines in need of oil. They resist change because friction in the gears impedes free thinking and hence the acceptance of new ideas. Perceived this way, resistance to change is a form of irrationality that derives from inefficient mental processes.
Naturally, I have an alternative theory. Resistance to change is the outcome of rational information processing. Think of people as Bayesian updaters: they have prior beliefs about the world -- essentially probability estimates -- which they update on the basis of a stream of new information they receive from their environment. They engage in hypothesis testing, and whether any given hypothesis is accepted or rejected depends on the data set. A young person has a small data set, because he has had few experiences and less time to observe the world. Consequently, the marginal impact of any new observation is larger. An older person, on the other hand, has a large data set, and therefore the marginal impact of one additional data point is likely very small. (If I’ve only had nine experiences of a particular kind so far, one new event constitutes 10% of my experiences of that kind, and the effect on my beliefs could be quite dramatic. If I’ve had 99 experiences of a particular kind, one new event constitutes a mere 1% of my experiences of that kind, so radical shifts are unlikely.) It follows that rational people will tend to become more obstinate in their beliefs over time.
Of course, I’m leaving out many potential sources of irrationality here. For example, it is entirely possible -- likely, even -- that one’s current beliefs shape both the collection and interpretation of new observations. The result is a path-dependent process in which new observations systematically tend to reinforce the conclusions that resulted from old observations. I’m not saying this doesn’t occur; I’m merely pointing out that irrationality is not necessary to explain the resistance of the older people to change.
I have another, complementary theory of the same phenomenon, but I’ll wait until later to post it. Jim also has a theory that he described at lunch today -- something about human capital -- so maybe this post will prod him to post his ideas as well. (When I invited Mike and Jim to join the blog, we agreed not to put each other on the spot like this, but this time Jim gave me permission to do so.)
Friday, September 26, 2003
False Political Advertising
I saw an advertisement last night, funded (I believe) by Gray Davis’s anti-recall campaign. The primary message of the ad was that the recall would hurt California’s economy, cost too much money, and so on -- and that, therefore, voters should vote against recalling Davis. The ad showed lots of newspaper clippings with headlines about the recall’s terrible toll on the state of California.
The ad’s reasoning is disingenuous, of course. Although I don’t have those newspaper clippings in front of me, I’m willing to bet they related to the economic costs of having the recall election at all, not the costs of removing Davis from office. And since the recall election is happening whether you like it or not, those costs are sunk. We will suffer them regardless, and therefore they are utterly irrelevant to the question of how one should vote in the recall election.
Thursday, September 25, 2003
Conservatives Guilty of Being Good Debaters?
Chris Bertram at Crooked Timber observes that conservative arguments against [fill in the blank here] very often fall into three categories, to wit:
Bertram also observes that conservatives take these positions and “advance[e] them simultaneously or switch[] promiscuously among them.”It isn’t true.orIt may be true, but it doesn’t matter.orIt’s true, and it matters, but doing something about it would (a) have the perverse effect of making that thing worse, or (b) make something else worse. etc etc.
In other words, Bertram convicts conservatives of being good debaters. In my old high school debating days, we were taught that it was wise to attack all aspects of an opponents’ case if possible, casting doubt on both the significance of a problem and the viability of the solution proposed. And there’s nothing contradictory about doing so, as long as you’re sufficiently careful about how you present the arguments. You can consistently argue that phenomenon X is not widespread, that even if widespread it should not be regarded as a problem, and that even if it’s a widespread problem the policy in question would either increase its incidence or create offsetting disadvantages. (The “even if” form of argument, in my experience, was among the most powerful approaches in winning debates, because it emphasized that the listener could disagree on one or more points and still agree with you on the central proposition.) Also, it’s worth noting that all three forms of argument can be used to advance changes in policy as well as defend the status quo. They are deployed by people of all ideological stripes.
Take the case of drug legalization. The legalizer can, and I would argue should, advance all of these propositions: (a) that the harms of drugs have been grossly exaggerated by the prohibitionists, (b) that those harms of drugs that are self-regarding ought not be the subject of social control, (c.i) that prohibition exacerbates many of the problems associated with drug use, such as drug poisoning and overdoses, and (c.ii) that prohibition empowers a violent criminal class that creates real threats to the non-drug-using population. Far from being contradictory, these positions bolster each other.
Conservatives do, of course, offer many fallacious forms of argument; argumentum ad naturam (the appeal to nature) leaps to mind. Liberals do, too; ad misericordiam (the appeal to pity) is pretty common. Interestingly, Bertram’s position verges on the latter: he implies that conservatives deploy the sound argumentative strategies above as a means of dismissing “the plight of the poorest and most vulnerable people in our societies.” Aren’t there enough fallacious arguments out there to condemn, without also condemning arguments that are perfectly reasonable?
No Longer No Comment
BlogSpeak seemed like a pretty good comments service, but then it turned out that it prevented Netscape 4.0 from reading the blog page. I don't know how many people use Netscape 4.0, but I'm thinking it must be a lot, because my hits-per-day dropped almost to zero for a couple of days at least. Maybe it was just a problem with the counter, since I've been using BlogSpeak for over a week. But rather than play detective, I just decided to find a new comments service, HaloScan. The template is pretty stripped down, but at least I'll have comments again. Again, my apologies to anyone who thought my comments area would be an excellent place to save their literary endeavors.
Wednesday, September 24, 2003
Comments Down
Comments will be down until further notice. For some reason, Netscape can't access this page because of some kind of error in the comments script.
Tuesday, September 23, 2003
Innumeracy in the Recall Election
A recent Schwarzenegger campaign commercial charges that Gray Davis “Increased Car Tax 300%.” The L.A. Times’s “Ad Watch,” which evaluates the validity of statements made in campaign ads, deemed the figure (if not the blame) accurate: “The car tax was in fact tripled, though Davis maintains the increase was required by a law passed under former Gov. Pete Wilson…” But if the tax was indeed tripled, then Schwarzenegger’s figure is flat wrong: a tripling of the tax constitutes a 200% increase, not a 300% increase.
In Defense of Gouging
C. C. Kraemer defends the practice of “price gouging” during times of crisis (like hurricane Isabel), and he gets it exactly right, so I’m rather surprised by Tyler Cowen’s more skeptical take. Kraemer’s basic point is that higher prices induce suppliers to bring more of the scarce good – generators, batteries, flashlights, etc. – to market. Tyler responds by pointing out that, in the short run, the supply is fixed – but then he immediately offers the obvious counterpoint, which is that “in the long run the economy will stand readier with emergency flashlights.” Exactly so, and this seems to me a decisive argument. In order to stock generators and such, shop owners have to take up valuable shelf space that could have been used for other items. The added profit they can reap during times of crisis is the financial reward that compensates them for making sacrifices during ordinary periods. A policy that clamps down on “gouging” during a crisis makes it less likely that necessary items will be available during the next crisis. Also, as Kraemer notes, the higher prices attract suppliers in non-crisis regions to transport their goods to the region where they’re needed most.
There is another economic argument in defense of raising prices during a crisis. Even if the higher price does not attract greater supply to the market, a higher price for the fixed quantity assures that the goods are allocated to their highest-valued uses. When the price is kept low, the first consumer to walk in the door is more inclined to buy a large quantity when a small quantity would do. Perhaps he’ll buy bottled water not just for drinking during the hurricane, but for watering his indoor plants. As a result, the next consumer finds himself unable to buy water for drinking, even though he’s willing to pay much more than the fixed price.
One more defense of price hikes during crises is that it encourages people to think ahead. If you live in a hurricane-prone region, it makes sense to have a stock of fresh water and batteries on hand instead of rushing to the store and fighting the crowds at the last minute. When I lived in Washington, D.C., I made a point of buying umbrellas when it was not raining. To the extent that people think ahead like this, the magnitude of price hikes during crises is dampened because the demand is lower.
So why does Tyler oppose such a policy on “libertarian freedom grounds” alone, when strong economic grounds exist as well? His point seems to be that gouging creates resentment, and “not wanting to be gouged is a preference too.” Of course, the desire not to be gouged may be no different from the standard desire to pay a lower price, in which case the argument carries no weight. But the resentment may also play the added role of punishing gougers by depriving them of future sales (of the same goods and other goods they sell) in non-crisis periods. This, Tyler suggests, is a desirable norm because it keeps the gouging in check: “our current norms help keep our suppliers in line and limit their ability to defraud us.” While there is truth to this point, it does not follow that a law is needed to reinforce the norm. The resentment does the job on its own, by forcing suppliers to take into account the lost trust and good will resulting from steep price hikes, while not putting them in the legal straightjacket of never raising prices during a crisis.
It is true, as Tyler says, that we can critically evaluate whether stronger or weaker fairness norms would be desirable. The more competitive are the markets in question, the less important such fairness norms should be. Why? Because when there is competition among suppliers of emergency provisions, a supplier who raises his price more than is necessary to compensate for stocking costs will lose out to other suppliers – either immediately or during the next crisis. In more monopolistic situations, by which I mean situations where both actual and potential competition is weak, a stronger norm might be necessary. (This may be the point of the Mankiw/Akerlof paper Tyler cites, which I can’t seem to access.) But the broader point is that, given the strong economic defenses of price hikes during crises, it seems wiser to rely on flexible private norms over inflexible anti-gouging laws.
Monday, September 22, 2003
What Consistency Consists Of
A few months ago, Julian and Will both observed that Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous quotation, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds,” has been the victim of a gross misinterpretation. Emerson was not defending the holding of contradictory views at the same time; rather, he was defending the virtue of being willing to change one’s mind, rather than forcing one’s present views to be consistent with what one said in the past. As Julian notes, self-contradiction is hardly a virtue: “The notion that there's something wrong with consistency within one's own views at a given time—the idea, in other words, that you should just arbitrarily apply a principle in some cases but not in others, is pretty bizarre, and I can't think of anything to recommend it.”
It occurs to me, however, that while consistency-within-time is the greater virtue in philosophical matters, consistency-over-time is often the greater virtue in law and public policy. One of the fundamental principles of the rule of law is that individuals should be able to predict how the law will apply to their specific cases, both in the present and the future. The ability of people to predict the rules gives them a greater capacity to plan their lives, form commitments, make investments, and coordinate their behavior with others. Of course, this doesn’t mean the rules can never change; indeed, it is desirable for people to know that the law will sometimes change in ways that take account of new circumstances. But in general, there is value to having a degree of constancy in the rules to facilitate individual planning.
As my one-time dissertation advisor (and now coauthor) Mario Rizzo has pointed out, there is a difference between logical consistency and praxeological consistency. (He drew this distinction partially from Mises, but I don’t think Mises was especially clear on the subject.) Policies that are praxeologically consistent are those that people can rely on for purposes of choosing their behavior; it can also mean policies that minimize interpersonal conflict and allow people to coordinate their actions. Policies that are logically inconsistent might nonetheless be praxeologically consistent. For instance, the doctrines of tort law might be justified on normative grounds that are foreign to property or contract law. And yet as long as the resulting rules are sufficiently clear and predictable, they can provide the basis for intelligent planning by individuals. Changing one of the rules might make the two branches of law more consistent with each other, but less consistent with what has gone before – possibly botching people’s plans in the process.
Take, for example, the recent trend in tort law toward holding people liable for the self-regarding choices of others – e.g., the possibility of holding McDonald’s liable for the obesity of its customers. Obviously, the underlying principle here is that individuals cannot be held totally responsible for their own actions. Fortunately, this notion has not yet taken firm hold – the McDonald’s suit hasn’t succeeded yet (though it still might, and there are plenty of other examples in tort law of people getting compensated for harms brought on by their own poor judgment). But let’s suppose that it eventually does take hold. We might still be spared a horrendous legal outcome by the fact that contract law has been somewhat more resistant to anti-responsibility norms. A contract like this one pointed out by Amy, in which restaurant customers sign a waiver before consuming a sinful dessert, would still be upheld in court. As a result, the law would be logically inconsistent but praxeologically consistent: customers and restaurants could still make their transactions with a reasonable ability to predict the outcome. But then suppose that contract law were forced to become consistent with tort law. Restaurant owners might suddenly find themselves liable for numerous activities (like serving desserts to waiver-signing customers) that they had thought would be just fine. If they had known how the law would change, perhaps they and their customers would have behaved differently. Worse, the change in the contract law could create a plethora of unintended consequences in other endeavors where waivers are involved: bungee-jumping, medical procedures, and so on. For a time, at least, turmoil would reign.
On the other hand, plenty of policy examples demonstrate the importance of consistency-within-time relative to consistency-over-time. The S&L debacle is a nice example of a case in which it would have been better to adopt any consistent policy (either FSLIC plus extensive investment regulation, or no FSLIC and minimal investment regulation) instead of the inconsistent policy we did choose (which allowed S&L’s to keep over-risky investment portfolios and stick the taxpayer with the tab when their investments turned south). Moral hazard is just one possible result of inconsistent policies existing simultaneously.
My question, then, is whether there is some principle for choosing between consistency-over-time and consistency-within-time. Is there a weighing process? Or should one always outweigh the other whenever they conflict?
Friday, September 19, 2003
Youth Creep
I am often mistaken for younger than my actual age (31), and naturally I’m flattered. But I don’t get a swollen head about it, because I have a theory that most people “look younger than their age.”
How is this possible? Well, presumably people’s assessments of what any given age looks like are based on their previous observations of people who were that age. My idea of “what a 50-year-old looks like” is based on all the 50-year-olds I’ve met. But of course, the people I’ve met who were 50 then are all older than 50 now. This wouldn’t matter if standards of health and nutrition remained the same over time. But in fact, health and nutrition continue to improve year by year, which means that people who are 50 now probably look better than people who were 50 a decade ago looked at that time. The current 50-year-olds have had greater access to new means of preserving youth. Thus, my age assessments are biased downward systematically, unless I make a special effort to take into account improvements in preservation technology.
As evidence for my proposition, I could rely on the fact that it’s so rare to hear about someone overestimating another person’s age. But that phenomenon could result from people’s desire not to hurt each other’s feelings. So to test my hypothesis, we would need to conduct a study in which people were asked to guess ages of people in photographs or on video. The first test would check to see if the difference between age guesses and actual ages is negative and statistically significant. The second test would look to see if older people, whose observations of people stretch back further into the past, are more inclined to underestimate someone’s age than younger people.
Tuesday, September 16, 2003
Heap Big Smoke
“Someone is either a smoker or a non-smoker, there's no in-between. The trick is to find out which one you are and be that.”I always liked that line, but I thought the answer was supposed to be philosophical or psychological -- you know, discovering your true preferences and embracing them or something. But it turns out the answer might be genetic. A recent Israeli study purports to show that smokers with low levels of a particular enzyme are 5 to 10 times more likely to get lung cancer than smokers with high levels of the enzyme. If the study’s results are confirmed, you may eventually be able to take a blood test to find out whether you’re a born smoker or not. (But before you smokers get too excited, you should know that even the smokers with high levels of the enzyme were much more likely to get lung cancer than non-smokers. And then there are all those other health conditions, like emphysema.)
- Robin Williams in “Dead Again”
Monday, September 15, 2003
Anecdotes and Antidotes
Radley linked my defense of him versus Al Giordano, saying (among other things) that “empirical evidence is always preferable to anecdotes.” Giordano responds in the comments box, saying (also among other things) that “[Radley] based [his] claim exclusively on polling data (which, after all, is no more or less than the science of collecting anecdotal information from many people at once).”
At this juncture, I think it would be useful to consider the meaning of “anecdotal.” The definition is “Based on casual observations or indications rather than rigorous or scientific analysis.” The very nature of an anecdote is that it is a particular instance observed in an idiosyncratic fashion. When you start collecting a large number of anecdotes in a systematic fashion, they cease to be anecdotes and become a data set.
Now, it’s true (as Giordano emphasizes) that polls and surveys can be very misleading. So perhaps something is wrong with the surveys Radley cites, which indicate that poor people in the developing world actually like globalization. Maybe the wording of the questions was biased. Maybe the sampling method didn’t generate representative samples of the populations. But it seems awfully strange to dismiss the results of such surveys, which at least attempt to be scientific, on the basis of a handful of observations with no consistent sampling method. Even if we accepted Giordano’s strange notion that a poll is nothing more than a collection of anecdotes, does it make sense to reject the clear results of a large sample of anecdotes (38,000, in fact) in favor of the unclear results of a smaller sample of anecdotes generated largely via undocumented collection methods?
Friday, September 12, 2003
Ch-ch-ch-changes
And while I was dealing with the comments problem below, I went ahead and updated the site a bit. As you can see, author names and post-dates now appear below the post titles; this is possible now because Blogger is allowing all users access to the Titles feature (previously available only to BloggerPro subscribers). I also expanded the blogroll and changed the site's subtitle. Finally, I added the little proviso at right, letting anyone who sends us email know that their messages are subject to publication unless they request otherwise.
Out with the SquawkBox, in with the BlogSpeak
So my comments provider, SquawkBox, suddenly decided to charge money for my account. My original terms of service specified a 12-month introductory period during which no payment would be required, and I only signed on last April. But it seems they changed the terms of service about a month ago, with no notice except a single message on a support forum – which I’d never bothered to visit because I hadn’t had any problems. Now they require you to pay for the service if you have a high volume of comments; “high volume” appears to be anything more than a few comments a day.
“Ah well,” I said to myself, “the service is (or was) free, so I guess they can run it how they want.” I thought I might even grit my teeth and actually pay for the service, since I hadn’t had any prior problems. But first, I wanted to (a) make sure there wasn’t any mistake, and (b) find out if I could capture all the old comments, in case I wanted to switch comment services now or in future. Well, SquawkBox doesn’t have a single email address listed on its website; the only way you can ask questions or make complaints is by using one of their forums. And you can’t use their forums unless you’re a current customer in good standing – i.e., all paid up.
In short, I can’t get my comments back unless I cough up the money to keep my account active. Well, to hell with that. I don’t want to pay money to an organization that won’t let me get a parachute out. I’ve decided to shoot the hostage – well, abandon him anyway – by not buying access to all the old comments. (My apologies to any readers who had composed and saved their dissertations in my comments box.) I’m now running my comments via BlogSpeak, which turns out to have a simpler and more flexible system anyway.