Thursday, September 11, 2003

Academic Blogs and Infotainment

Tyler Cowen, in an interesting interview, argues that academic blogs are the wave of the future. Top academics will aim for a few prestigious publications and then present the rest of their ideas through blogs and other channels. I’m a bit skeptical since blog topics seem pretty limited to me. Cases, anecdotes and cute stories work well, which is why law and the cute-story part of economics (e.g. why there is such a big markup in movie popcorn) make up most of the blogs I read.

I think it works less well for other issues, such as those that make up most of economics. To give an example, Tyler Cowen presented his “Macroeconomics in Five Easy Lessons”. In his discussion of Fed policy he says (without any explanation)

“Don't worry about the discount rate, when the Fed lends to banks, that is secondary and I will ignore it.
In a response to the “first lesson”, Daniel Davies replies to that sentence by saying,
It isn’t secondary at all, particularly if you’re operating on a standard of “what the stock market cares about”. I explained at length a while ago how the control of the overnight money rate can be used to exercise a significant degree of control of the entire yield curve
For that exchange to be meaningful the reader should be able to answer the following questions: Why is anyone worrying about the discount rate in the first place? Why is Cowan right that you can ignore it? And what two things is Davies confusing?

Here is the answer.
The Federal Reserve can affect the amount of reserves in the economy through purchases of bonds (a process called open market operations) or by lending reserves directly to banks. The part of the Fed that makes loans is called the discount window, and the rate it lends at is the discount rate. In the past, the Fed has worked to control the quantity of reserves and short-term interest rates by regulating the amount borrowed at the discount window, which is why the discount rate was important in the past. It no longer does this. There is still some borrowing at the window, but it is mostly for technical reasons, seasonal loans to banks in agricultural areas, and very-short-term (mostly overnight) loans to banks that have temporary difficulties in meeting their reserve requirement. So, the reason you don’t need to know about the discount rate is that changes in Fed policy have made it irrelevant for bigger questions of monetary policy.

What matters for policy are open market operations. These influence the interest rate charged by banks to other banks on overnight loans, which is called the Fed Funds rate (this is the “overnight money rate” referred to by Davies). As he argues, the overnight rate is important; however, it is a separate thing from the discount rate.
My point is not that the discount rate is an important subject (although both people brought it up one way or the other) but rather that it is not entertaining, and this distorts the coverage. Because it is not entertaining, Cowen isn’t going to provide an explanation, and no one but economists with formal training will know what is really being talked about. Which is why I doubt that blogs will develop into an alternate location for serious discussions about most parts of economics. What works well on blogs is just too narrow.

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Wednesday, September 10, 2003

The Argument Clinic

Micah Ghertner does a nice job of defending Radley Balko against Al Giordano’s scurrilous attack. Essentially, Giordano plays the “silly libertarians must be ignorant, naive, stupid, or evil to believe what they believe” card. Ghertner correctly identifies this as the ad hominem non-argument that it is.

There is one aspect of Giordano’s post that Ghertner doesn’t give the battering it deserves, however, so allow me to take it on. Giordano repeatedly cites Radley’s lack of personal, hands-on experience as a reason to doubt his positions. On the issue of globalization, Giordano notes that Radley has apparently never “learned any of the languages these mythical ‘poor people’ speak” or “done his own heavy lifting in his research [on globalization].” On the issue of prison rape, Giordana urges Radley to “Spend some real time in jail - as an inmate - and then come back and talk to us about prison rape.”

These arguments (if you can call them that) are individual species of a broader genus known as “if you haven’t been there you just can’t understand.” Other members of this genus include “until you can get pregnant, you don’t get to express an opinion about abortion” and “if you haven’t ever worked for the minimum wage, then how can you advocate eliminating it?” The implied claim behind all these positions is that the only valid knowledge is that which is gained through direct personal experience.

I wonder if those who take positions like these would affirm similar statements about non-favored groups, such as “unless you earn over $100 grand per year, you don’t get to support high marginal tax rates,” or “unless you live in a country that is going to get punished by the Kyoto Protocol, you have no business supporting it”?

I encountered a version of this argument a few weeks ago, when I was discussing globalization (yeah, it’s a popular topic) with an intelligent -- and very left-wing -- couple I met at a book reception. After I’d made several economic arguments in defense of globalization (to which I didn’t think they had responded very well, though some observers may have disagreed), they played their “we’ve traveled in the third world, have you?” card. Well, no, I had to admit -- I don’t make enough money to afford vacations in places I’d like to visit, to say nothing of hellholes. What, I wondered, did they think I would see in such places that would change my mind? The clear implication of their statement was that, upon seeing such terrible privation and squalor, I’d reject capitalism. But first, I don’t support globalization because I think life in Pakistan and Indonesia is hunky-dory; on the contrary, I support globalization because I think life there is pretty horrible. And second, their economies are very far from being capitalist, so it would be pretty weird for me to blame their terrible conditions on an economic system other than the one they have.

I suppose they might respond that the poverty of third-world nations is attributable not to their collectivist and totalitarian domestic economic systems, but to the international capitalist system. Okay, fine -- I think that’s wrong, but let’s suppose it’s true. That only strengthens my point, which is that something other than direct personal experience counts as relevant knowledge. If both of us can look at the same squalid conditions, and you can blame them on capitalism while I can blame them on collectivism, then isn’t it apparent that further study, of both a theoretical and empirical character, is required? Yet that is just the kind of evidence the anti-globo crowd is usually disinclined to consider, unless, of course, it’s just raw data (e.g., “The richest fifth of the world’s people consumes 86% of all goods and services while the poorest fifth consumes just 1.3%”) that really proves nothing on its own. Facts do not speak for themselves; they require interpretation.

Ultimately, the “if you haven’t been there” arguments constitute intellectually suspect appeals to emotion. They invite you to make decisions on complex policy issues on the basis of your gut reactions to images of the sad and pathetic, instead of careful analysis. Worse, the argument is deployed in conversation and debate with the clear purpose of dismissing analysis and discrediting the speaker who offers it.

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Return of the Firefly

Good news for Joss Whedon fans: "Firefly," Whedon's underrated TV space western that was canceled last year after less than half a season, will be turned into a feature-length film. Plus, all episodes of the show (including three unaired episodes) will be released on DVD this December.

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Man Sends Himself by Airmail

Read the whole ridiculous story here. This guy would have been an excellent candidate for the Darwin Awards, if only he had died (which he easily could have). My favorite part: "The freight cost — billed to McKinley’s employer — was $550. At that rate, 'he could have flown first-class,' Phillips said."

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Monday, September 08, 2003

Do Not Swap List

Julian takes the RIAA to task for a rather silly argument they’ve mustered in favor of a file-swapping crackdown: that the software used to swap music files is also used for swapping kiddie porn. Radley suggests that Julian is being inconsistent, because he has defended the constitutionality and libertarian-compatibility of the national Do Not Call list: “Why is the DNC list a legitimate use of federal power via the Commerce Clause, but federal laws against fileswapping aren't?”

Radley misunderstands Julian’s argument on the file-swapping issue. He notes, correctly, that many of the same points Julian mustered in defense of the DNC list apply here: (1) there is some form of theft involved [assuming you buy the notion of intellectual property], (2) the theft is being perpetrated by means of public utilities, (3) it’s occurring across state lines, and (4) state laws are insufficient to deal with the problem. And these points would be sufficient to show that a file-swapping crackdown would be constitutional and [again, if you buy the notion of intellectual property] libertarian-consistent if done correctly. But that’s not what Julian was trying to prove. He was simply drawing attention to a thoroughly unbelievable statistic implying that 42% of downloadable porn images were kiddie porn. It turns out this statistic was found by seeing how many of the files had titles or descriptions with certain words like “underage” in them, which in no way indicates that the images actually involve children.

As a constitutional matter, the federal government clearly has the power to deal with file-swapping in some manner, because Article I Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Commerce clause need not even be invoked here. The constitutional basis for file-swapping legislation is even better than that for the DNC list.

With respect to libertarian-ness, there are those libertarians who think the IP rights are illegitimate grants of monopoly power, but Julian and I am not among them. I think that IP rights, while differing from traditional property rights in many respects, share with traditional property rights the same consequentialist justification: they deal with a positive externality problem that would exist in their absence. I therefore regard IP as just an unusual species of property. Julian, I happen to know, thinks IP rights should not be regarded as true property, but are justifiable nonetheless. Both of us are skeptical about the rent-seeking efforts of organizations like the RIAA to strengthen the enforcement of IP rights whatever the cost, to extend copyright periods indefinitely, and so on.

Aside from constitutionality and libertarianism, there is the additional issue of effectiveness. It’s entirely possible that anti-file-swapping legislation would be utterly incapable of dealing with distributed networks like Morpheus and KaZaA, in which case the legislation would be constitutional but pointless. The logistical problems associated with the DNC list are not nearly so difficult -- though I could still be convinced by evidence that, on net, the DNC was practically not such a good idea after all. Point being, good policy must be constitutional, just, and practical.

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Econobloggers

Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok started an economics-focused blog called Marginalist Revolution last week, and it's already been the site of several really excellent posts. I particularly recommend Tyler's and Alex's mini-debate on the desirability of school vouchers (see here, here, here, and here). This is must-reading for voucher supporters, because Tyler's challenges are not your typical anti-market dreck, yet Alex's responses aptly weigh the disadvantages of a voucher system against the equivalent disadvantages of the status quo.

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Friday, September 05, 2003

Take Away My Free Privileges? How Dare They!

My comments are down because, apparently, SquawkBox has decided to charge me money to continue the account. I don't recall their having notified me of this possibility when I signed up -- otherwise, I might have chosen a different comments manager. Anyway, looks like they'll charge me 14 British pounds, which I'm guessing is between $20 and $25, for a year's worth of service. Anyone know if that's good? Is there another free service out there that won't suddenly demand that I upgrade? Your answers to these questions will, of course, have to be emailed to me since, um, my comments box is down.

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The Marriage Pool

Conservatives like Jonah Goldberg subscribe to what I call the “public swimming hole” view of marriage. In their concern about the possibility of gay couples undermining the institution of marriage, they seem to think there is only one great big marriage for everyone, and therefore the behavior of any married couple affects everyone else. People who have promiscuous “open” marriages are basically pissing in the pool and ruining it for everyone.

I, on the other hand, think marriage is a lot more like a private pool in your back yard. If you want to pee in it, fine. If you and Jonah want to fill your pool with so much chlorine it makes your eyes smart, well, that’s okay too.

Critics of my view might point out that, by its very nature as an institution, marriage is necessarily a social phenomenon affected by all individuals who take part. “If people don’t perceive marriage as a desirable state of affairs, fewer people will try it out. If more people believe that marriage need not imply sexual loyalty, then more people will think it’s okay to cheat in their marriages.” But the monolithic character of the institution should not be taken as given. There is not just one model of marriage to which everyone must submit. The fact that some people have “open” marriages hasn’t changed the fact that, for the vast majority of married people, sleeping with other people is considered a serious violation of trust. And every marriage has its own idiosyncratic norms that other couples might find bizarre.

Unfortunately, the current one-size-fits-all legal regime encourages the notion that all people must swim in the same marriage pool. Anyone who gets married -- even once gays are allowed to take part -- faces the same obligations, the same rights and privileges, the same rules for jumping ship and dividing the property (at least within any given state). If conservatives are really concerned about saving their own vision of marriage, they ought to get behind privatizing marriage, thereby reducing the state to the role of contract enforcer. If marriage were privatized, many concepts of marriage could flourish, each with its own set of pool rules.

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A Better Joke Candidacy

A few weeks ago, Mike asked why the California LP shouldn't nominate Gary Coleman for governor. The answer (of course) is that the last thing the LP's reputation needs is another joke candidacy a la Howard Stern. Nevertheless, it is interesting how often these political outsiders have libertarian sensibilities, even if they lack philosophical consistency. For the latest example, check out porn actress and gubernatorial candidate Mary Carey's platform. Aside from the tax on breast implants and the porn-for-guns program, it all looks fairly libertarian. And she has just announced four new positions (not that kind of position, you perv) that will have libertarians cheering: "Ms. Carey is against [that's right, against] government-provided universal health coverage [yeah!]. She supports physician-assisted suicide [right on!]. She is pro-choice [of course!]. She supports legalizing ferrets [woo-hoo!]."

Could this election be any more fun?

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Tuesday, September 02, 2003

Cancerous Statistics

An op-ed in the Sunday L.A. Times (registration required), authored by Drs. Samuel S. Epstein and Quentin D. Young, argues for increasing government spending on cancer research, especially research focused on prevention rather than cures. In order to prove the current approach (which already involves extensive government spending) is inadequate, they note the following:

A recent government analysis of leading causes of mortality in the U.S. from 1973 to 1999 revealed that, although the percentage of the population dying from heart disease decreased by 21 percentage points during the period, cancer deaths increased by 30 percentage points.
These statistics do not even begin to show that cancer is a growing problem in the United States. The numbers provided would even be consistent with a decreasing cancer threat, so long as the threat of heart disease declined even faster. And as a matter of fact, that’s almost exactly what has happened.

If you download the SEER report cited by the authors (in pdf format) and look at Figure I-2 (page 42), you’ll see that cancer was responsible for 23.0% of deaths in 1999 versus 17.7% in 1973 -- a 30% increase in the percentage (yes, that’s a percentage of a percentage), as the authors indicate. But if you go to the very next page (Figure I-3), you’ll see that the number of cancer deaths per 100,000 actually went down by about 20% for people under the age of 65 during the 1973-99 period, while rising by just over 10% for people over 65. You’ll also notice that in both pictures, the number of deaths from heart disease per 100,000 fell dramatically over the same period. (Note on interpreting the graphs: “neoplasms” is another word for tumors -- in other words, cancer.)

Of course, old people die a lot more than young people, so the rate for the whole population could have increased. But if you look at Table I-2 (page 18), you’ll see that the U.S. cancer death rate rose by just a tenth of a percent annually from 1975 to 1999, which is not nearly as scary as the authors imply in the article. (The figures are age-adjusted to take into account changing demographics, so the small increase is presumably not attributable to the aging of the population. It might, however, be attributable to the fact that some of the elderly people who would have died of other illnesses died of cancer instead -- which again does not indicate an increase in the cancer threat.) It also turns out that cancer death rates have been falling since the early 1990s (new document, Table II-3, page 3).

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Friday, August 29, 2003

Tragically Hip Replacement

I got every question right on this slang trivia quiz, which means, of course, that all of the slang used in the quiz is hopelessly passé. Yeah, sure, there were one or two terms that gave me pause (never heard anyone use “aggro” to mean “upset” before), but most of the “new” slang was positively ancient: who doesn’t know what “bogart,” “jonesing,” “dis,” and “benjamins” mean? The fact that these terms are included in an online quiz is a sure sign that none of the cool kids are using them anymore.

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Tuesday, August 26, 2003

More on Soviet-Style Education

A peculiar thing about American colleges and universities, whether public or private, is that they typically have to buy labor in competitive markets – but sell it at a fixed price in their internal markets. When a college wants to hire a new professor, they have to bid against other schools as well as the non-academic sector. The better are the opportunities available elsewhere, the higher the salary offer must be. Thus, for example, finance professors are typically paid very well relative to, say, English professors. Why? Because someone with financial expertise usually has very lucrative prospects in the outside world, prospects not available to someone whose expertise is late-18th century English lit.

But despite their differing costs of production, the educational services produced by these two professors are not priced separately. In most universities, as far as I can tell, tuition per credit hour is the same regardless of the discipline. If you take a finance class, you have to pay only as much as you would for an English class. Students are overpaying for the low-cost English classes and underpaying for the high-cost finance classes, which means the former are subsidizing the latter. Of course, this is only a supply-side analysis; the full analysis would take into account the differing demands for finance and English. But for many disciplinary comparisons, adding the demand side would only strengthen my point, because demand is often greatest for those disciplines most costly to provide. The same fact that makes finance professors expensive to hire – lucrative opportunities in the world of finance – makes the finance major an enticing one.

It’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that the fixed pricing scheme misallocates students among majors. If prices rose for finance and fell for English, more students would choose English relative to the status quo. That might seem like a bad outcome, given the greater job opportunities of the finance major, until you take the cost side into account: the new English majors would be compensated by having fatter pocketbooks as a result of lower tuition. The larger point is that you have to do a rate-of-return analysis: the gross return on an English major might be low, but the return per dollar invested in one's education would be higher if English tuition were lower.

The question, then, is why the system is the way it is. Is it truly economically irrational, or does some other factor – such as high transaction costs or the logistics of menu pricing – justify keeping the status quo? The best explanation I can think of (at the moment, anyway) is that since most of these institutions are non-profit, they lack the necessary incentives to get the pricing scheme right. As a test of this hypothesis, we could look at for-profit institutions like DeVry to see if they have differential pricing by subject.

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American Education, Soviet Style

Yesterday was the first day of class for fall, and thus a hellish nightmare as usual. I had literally twice as many students who wanted to register for one of my courses as there were available seats. This shortage is, of course, due in part to the California budget crisis -- but only in severity, as shortages are the norm here. In class, I pointed out the excess demand for seats in the class, and said that if the students remembered their microeconomics, they would know this meant the price was too low.

Every semester when I encounter this situation, I am tempted to auction the seats to the highest bidders (raising the price until the number of students willing to pay is equal to the number of seats available). But I’m pretty sure this would be considered an ethical violation, even if I dutifully handed the proceeds over to the college or rebated them lump-sum to all auction participants. Instead, since rationing by price is not allowed, I will have to ration the seats by means of personal whim and caprice.

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Friday, August 22, 2003

My New Favorite Suffix

Every day, Merriam-Webster emails me a Word of the Day. Today’s word is “poetaster,” meaning a second-rate or inferior poet. According to the accompanying commentary, -aster is a Latin suffix (hey, they didn’t teach me that one in high school!) that indicates “partial resemblance” or “inferiority.” And it turns out there are several other English words with the -aster suffix, including criticaster (think Gene Shalit), politaster (Gray Davis), and philosophaster (William Bennett).

Despite the resemblance, the dictionary tells me that poetaster and its ilk do not share etymology with disaster and pederasty. But the similarity only adds to the derogatory power of the suffix.

I think this is a rich source of new word coinages. The possibilities are endless: bloggeraster, econaster (not economaster, because that “master” part could get confusing), columnaster, journalaster… This is fun! C’mon, try your own!

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The Rape Conundrum

Radley Balko has a friend who “doesn't think our criminal justice system is capable of handling rape, given that it’s so often a he said/she said thing, and that the results for both parties are so damning.” I think there’s something to this. The difficulty with rape as a crime is that it depends crucially on a single mental event: consent, an ephemeral phenomenon that takes place entirely within the mind. There is no unambiguous physical evidence of consent, because consent (or the lack thereof) can coexist with all sorts of physical circumstances. For the prosecution, even bruises and scratches aren’t good enough – some people like it rough. For the defense, clear and apparent sexual interest by the victim isn’t good enough – she can change her mind any time.

It might be objected that other crimes are like this, too. In a legal system largely based on individual rights and choice, consent is always of the essence, and consent is always ephemeral. Maybe the battery victim was actually a masochist who asked for it. Maybe Sears didn’t really want to keep that television, and didn’t mind that hoodlum walking out with it. But in those cases, while we can construct the hypotheticals, they just aren’t very plausible most of the time. The overwhelming majority of people aren’t masochists, and profit-maximizing firms don’t generally give away their products for free. To get away with these claims, the defense would have to adduce some strong evidence – e.g., the victim’s previous sado-masochistic relationships, or Sears’s advertising campaign in which it promised to give TVs to 10 lucky winners. Otherwise, the strong presumption is against consent. In the case of rape, however, no such strong presumption of non-consent applies: people give away sex for free all the time.

Furthermore, in other kinds of case, all sorts of circumstantial evidence can be introduced in court. Murder motives are not just allowed but welcomed. If the alleged assault victim had prior sado-masochistic relationships, we’d like the jury to know it. While the issue is still one of consent, we accept a variety of historical indicators of whether a specific person would or wouldn’t have been likely to give such consent, or would or wouldn’t have been likely to violate someone else’s rights. With regard to rape, however, we have moved progressively in the other direction, at least with respect to the interests of victims. Many states have “rape-shield” laws that specifically prohibit any evidence regarding the previous sexual history of the alleged victim. Why? Because no matter what she did in the past, she has the ability and the right to change her behavior in the present, and maybe she did. Of course, the same is true of the alleged rapist, though evidence of his previous history is often allowed – read this fascinating op-ed on that subject.

Perhaps the law is justified in keeping out character evidence in rape cases because of the peculiar nature of the crime, though it’s rather hard to justify allowing such evidence to be introduced only in support of one party. Nonetheless, the more we move in the direction of ruling out all evidence of character and history that is not directly related to the specific event, the more we will be casting about fruitlessly trying to find physical evidence of a non-physical event.

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Thursday, August 21, 2003

Jammu & Kashmir

Amy’s recent post on the subject of the Indian-Pakistani conflict in Kashmir provided me with the necessary excuse to make this post. Several months ago, when India and Pakistan were rattling their sabers especially loudly, I sent an email to a friend who knows something about the region asking him, “What is so $#@!$ special about Kashmir that India and Pakistan are apparently willing to go to war (possibly nuclear war) over it?” My friend (who wishes to remain anonymous) eventually sent me the following reply, which I found quite edifying. (As a disclaimer, however, I really know next to nothing about the issue myself, and thus cannot pass judgment on his accuracy.)

First, generally, the name "Kashmir" is misused if the person using it is referring to the entire region. The entire State/Province is collectively known as "Jammu & Kashmir" which comprises the regions of "Jammu," "Kashmir," and "Ladakh." Also, the entire region contains three major religious groups, Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. Muslims are the majority overall, but not necessarily in every individual region of Jammu & Kashmir.

India and Pakistan used to be one family (collectively known as India). At first, when India was partitioned, it was like one family was being divided, and in some ways, their relations resembled a family feud. This was how it was until the late 1980s. In 1989, a major conflict erupted within India's section of Jammu & Kashmir after elections in the region were found to have been rigged (to favor pro-Indian politicians, as opposed to separatists or pro-Pakistan politicians). It was a stupid/arrogant thing to do on the part of some Indian government leaders. (The most recent elections held in 2002 were relatively fairer and freer and had a good turnout of 48%, better than most American elections.)

As a result of the 1989 elections, the pro-Pakistanis and pro-Separatists (both groups comprised entirely of Muslims) violently rebelled and resorted to terrorism to meet their goals. Unfortunately, they did not target just Indian security forces, but also civilians (to ethnically cleanse the region and increase the percentage of Muslims). They targeted Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and even other Muslims (those who didn't agree with their agendas). The terrorists primarily use fear/intimidation/violence as a means of getting supporters or silencing their critics.

Pakistan has been arming, training, and sheltering these terrorists, there is no question about that. This has made the situation difficult for India to resolve. In addition, unemployed Afghan mujahadeen (now mercenaries) from the Soviet-Afghan war have turned up in the region.

(Clearly, the Reagan administration was naive, ignorant, or just didn't care if they thought there would be no fallout from supporting, training, and arming the mujahadeen in Afganistan. This is how many Al-Qaeda and Taliban got their initial funding and training. These people were clearly more dangerous, unpredictable, and much less rational than the Soviets were. Plus, Afganistan actually ended up being even more worse off when the Soviets left. But, as with most American policies, nothing really looks beyond the short-term.)

Now, even the terrorists are divided. Some are pro-independent Kashmir (and within this group, some want a secular Kashmir, others want an Islamic state made out of Kashmir; India does not want a radical Islamic state on its doorstep). Others are pro-Pakistan and want the region to join Pakistan. As for other terrorists (particularly those Afghan and Arab mercenaries), they probably would prefer a radical Islamic state, but, for the most part, they probably prefer the status quo so they can continue enjoying killing and terrorizing innocent people. Killing is all these people know, and the only skill they were ever trained in. How can they be integrated back into civil society?

But, for India, Jammu & Kashmir remaining a part of the country doesn't only have to do with protecting the large minority ethnic/religious groups in the region, or with keeping a large chunk of real estate. Jammu & Kashmir is rich in some natural resources. Plus, a lot of the water the rest of India uses originates in the snow-capped mountains of Jammu & Kashmir. Considering some parts of India have been suffering droughts as of late, the water issue is no small thing and, for them, worth going to war over.
Probably the most disturbing part of this story is the second-to-last paragraph. What can you do with a group of people who know nothing but terrorism?

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Wednesday, August 20, 2003

Website Plug

I've said it before, and I'll say it again: Dan Savage is hilarious. This week's Savage Love (first letter especially) had me LMAO.

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Tuesday, August 19, 2003

Little Things That Bother Me

Reason’s Hit & Run is a great blog, but every time I visit the site the subtitle gives me pause:

Continuous news, views, and abuse by the Reason staff
Okay, so should I go for the grammatical consistency of three nouns in a row, and therefore pronounce “abuse” as “abewss”? Or am I supposed to go for the three-word rhyme and pronounce it “abewz”?

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Gays of Our Lives

What explains the right’s fear of homosexuality? The usual answers range from the religious (“they were just raised thinking sodomy is morally wrong”) to the psychological (“they harbor unresolved feelings of homosexuality themselves and fear they might say yes if propositioned by a gay man”). These explanations may well be correct, but they’ve always seemed a bit too ad hoc for my taste. The religious explanation in particular strikes me as a “theory of the data set” – a theory whose explanatory power is limited to a specific historical phenomenon, with no wider applicability or predictive power. Many religions do not condemn homosexuality with the fervor of the fundamentalist Christians, and many individuals have managed to escape the teachings of their childhood religions. Given these facts, it’s just too easy to say “religion makes them do it,” because then we need an explanation of why this particular religious view has had such influence and staying power.

These thoughts sprang to mind when I watched VH1’s “Totally Gay,” a retrospective on the influence of homosexuality on popular culture over the last 10 to 20 years. The show was surprisingly insightful for a VH1 filler piece, and a couple of its observations jumped out at me as potentially more fruitful explanations for the anti-gay backlash. They are probably not the primary reasons for anti-gay sentiment, but I wonder if they might at least play a part.

At one point, the show’s narrator said, “You can’t take the sexuality out of homosexuality, so the rising visibility of homosexuals has sexualized the culture.” Or something like that. And I think there’s a nugget of truth there. Unlike other marginalized groups like ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals are a group identified entirely by their sexual behavior or orientation. The growing visibility of such a group has got to have an effect on the sexuality of the culture in general. It’s pretty difficult to talk about homosexuality without talking about sex. It’s no secret that sexual humor and sexual situations are increasingly common in television and movies, and a lot of it has homosexual undercurrents (or overcurrents). Now, I’m okay with that, as are most people I willingly associate with: sex talk is fun! But lots of people are uncomfortable with sex, and for them this is an undesirable development. The anti-sex attitude most likely has religious roots, so maybe I’m back to the old ad-hoc “religion makes them do it” explanation, but with a twist. We don’t have to assert the existence of a pure “homosexuality-bad” meme within the religious structure; instead, we can view the homosexuality-bad notion as the consequence of a general discomfort with sex, combined with the empirical tendency of homosexual visibility to increase the visibility of sexuality more generally.

Another point made in the show was that homosexual norms vis-à-vis personal grooming, hygiene, fashion, and health have raised the bar for heterosexual men in all those areas. “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy” is only the latest instance of the phenomenon. One of the show’s commentators noted that when a buff gay man walks into a restaurant or gym, all the straight women’s heads turn – and the hetero men notice that. Straight guys have begun to realize that they look and dress like slobs compared to women’s gay friends, and women are now more likely to demand that straight men rise to the challenge. Before gays became prominent in pop culture, it was virtually unheard of for a straight man to get a facial or shave any part of his body except his face. Now, it’s becoming common – witness the “metrosexuals,” about whom I’ll provide no hyperlinks because they’ve been blogged to death already. Notice also that Maxim magazine, the quintessential magazine for the regular (hetero) guy, has now endorsed a line of hair coloring products. Point being, straight men as a group are having to meet higher standards because of the visibility of gay men, and some of them may resent it.

I’m hesitant to say that the expectation-raising effect explains the anti-gay backlash, because the straight men most affected by it are young single men of my generation and younger, a group that is not notably anti-gay. But it is, nonetheless, a real development that I hadn’t really thought about before, and compared to the usual reasons offered for anti-gay attitudes (which, as Julian notes, are so intellectually flaccid that it would be offensive to assume those who make them actually believe them), it’s a reason that would actually be marginally more rational. No one likes to be the victim of higher standards.

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Monday, August 18, 2003

Return of the Dread Pirate Roberts

A few months ago, I tackled Paul Craig Roberts’s protectionist arguments against foreign outsourcing. Now Daniel Griswold of Cato takes a swing. His arguments are largely the same as mine, but he musters a lot of actual data (!) that I didn’t have handy. Read the whole thing. (Thanks to Tyler Cowen for the pointer.)

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Sunday, August 17, 2003

Pseudo Cum Laude

Number 2 Pencil relates the sad, sad story of a young woman who would be her class’s valedictorian if not for her inability to pass a basic math proficiency exam. Eugene (thanks for the pointer) quotes Joanne Jacobs’s summary of the story: “They were giving her As for being a good kid. But they weren't teaching her.”

All this reminded me of a key passage in one of my favorite books, The Bonfire of the Vanities. I’m cutting it down substantially so this post won’t be ridiculously long… but as the saying goes, read the whole thing. And by thing, I mean the book.

“Actually, I’m calling to inquire about one of your students, a young Mr. Henry Lamb.”
“Henry Lamb. Doesn’t ring a bell. What’s he done?”
“Oh, he hasn’t done anything. He’s been seriously injured.”
…
“Henry Lamb … Oh yes, I know who you mean. Well, that’s too bad.”
“What I would like to find out, Mr. Rifkind, is what kind of student Henry Lamb is.”
“What kind?”
“Well, would you say he was an outstanding student?”
…
“… I gather you’re not from New York. … Then there’s no reason you should know anything about Colonel Jacob Ruppert High School in the Bronx. At Ruppert we use comparative terms, but outstanding isn’t one them. The range runs more from cooperative to life-threatening.” …
“Well, how would you describe Henry Lamb?”
“Cooperative. He’s a nice fellow. Never gives me any trouble.”
“Would you describe him as a good student?”
“Good doesn’t work too well at Ruppert, either. It’s more ‘Does he attend class or doesn’t he?’”
“Did Henry Lamb attend class?”
“As I recall, yes. He’s usually there. He’s very dependable. He’s a nice kid, as nice as they come.”
“Was there any part of the curriculum he was particularly good – or, let me say, adept at, anything he did better than anything else?”
“Not particularly.”
…
“Will Henry Lamb graduate, or would he have?”
“As far as I know. As I say, he has a very good attendance record.”
…
“Let me ask you this. How does he do on his written work?”
…
“Written work? There hasn’t been any written work at Ruppert High for fifteen years! Maybe twenty! They take multiple-choice tests. Reading comprehension, that’s the big thing. That’s all the Board of Education cares about.”
“How was Henry Lamb’s reading comprehension?”
“I’d have to look it up. Not bad, if I had to guess.”
“Better than most? Or about average? Or what would you say?”
…
“…these kids haven’t reached the level where it’s worth emphasizing the kind of comparisons you’re talking about. We’re just trying to get them up to a certain level and then keep them from falling back. You’re thinking about ‘honor students’ and ‘higher achievers’ and all that, and that’s natural enough, as I say. But at Colonel Jacob Ruppert High School, an honor student is somebody who attends class, isn’t disruptive, tries to learn, and does all right at reading and arithmetic.”
“Well, let’s use that standard. By that standard, is Henry Lamb an honor student?”
“By that standard, yes.”
“Thank you very much, Mr. Rifkind.”

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Saturday, August 16, 2003

Devolution

I really dislike almost any form of political or religious message on a car, whether in bumper sticker form or some other medium, such as the metallic Jesus fish. The only ones I like at all are those that make fun of others, such as the metallic Darwin fish (which I admit has officially outlasted its funniness phase). But at least the original versions of both the Jesus and Darwin fish gave tailgaters some intellectual credit. To understand the original two-stroke fish, you at least have to know what the symbol means (though you may not know its early Christian history and so on). Likewise for the two-stroke-with-legs Darwin fish. But now they insist on spelling it out for you, literally: the symbols almost always have the letters “JESUS” or “DARWIN” crammed inside. So much for subtlety.

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Friday, August 15, 2003

Made Me Laugh Department

Two great photos, with commentary, posted at The Agitator:

Gray Davis Inflatable Doll

Would You Like Your Giza Deep Dish or Thin Crust?

Actually, the latter link really belongs in the Made Me Smile Department, but I didn’t want to make two different blog posts.

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Tuesday, August 12, 2003

Kobeconomics

I’m mildly perplexed by Tyler Cowen’s take on the Kobe trial [note: the permalink is not working correctly, so you’ll have to search for “Kobe” around 9 August]:

Should economists think that Kobe Bryant is innocent? Don't we teach our students, first and foremost, that incentives matter? Didn't Kobe have huge and obvious incentives not to do it? Wouldn't an attention-seeker victim have some incentive to lie and stretch the story? Even if, heaven forbid, a guy had rape as his goal, rather than sex, wouldn't an economic model predict he would pick a different state and county? Yet I have asked a few economists, market-oriented economists, the kind who believe in the power of incentives, and they all think Kobe is guilty as charged (admittedly my sample is not huge).
First, as to Kobe’s guilt or innocence, I’m resolutely agnostic: I don’t know all the facts, so I feel thoroughly unqualified to pass judgment. I’m also militantly agnostic: I don’t know, and you don’t either.

Second, as to whether economics has something to say on the matter, I think the answer has to be a qualified “no.” The predictions of microeconomic decision theory are rarely, if ever, so specific that they tell us the actual choices of particular individuals. We usually make pattern predictions, not point predictions. Economic theory tells us that, other things equal, a greater expectation of punishment for rape should result in a smaller number of rapes. And it tells us that, other things equal, the existence of more readily available substitutes for rape (i.e., lots of willing sex partners) should result in a smaller number of rapes. But economic theory does not tell us the actual number of rapes that will occur, and it certainly doesn’t tell us that it will be zero for certain individuals.

I am not just making the point that Tyler recognized in his post, that “[s]ome economists argue that economic laws apply to averages and aggregates, in a market setting, and not necessarily to individuals.” I do think economic laws apply to individuals, at least to some extent. The point is that the kind of predictions we can make about individuals aren’t that precise. I’m willing to say this much: that a rich and famous Kobe Bryant (who has lots to lose from committing rape and many available substitutes) is less likely to commit rape than a poor and unknown Kobe Bryant (who has less to lose and fewer substitutes). But that’s as far as I can go, and "less likely" doesn't mean "never." Microeconomic theory rests on subjectivist underpinnings, which means that the strength of an economic incentive with respect to any particular person is unknown a priori.

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F^*$ Arnold


I've got a new favorite candidate.

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Monday, August 11, 2003

Brace Yourself

Despite the thousands of people who get cosmetic surgery every year, there's still a bias against it. There's a common, though by no means universal, perception that people who get nose jobs, boob jobs, tummy tucks, etc., are often deficient in some way: their lack of self-esteem makes them hate their own bodies, or their lack of self-discipline makes them resort to surgery instead of exercise. On top of these attitudinal judgments, which some people are willing to voice in public, I suspect there is an unstated physical judgment as well: someone who gets cosmetic surgery must not be naturally beautiful, and natural beauty is superior to artificial beauty, right?

But oddly, there is one kind of cosmetic medical treatment that is regarded differently from all the others: teeth straightening. Nobody is ever looked down upon for having worn braces (although there is sometimes teasing during the actually brace-wearing phase, especially if headgear is involved). Someone who has straight teeth without orthodontic work is regarded as lucky, but not superior. Far from being stigmatized, procedures to fix your teeth are regarded as normal and even expected.

Why the inconsistency? I'm not sure, but (naturally) I have some theories. One is that the stigma against cosmetic medical treatments has a "necessity" escape clause. If you have nose surgery to fix a deviated septum that hinders your breathing, that's okay, even if you look radically different afterward. Similarly, fixing your teeth might be necessary to facilitate eating, stop you from biting your tongue all the time, and so on. But I don't think this theory works, because no one expects you to justify your braces by reference to your TMJ disorder.

Another theory is that orthodontists have simply done a better PR job than plastic surgeons. They've successfully spread the idea that having straight teeth is a sign of good breeding, even hygiene, equivalent to having a clear complexion or getting a good haircut. But this theory raises the question of what orthodontists did to get this result, and why plastic surgeons haven't successfully followed the same strategy.

A third theory - and my favorite - is that people are expected to exhibit swiftly diminishing marginal utility from body modification. Everyone's entitled to a certain amount, but the more you have done, the more likely it is that your real problem is mental. On one end of the spectrum, we have a person who gets one nose job; on the other end, we have Michael Jackson. While it's hard to draw the line on the spectrum between functional and dysfunctional, to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart's comment on obscenity, we know dysfunctionality when we see it. And since teeth-straightening is usually the first - and often the only - body modification that someone gets, no stigma yet applies. Add on a nose job, and the stigma (if any) is still mild. Add on two tummy tucks, a facelift, monthly Botox treatments, another nose job, and a chin implant… welcome to stigmaland. (For bonus points, apply this same theory to body piercings and tattoos.)

Incidentally, my comments here are not meant in any way to contribute to (or detract from) the stigma I'm talking about. I'm just trying to understand why people have the attitudes they do, not justify them. And yes, in case you're wondering, I have been watching FX's new show "Nip/Tuck."

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Sunday, August 10, 2003

Holy Deceptive Numbers, Statman!

Mark Kleiman recently penned an excellent article about how “counting the winners and ignoring the losers” allowed researchers to fudge the effectiveness of the InnerChange Freedom Initiative in rehabilitating criminals. This kind of statistical bias is nothing new, of course. But because of Mark’s article, the topic happened to be on the tip of my cerebral cortex when I opened a piece of junk mail from 21st Century Insurance. The letter states that “On average, new customers report saving $300.00 each year.” Sounds impressive, until you think about it for more than a couple of seconds. The problem is that only the people who called 21st and discovered they could actually save money switched over and became new customers. Those who called 21st and discovered they would lose money by doing so are thus excluded from the sample.

At least the company is not being duplicitous – they do say “new customers.” If they had said, “On average, you can save $300 by switching to 21st Century Insurance,” that would have been truly misleading. Still, I wonder how many people who receive the ad get the false impression that 21st Century must be offering systematically lower rates than its competitors.

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Thursday, August 07, 2003

What Might Be Right For You May Not Be Right For Some

Can anyone--anyone--tell me why the Libertarian Party of California should not give its official endorsement for Governor of California (and the dozens of votes that are guaranteed with it) to Gary Coleman?

(Link via Hit and Run)

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Wednesday, August 06, 2003

Made Me Laugh Department

BEST NAME FOR A LANDSCAPING FIRM:
Marquis de Sod
(No link, but I actually saw one of their trucks.)

BEST NAME FOR A TV BIOPIC:
Dark Roots: The Unauthorized Anna Nicole

BEST GIFT SITE FOR BOSSES AND COWORKERS:
The Demotivators Collection
(Thanks to my Uncle Rick for the link.)

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Tuesday, August 05, 2003

It’s the Bloodlust, Stupid

Look at this amazing graphic showing Shrub’s poll approval numbers. Note the discontinuities right after 9/11 and the commencement of the war in Iraq. Iran and Korea had better watch their asses right before the 2004 election. (But not Saudi Arabia, even though the evidence connecting them to Al Qaeda is better than anything we ever had on Iraq.)

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Monday, August 04, 2003

Seattle Debrief

Officially, Andrew and I won the debate in Seattle on Friday. Of course, it was an engineered 2-to-1 vote, as one judge on the panel was chosen to be biased in our favor, and another was chosen to be biased in the other side’s favor. So in truth, our victory represented the opinion of exactly one judge. Still, the audience seemed favorably disposed to our position, and we were relatively pleased with our performance.

Because of the very short speaking times -- each speaker had one 5-minute and one 3-minute speech -- none of us, on either side, were able to make all the points we intended to. In this kind of abbreviated format, coverage and depth take a back seat, and what really matters is the sound bite: who really sounds like they’re on the right side of the issue?

Ultimately, I think what swayed the swing member of the judging panel, and I think many audience members as well, was an argument that Andrew and I had thought would be a throw-away filler argument. The subject of the debate was a recently passed Seattle law that granted two big corporations a monopoly on construction waste hauling. Our substantive arguments against the law had to do with the evils of legal monopolies: they drive up prices, harm consumers, reduce the level of service, and put competitors out of business. We also had prepared responses to likely arguments of the other side (alleged benefits in terms of safety and health, for the most part). But we also had another argument in our pockets: that the law in question was corporate welfare, a sweetheart deal pushed by two giant businesses and their cronies in the public utility commission.

Theoretically, that argument shouldn’t have mattered to the debate, because the origin of a law is irrelevant to its desirability. Just because the law was passed for bad reasons doesn’t mean good reasons don’t exist. Nonetheless, the audience’s reaction to the corporate welfare argument was palpable. The look on their faces (well, some of them, anyway) said, “Ohhhh, now I get it.”

The lesson, I think, is that most people assume that laws exist for good reasons. If there weren’t a problem, why would the law have been passed? In response to that question, it’s not enough to just argue that the law is ineffective or counterproductive; you need to explain why such a law would ever have existed in the first place if it were really so bad.

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Thursday, July 31, 2003

Organ Nine to Five, What a Way to Make a Living

My sister Ellen, who is a pre-med student, had some interesting points to make about my post below on organ selling. She agreed to let me post them here, and I’ll intersperse my own reactions.

I haven't read the article you're talking about -- I clicked on the link but I couldn't read it because I don't have a subscription -- but I bet that what the [author] finds wrong with organ selling isn't exactly a problem with organ selling per se. If [her] arguments are on what [s]he says are moral grounds, [s]he is probably mad that people are so poor that they have to sell their organs. Whether or not that's actually the profile of people that sell their organs, [s]he probably thinks it's disgraceful that some person out there isn't getting helped by society or something enough that he doesn't find himself so strapped for money that he has to risk his health [by] giving up organs to make a buck. I don't know if I agree or disagree with that. The problem there isn't with organ selling but with other conditions that would cause someone to consider organ selling.
I think Ellen is totally correct about the sentiments behind the op-ed. And it’s indeed horrible that some people are so poor that they’d sell their organs to get ahead. But -- and this is the key point -- you don’t make those people any better off by taking options away. Preventing organ sales does nothing to improve the condition of poor people in underdeveloped countries; it just shuts down one of the possible exit routes.
Anyway, the quote [s]he used didn't support an argument against organ sales, like you said, but the guy [s]he quoted (hypothetical?) wasn't completely on the mark either. People with cirrhosis or other things wrong with their organs aren't allowed to be organ donors. Among the many tests that have to be done before the organ is transplanted, checking it for overall good health is one of them. The people who have shitty organs are the ones getting the transplants, not donating them. Stress on the body can cause damage to organs over the long term, but the things he was referring to (like car wrecks) wouldn't affect the organs too much. The reason people go into shock after a trauma is to save the vital organs, or rather, keep those organs from becoming damaged/deprived if they weren't already at the expense of everything else (b.p., temp, etc.). So the organs will nearly always come out fine. If the case is that the organs are themselves damaged in the trauma, they aren't used for transplants. Abraham or whatever his name is would probably get organs about the same in health and functions whether he got it from a gunshot victim as a voluntary seller.
Good points. However, it's not as though the organs from car wrecks and gunshot victims are going unused. There is a shortage of organs, so people take what they can get. Avraham’s medical knowledge may be deficient, but his choice to buy organs from healthy people just assures that more organs from accidental donors will be available for others.
The one thing different [between accident donors and healthy donors] is something that is actually an argument for selling, which is that type-matching might be easier with selling, because someone might offer more money if someone that matches him steps up to sell, whereas the other way has no dependence on blood type or anything like that.
That’s a new argument in favor of organ selling that I’d never heard before. Cool.
Oh yeah, I'm willing to bet that if this [author] is opposed to organ selling for the reason I said, [s]he also doesn't like egg-selling either, although not as strongly as [s]he dislikes organ-selling. [Sh]e may not even like sperm donation, but a lot of people all of a sudden change their views on that one because sperm are so easy to get while egg-harvesting can be a painful process and eggs, unlike sperm, aren't seen as "a dime a dozen." Or a dime a million. Whatever.
Great point. I don’t know if the author of that article actually opposes sperm- and egg-selling, but to be consistent she should, because some poor people do it for the money.

ADDENDUM: Ellen emailed me again (after I told her I might blog this) to make a small correction:
I don't know why I said "shock" when I referred to the body's response to trauma. Shock can be caused by trauma or by other things (septicemia, anaphylaxis...), but shock actually leads to the organ's failure. However, doctors do do all they can do to prevent this, and the organs are the last thing to go, so even someone that entered early stages of shock could probably still donate at a later date. I do know though, that the body will try to save its vital organs at the expense of things peripheral. I don't even remember if there's a term for it, but I know it happens. Think hypothermia -- people end up with frostbite because their blood was shunted to their heart/lungs/brain/etc. Provided someone doesn't end up with a [positive-feedback] shock response, the chance of sustaining noticeable organ damage because of a trauma not specifically related to that organ isn't terribly high -- not enough to worry that their organs aren't healthy enough to be transplanted. If they actually get medical attention. Still, I know I am right about the kinds of people that they let donate. People who have self-inflicted damage, people who have abormal organs, people who died because the organ in question failed...most of the people that Abraham was worried about.
I don’t think this changes any of the discussion above, but I thought I’d post it for the sake of medical correctness. Thanks to Ellen for all the useful comments.

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Public Debate in Seattle

Tomorrow (Friday) I will participate in a public debate at the University of Washington in Seattle. The official topic of the debate will be: "RESOLVED: The Seattle City Council's Monopolistic Policies are in the Public Interest." The actual focus of the debate will be a truly inane law (uh-oh, am I poisoning the well?) passed by the Seattle City Council that effectively gives two big firms a monopoly in construction waste hauling. Naturally, I'll be on the opposition side. Each side will consist of one student and one professional. I'll be partnered with Andrew Bailey, a Biola student, and our opponents will be Michael Howard, a UW student, and Rod McCarvel, a Seattle attorney.

Here are the details, if any readers happen to live in the area and feel like attending:
UW Seattle campus, Thompson Hall Room 101, Friday 1 August 2003, 6:00 - 7:00 pm.
A splendid time is guaranteed for all.

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Wednesday, July 30, 2003

Organ for a Livin’

I read this article about the evils of human organ sales in yesterday’s L. A. Times. I would refute the arguments – if I could find any. Unfortunately, the author just plays on morbid fears and hyperbole, with nary a trace of analysis. Ironically, the most persuasive part of the piece is a quotation that the author presents as self-evidently wrong:

Avraham, a retired lawyer in Jerusalem, explained why he went through considerable expense and danger to travel to Eastern Europe to purchase a kidney from a rural worker rather than wait in line for a cadaver organ in Israel: "Why should I have to wait years for a kidney from someone who was in a car accident, pinned under the car for many hours, then in miserable condition in the intensive care unit for days and only then, after all that trauma, have that same organ put inside me? That organ is not going to be any good! Or, even worse, I could get the organ of an elderly person, or an alcoholic, or a person who died of a stroke. It's far better to get a kidney from a healthy person who can also benefit from the money I can afford to pay."
And that’s bad because…?

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Tuesday, July 29, 2003

Terrorisks

Last night, I saw some jackass Congressman denouncing the terrorism threat-bet concept as “just plain immoral,” and Hillary Clinton called it a “futures market in death.” Now, I’m not entirely sold on the notion of ideas futures as an efficient means of assessing risks, for reasons I’ll explain below. But to condemn the program out of hand just because it sounds morbid is truly stupid. The question should be a factual one: would these betting markets in fact provide the authorities with better information about likely terrorist events without making such events more likely? If the answer is yes, then I think it would be immoral not to use them.

And it’s quite obvious that the Congressmen who’ve been criticizing the idea really don’t understand it at all. The most common charge is that it would allow terrorists to profit from their planned terrorist acts, because they could engage in a kind of insider trading. As Barbara Boxer puts it, “terrorists knowing they were planning an attack could have bet on the attack and collected a lot of money.” Hmm, let’s see how this would work. Suppose Ahmed the Terrorist is planning to blow up the Seattle Space Needle. So he does months of planning, all in secret so he won’t get caught. And then he gets the brilliant notion of making money at the same time, so he logs onto the DARPA website and buys a whole bunch of shares of “Seattle Space Needle gets blown up.” The price suddenly jumps, and the authorities immediately focus their attention on potential threats to the Space Needle, making it much more likely that Ahmed’s plot will be foiled. That’s exactly how the system is supposed to work.

The problem, as I see it, is that some terrorists won’t be as stupid as Ahmed. Instead, they will spend money with the deliberate purpose of driving up the price on other events -- ones that they have no plan to make happen -- with the intent of drawing attention away from their real plans. Or if they were really foresighted, they could start buying shares for the events they intend to make occur months in advance, and then deliberately dump their shares a little while before the plan goes into effect so that the price goes down. Or they could just buy and sell randomly, in order to create noise in the data. Would they lose money doing this? Yes, but terrorists have shown a great willingness to spend money in order to hurt people.

In short, the terrorism threat-bet plan might not work, but the critics’ criticisms are exactly backward. The problem is not that terrorists would be enabled to make money on their own criminal acts, because the very act of trying to make money on your terrorist plans is exactly what would thwart them. The problem is precisely the opposite: that terrorists might deliberately lose money in order to foil the system.

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Monday, July 28, 2003

Gay High

Somehow this strikes me as a bad idea. I’m all in favor of shielding gay students from physical and psychological abuse, of course, and maybe that alone is enough to justify the creation of a new gays-only school. But it’s a pretty damning indictment of the NYC public schools’ disciplinary system if they have to segregate people in order to protect them against violence.

In addition, the existence of a school for gays will bolster the bigoted belief that gays are so different from the rest of us that they need to be quarantined. And it makes it even more likely that young people in their crucial bigotry-forming years won’t be exposed to any real live gay people. I realize transferring will be voluntary, but that won’t challenge the impression that is created in the minds of students. The option will soon become an expectation on the part of bigoted students. “Why don’t you go to Gay High, queer!” will be the new taunt of choice.

Furthermore (and here’s where I might hack some people off), I think it’s unwise for kids to categorize their sexuality at such a young age. High school students are bubbling cauldrons of hormones, fears, anxieties, and sudden impulses. They may not really know what their actual orientation is until years later. Yes, I’m sure that lots of gay people realize their orientation with great certitude early in life (many have told me so). But there have to be many others who do not; I’m betting that women are overrepresented in this category. In the narrow environment of a single-orientation school, students with second thoughts may feel trapped by rash decisions made early on. Worse yet, they might even feel pressure to conform, since a choice to go straight means having to switch schools.

On the upside, I can’t wait to hear what the school’s mascot is.

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Friday, July 25, 2003

Shocker

It turns out that a dish of three scoops of ice cream covered with whipped cream, hot fudge topping, nuts, sprinkles, and a cherry actually has lots of calories and fat in it. I'm glad they did a scientific study to figure that one out for us.

Read Jacob Sullum's excellent article on the highly annoying Center for Science in the Public Interest. I remember the days when CSPI was actually doing something useful, like telling us that Chinese food might not be as healthy as you thought, despite all those veggies. But I stopped listening about the time they helpfully informed us that Mexican food is not so healthy, either. As one columnist (can't remember who -- Tony Kornheiser maybe) put it, "If something fried is bad for you, how can something refried be good for you?"

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Brights Out

Despite my sympathy with Daniel Dennett’s desire to raise the profile of atheists and agnostics in this country, I have to agree with Julian (read the comments box), and some other commentators, that Dennett’s choice of labels – “brights” – is pretentious and silly. (Not to mention that it opens the door to calling agnostics “Light Brights.”) But what other term would be appropriate?

I was pondering that question last night, when I caught my first episode of “Queer Eye for the Straight Guy” (which has many of the same annoying qualities as TLC’s “What Not To Wear” – maybe more on that later). And then it hit me: why not follow the strategy of homosexuals and other marginalized groups who have taken derogatory names for themselves and co-opted them as signs of pride?

Thus my proposal: atheists and agnostics should henceforth be known as “heretics.”

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Thursday, July 24, 2003

Politics as Spectator Sport

Once you realize that the typical person has pretty much zero marginal impact on politics, and once you admit to yourself that you are in fact a typical person, it becomes a lot easier to view politics as essentially a form of entertainment. And California is a state known for its fabulously successful entertainment industry. Think of the Davis recall as the latest in reality television.

During the whole Lewinsky drama, many people criticized Kenneth Starr for spending $40 million (or whatever it was) to carry out a vendetta against the president. Put that way, it does sound pretty bad. But then again, the National Endowment for the Arts has an $80 million yearly budget, and it’s never provided me anywhere near as much entertainment as Kenneth Starr did.

So now, opponents of the Davis recall are protesting the $35 million that it will cost to have an election. Below, Mike offers a sensible defense of that expense on grounds of improving democracy and such; but I’m willing to make a defense on the basis of pure entertainment value. Boy, it sure will be mighty fun to watch Davis squirm! As an added bonus, we might even end up with the Governator in charge. And as per usual, the West Coast provides amusement for the rest of the country.

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Suffrage vs. Suffering in CA

There is almost a unanimous consensus that the petition to have a recall election against Gray Davis is dangerously misguided. Some might see the convergence of normally fractious voices of the citizens’ intelligentsia (AKA blogosphere) as proof that this is, in fact, a really bad idea. I, on the other hand, see this is an opportunity for an exercise in contrarian thinking.

The argument is that this election is (a) expensive (b) destabilizing and (c) not likely to lead to better government for the Golden State.

It is impossible to argue that this election will not be expensive if you think $35 million is real money and not chump change. But if you believe that this election could in fact buy better, more responsible government for California, then $35 million isn’t so much. Hell, it’s less than 1/1000th of the state’s $38 billion deficit.

So the question, then, is whether this can produce better policy in the short-term (i.e., over the next four years) and/or whether this might produce improved long-term governance through structural adjustment.

I think that there’s a chance that the answer to both is possibly “yes.” But first, let’s note that there’s a huge positive externality for the rest of the country, regardless of the outcome. This is one of those “federalist moments” during which a single state really serves as a “laboratory of democracy” by trying something completely different from what is policy in other states. California’s groundbreaking Proposition 13 worked in this way when it showed the way to cap taxes is through tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) legislation.

But that, of course, reduces Californians to the role of guinea pigs, which is something that they might not be happy about.

Here are two reasons why Gray Davis’s recall might help California in the long- and short term. Let’s take the short term first. Davis’s replacement will have a mandate to save California from its budget crisis. Anything that makes the fiduciary relationship between citizen and public servant more explicit is to be lauded. If the Davis replacement can convincingly assert that their primary motivation is to get California on firm fiscal footing so that the government and state can recover its normality, the citizens will be able to buttress their support for making the hard choices (spending cuts) needed to overcome the current fiasco.

Next, and more importantly, are the doomsday predictions that this undermines the essential stability and orderliness of regular elections. It might be noted that regular elections give politicians the chance to do both (a) what is necessary but unpopular (early in the term) and (b) what the people demand (towards election time). But why must we assume that this irregular recall function will be abused by Golden State voters? Californians are currently getting an object lesson in how expensive, complicated, and time consuming this process is. Perhaps they will not take so lightly the prospect of recall elections in the future. Maybe this will be a sort of “emergency exit” to be used during special occasions of democratic failure rather than a vehicle for the whimsical ambitions of those who are out of power. The truth is that, as of now, we just don’t know.

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Tuesday, July 22, 2003

Please Don’t Ask Me, I Might Say Yes

Tyler Cowen raises an interesting question vis-à-vis the national Do Not Call list, inadvertently making me realize that the Do Not Call issue is actually related to my current research.

Tyler observes that some people who register on the DNC list might be protecting themselves from, well, themselves. They are afraid that if telemarketers call them, they might actually be tempted to buy stuff they don’t really need. Like Ulysses, they tie themselves to the mast to restrain their future, more impulsive, selves.

As it happens, my primary research project at the moment is economic models of internal conflict – specifically, meta-preferences and multiple selves. Tyler’s own research on the topic has been useful to me in forming my perspective on the matter. And he repeats his most significant point in his post on telemarketers: “Why should we assume that the rational controlling self is the only one who counts (do you really want a life devoid of spontaneity?)? Why should our government be in the business of altering this balance in one direction or the other?” In other words, if we really do have multiple selves with conflicting interests, there is no particular reason to have institutions that favor one self over another.

Tyler suggests that these considerations might force libertarians who support the DNC list to support a variety of non-libertarian policies: “How many of you out there will be consistent? How about a government list for people who do not want to be allowed into casinos? Do not want to be allowed to buy cigarettes at the local 7-11? Do not want to be allowed to order dessert?” In short, are we willing to embrace a variety policies designed to protect people, not from each other, but from themselves?

But this argument only works *if* protecting people against themselves was the justification for the DNC list. That is not, in fact, the justification that libertarians (like Julian and me) offered in defense of the list. The main argument was that the DNC list is functionally equivalent to a “no trespassing” or “no soliciting” sign on one’s front lawn, and thus a simple application of property rights. Now, it’s certainly possible that I put a “no trespassing” sign on my lawn because I fear that Jehovah’s Witnesses might actually be successful in converting me, and therefore my rational self has chosen to constrain my spiritual self. But privileging rational selves over spiritual selves is not the usual justification offered in favor of protecting property rights in land. It just happens that some property owners might use it for that purpose.

And notice that a pure defense-of-property-rights position would not obligate libertarians supporters of the DNC list to support any of the other policies that Tyler cites. In the case of the DNC list, others are prohibited from entering my property. In the case of a no-casino-entry list, others are prohibited from letting me enter their property, even if they want me to and I (apparently) want to.

Admittedly, the discussion gets a bit dicier if we delve into the reasons why we support private property rights in the first place. Consequentialist libertarians like me will often justify private property on grounds that it minimizes externality problems by concentrating the costs and benefits of resource use on an individual. The problem is that if we regard an individual as having multiple selves, then the actions of one self may create externalities (or as some analysts call them, “internalities”) on the other selves. The question, then, is what kind of property rights structure -- if any -- would best allow the multiple selves to cooperate for greatest mutual gain, and whether government policies can or should be evaluated on the basis of how they affect that structure. That’s one of the tricky questions I’m grappling with now, and I don’t have a good answer yet. (At this point, I might still come down on the side of “multiple selves” being a pointless concept, albeit a decent premise for a sit-com -- remember “Herman’s Head”?)

But even if multiple selves are real, and even if government policies do affect the balance of power among them, it doesn’t follow that the DNC list is undesirable (or unlibertarian). In the status quo ante, a person’s multiple selves existed within a de facto property rights regime. A change in policy made on other grounds arguably changes that regime. But if Tyler’s right that there’s no particular reason to favor the long-run self over the impulsive self, it’s also true that there’s no reason to do the reverse, either. And in that case, the multiple selves issue provides us with no grounds to prefer either the status quo ante or the new policy, and thus we focus on the other pros and cons of the policy.

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Monday, July 21, 2003

Granny You Can Drive My Car

According to an L.A. Times article, drivers over 75 are responsible for 11% of traffic fatalities in New Hampshire, as compared to 13% nationwide. The difference is attributed to the NH law that requires drivers over the age of 70 to pass driving tests in order to renew their licenses. Eugene points out three major problems with this analysis; I wish to point out two more.

First, neither the 11% nor the 13% figure means anything without a comparison statistic -- specifically, the percentage of all drivers who are over the age of 70. If that figure were significantly smaller than the numbers above, we could conclude that older drivers are in fact more dangerous than others; but if that figure were significantly larger, we could conclude that they are actually less dangerous. So what’s the real figure? I don’t have numbers for drivers, but as a proxy, look at this page with age figures for the U.S. in 2001. After excluding the age groups in which no one can legally drive, people over 70 constitute 11.7% of the remaining population. Hmm… seems pretty close to the 11% and 13% figures. Now, my figures shouldn’t be taken too seriously, because it’s possible that lots of older people are choosing not to drive or are unable to drive, and thus their representation in the driving population could differ from their representation in the population as a whole. But the figures are certainly close enough to give us pause.

[UPDATE: Eugene summarizes a study with more specific figures on the accident frequencies of different demographic groups. The bottom line is that, on average, people over 70 aren't the safest age group of drivers out there, but they're not the most dangerous either. They are safer drivers than teenagers and often safer drivers than people in their 20s.]

Second, a tougher licensing standard applied to any demographic group would reduce the percentage of traffic fatalities attributable to that group, whether or not that group is more dangerous than the general public. What if, for example, we passed a law saying that all Jews had to pass driving tests to renew their licenses (while non-Jews could renew automatically)? Then some Jewish drivers would be weeded from the driving pool, and as a result, the percentage of traffic fatalities attributable to Jews would probably fall. This would be true even if the driving tests were totally uncorrelated to driving competence, simply because they would reduce the total number of Jews on the road. But that would in no way indicate that Jews are less safe drivers than the rest of us. Substitute any other group for Jews and you’d get similar results.

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Turnabout Is Fair Play

The ever-hilarious Dan Savage, author of the Savage Love sex advice column (warning: contains sexually explicit content, so be caref… hey, come back here!) is doing an excellent job of spreading the use of “santorum” as the term for an anal-sex-related phenomenon of which Sen. Rick Santorum would certainly disapprove. C’mon everyone, do your part: this is a meme worth propagating.

There is one minor problem, though: there are other people out there with the name Santorum who might not deserve this kind of rough treatment. But when one of Savage’s readers pointed this out, Savage shot her down:

Sorry, SINMLN, but innocent people named Santorum will just have to deal, just like guys named Dick and girls named Peg and people named Lewinsky. If other folks named Santorum are angry, well, they should direct their anger at the jackass senator himself. He brought santorum down on all their heads, not me.
Well put. But is what’s sauce for the goose also sauce for the gander? Another reader tries to play turnabout:
I've got a great idea, Dan. Now that your readers have successfully coined the term "santorum," why don't they co-opt the name of another hatemonger? After being fired from his MSNBC talk show for telling a gay caller that he should "get AIDS and die, you pig" and "go eat a sausage and choke on it," shock jock Michael Savage certainly deserves to have his name immortalized as an offensive sex act. As for all the innocent people named Savage out there, they'll just have to deal with it, won't they?
D’oh. But Dan cleverly worms his way out, observing that “savage” already has a (more positive) sexual connotation. Lucky for him, else he might have been hoist by his own petard.

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Friday, July 18, 2003

Dreaming On

Any post ( “California Dreaming”, below ) that begins with a joke about Canada and ends with a surfing reference probably shouldn’t be taken too seriously. And yet, I think I have a point. If we think about bad local government as a tax on the citizenry, the magnitude of this tax is small relative to other things that determine the quality of life. Which is why I suggested that political theory, in the pragmatic sense of how to design a government so that it functions well, seems not to be a major concern. Of course, government design ties into the bigger question of political theory: what should be the purview of government? As Mike correctly points out, the world has had some bad experiences with crazy political theories (and individuals), but the national debate is not whether we should turn the US into North Korea, it’s whether we should turn it into Canada.

Now, this could matter. GDP per capita in Canada is substantially less than in the United States (take this kind of data with a grain of salt, but it is fine for rough comparisons). And in part, this gap is due to differences in government policies. But let’s not get carried away about how bad it is. I would be happy living in Canada, and indeed, if Vancouver had Los Angeles’s weather, I would prefer it. Of course, this is personal preference - my version of the good life includes sun and the ocean - others may prefer wilderness, or traditional big cities, or whatever, but in any case, it is rarely differences in governments that drives us.

Maybe people in California care less than elsewhere (I know people in DC do care, but I’ve lived inside the Beltway, and its not like anywhere else). I really think that these issues rationally do not matter much for the average person (and since we are writing about this for fun, we are definitely not average). A policy that wastes 50 billion dollars per year still only moves us only a fraction of the way to Canada and can be made up with less than 1% growth in GDP per capita. Of course, there is no reason to do bad policies, and there is the whole Everett Dirkson thing, but I’m not surprised that people do not get excited about political issues.

Oh, and I had some other comments, but the weather is too nice and I think I’ll go to the beach :)

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The Wages of Sin Are Death, Prison, and Taxes

Mark Kleiman (here, here, and here) and Juan Non-Volokh (here and here) have been having a polite debate on the subject of alcohol taxation. Click the links to read Iain Murray's and Stuart Buck's comments on the same topic.

Mark’s main point is that alcohol consumption creates a variety of negative externalities, such as drunk driving accidents, increased public health costs, criminality, and so on, and a tax would internalize the externality. His back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that each beer consumed creates external costs of about $1. Juan replies by emphasizing that a tax would fall on all consumers of alcohol, not just the minority of abusers who create the vast majority of the social ills associated with alcohol (a harm Mark concedes but considers justified on net). Juan also observes that alcohol consumption can also create health benefits in terms of preventing heart disease, and some of that beneficial consumption would be deterred by a tax.

All of this is fine, but I think there’s a point that both Mark and Juan have given inadequate attention. Taxes are by no means the only way to internalize externalities. There are both civil and criminal punishments for the ill effects of drunk driving and other criminal behavior. If you actually cause harm to another person or property, you can be sued in civil court. If you get caught driving drunk, you can lose your license and go to jail. If you’re still allowed to keep your license, your insurance premiums will assuredly rise. Note that all of these types of punishment are focused on the real abusers, not the responsible drinkers. All of these facts indicate that if the external cost of a drink is $1 (Mark’s estimate), the optimal tax would have to be less than $1. To figure out how much less, we would need to calculate the expected dollar value to the consumer of the potential punishments that would result from the marginal drink. And don’t forget that taxes on alcohol already equal about 25% of the net-of-tax value per gallon (the average price per gallon of malt beverage is about $1). So we’re already about 25% of the way to Mark’s estimated external cost, without even having taken into account non-tax punishments.

Mark could still be right about the optimal tax needing to be raised (though not by the whole $1 per drink). The answer depends on two main things: first, the expected dollar-value of jail time, loss of license, and other non-tax punishments; and second, whether you’re willing to assume all policies other than the tax rate remain fixed. If the size of non-tax punishments is increased, the optimal tax will naturally decrease. And keep in mind that some of the “external” costs that Mark cites are not inherently external, such as the public health costs in socialized healthcare systems (like Medicare, Medicaid, and public ERs). As frequent readers of this blog will know, this is one of my hobby horses: when you socialize health costs, you create a political incentive for the regulation and taxation of personal lifestyle choices. Alcohol is but one example; others include eating fatty foods, engaging in high-impact sports, and being sexually promiscuous. Would we also support placing excise taxes on these other activities, which unlike alcohol currently are either untaxed or taxed at the same rate as everything else?

Oh, one other thing: the strategy of setting a tax equal to the marginal external cost only makes sense if the market is actually a competitive one in other respects, so that the price of the product is relatively close to its marginal cost of production. But in the case of alcohol, a slew of state and federal rules protect wholesalers from competition (and the laws also prevent suppliers and retailers from dealing directly with each other -- alcohol products must go through the wholesale sector). As a result, there is good reason to believe that alcohol prices are already a good bit higher than marginal cost of production.

[Note: the statistics I’ve cited here all came from my head, as a result of some research I did about a year ago. They do have original sources, of course, which I could track down if I had to, but I’m too lazy to do it right now.]

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Thursday, July 17, 2003

Your Money and Your Life

Julian has an excellent article on the valuation of life up at Reason, with some further ruminations on the subject posted on his personal blog. I have just a couple of comments.

First, as a political matter, I wonder if the EPA’s short-lived plan to discount the value of life for the elderly (for purposes of doing cost-benefit calculations) would have met less opposition if it hadn’t adopted such a sharply discontinuous value of life function. According to Julian, the EPA placed a value of $2.3 on the life of someone over 70, versus a value of $3.7 on the life of someone younger. Well, it’s not like something magical happens at the age of 70. They could just as well have adopted a “years of life saved” metric, without even having to refer to particular lives. The value of your total remaining years of life would consequently decline as you got older, simply because you have fewer of potential years remaining. I wonder why they chose to look at two arbitrarily defined blocks (over 70 and under 70) instead?

Second, in the discussion on his personal blog, Julian takes on the notion of valuing a life by finding out how much money one would accept to avoid a risk. In his example, if someone would take $5K to accept a one in 1000 chance of death, you might think we could just multiply $5K by 1000 to find that the value of life is $5 million. Julian argues that this approach is mistaken because “the function is non-linear, and … asymptotic to infinity as probability approaches one and time-to-demise approaches zero. (In other words, there's no amount you'd take to be killed with certainty five seconds from now.)”

This is all perfectly correct, and it explains why we wouldn’t let a potential murderer just pay a fee of $5 million for the privilege of killing his lover. But it seems to me that, when we’re talking about environmental regulations, product liability, and so on, that the logic works just fine, because we aren’t talking about a certainty of death for any particular individual. We cannot identify in advance the specific person killed by a certain increment of pollution, or saved by the EPA regulation (or liability rule) that prevents that pollution. We only know the specific person after the fact, and sometimes not even then (because we don’t know which death was the marginal death). So in cases like these, it seems perfectly appropriate to value lives in the manner described, because for each individual we are talking about a small risk of death rather than a certainty. One odd implication of this approach, though, is that there may be many different values of life depending on the size and context of the risk. The value of life would presumably be much, much larger for a one in 100 chance of death than for a one in 1000 chance of death. Perhaps it is misleading to call this a “value of life” at all, and we should call it a risk premium instead. But at the aggregrate level, it comes out in the wash: counting $5K one thousand times is functionally equivalent to count $5 million just once.

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Contrarian Thought for the Day

The erudite, ever-feisty, eminently readable John Derbyshire on colonialism.

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Wednesday, July 16, 2003

Living Libertarian

I sympathize with both Mike and Jim (see the two posts below). I posit that the seeming conflict between their views actually represents a dualism inherent in libertarianism. On the one hand, libertarians tend to be among the most political people you’ll ever meet. They have some of the most definite and vociferous political opinions around, and often as not, they won’t shut up about them. They realize, with Mike, that political institutions make a difference. On the other hand, the substantive content of libertarian belief is that most people should not have to be political. If government would just restrain itself to a narrow set of vital but manageable tasks, regular people could stop thinking about politics and instead focus their energies on the things that really matter in life, like running their businesses, raising their children, and, as Jim indicates, sipping cocktails and watching the surf roll in.

Sometimes I will meet a person who is apathetic about politics, who has very few opinions about politics aside from a good dose of cynicism, but who is just trying to make his own life – and the lives of those around him – better. And I think to myself, “That's libertarianism lived, not argued.”

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