Friday, December 13, 2002

Collective Consciousness

Ah, so I've finally gotten a slew of nominations for my clever group names contest. It's actually not a competition, only an exhibition -- so please, no wagering. Here are some of the best entries so far.

My sister Ellen suggests:
A batch of chefs
A population of ecologists
A litter of veterinarians
A gross of sanitation engineers
A cord of loggers
A ring of jewelers
When I mentioned sanitation engineers to Olivia, she suggested "shitload" might be more appropos.

Julian adds the following suggestions:
An E(x)E(y)(x?y) of logicians
An updraft (or a babble?) of pundits
A gush of liberals
A thump of fundamentalists
A Lott of racist senators
An indignation of activists
Radley has posted a whole list on his blog, so I'll just repost my favorites:
A rash of brothel patrons
A collective of socialists
A categorizing-by-species-is-artificial- and-degrading-to-the-uniqueness-and-authenticity- of-each-individual-and-therefore-this-entire-exercise -is-empty-and-moot of deconstructionists
A barefoot-nun-playing-a-melted- purple-trumpet of surrealists
Visit Radley's comments page for many others suggested by his readers.

Kevin Grinberg adds the following:
An array of computer scientists
A compendium of librarians
Will informs me that, much as he might like "a bewilderment of philosophers," the Philosophical Lexicon has already designated "cohen" as the collective term for philosophers. (It's allegedly a portmanteau of "cohort" and "coven," but there are also many philosophers with the last name Cohen.)

Finally, I have a few more suggestions of my own:
A sample of statisticians
A ream of accountants
A casket of morticians

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Thursday, December 12, 2002

The New Voucher System, Minus the Vouchers

This L. A. Times editorial discusses the perverse incentives created by a recent directive from the Department of Education (enabled by the No Child Left Behind Act), which says that "[s]tudents at the lowest-performing schools can transfer to a better school in the same district even if it's full. … The only exception is if the crowding would violate safety codes." The problem with this requirement is that it gives both good and bad schools exactly the wrong incentives. The bad schools have an incentive to get worse -- or at least not get any better -- so that students will leave. And the good schools have an incentive to diminish their performance in order to avoid attracting more students. As the Times editorial notes, "It's hard to see the benefit in turning good campuses into cramped encampments and in rewarding a successful principal and fine faculty by dumping more work and bigger class sizes on them."

These are the same kind of complaints often lodged against school voucher programs, but in this case they're right -- and they are a powerful indictment of the public school system, not market-based solutions. Can you think of any private industry in which consumers are regularly regarded as liabilities? In which growing demand for your company's product is a burden and a curse? Public schools have an incentive to reduce the number of students they serve because even when students are allowed to move (as under the new directive), they are not allowed to take their money with them. Under a voucher system, losing a student would mean losing funding, and attracting a student would mean attracting funding. Failing schools would have to scale down and fire under-performing teachers. Successful schools would receive regular infusions of cash, which they could use to expand their operations, buy new equipment and facilities, and make their valuable services available to more students. But none of this will be possible until we break the public school monopoly and create a functioning market in education.

ADDENDUM: To the extent that public school funds are allocated on the basis of enrollment, the Department of Education's edict could be an improvement over the status quo. The worst schools would be losing their funding as they lost their students. For the better schools, however, additional funds with additional students are not necessarily desirable unless the school has the discretion to expand using those funds. This is not something easily done in the command-and-control public system. Allowing students to take their money to private schools, rather than forcing the best public schools to accept them even if they think doing so would degrade the quality of education, would be a better move.

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Wednesday, December 11, 2002

Non Vultis Contendere?

I know somebody's reading this page, because the hit counter rises by about 25 a day, but apparently none of my readers feel like playing my silly games. So far I've received one submission for my best and worst Christmas songs contest, and zero submissions for my clever group names contest. Geez, doesn't anybody goof off at work any more?

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Break Out Your Tie-Dyes and Bellbottoms

In re Rockwell's problematic calculations (below), Franklin Harris asks:
I wonder how many years back you really do have to go to find a federal government of the size that could be paid for sans present income tax revenue?
Good question. By my calculations, we'd have to set the time circuits for 1974.

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Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Economic Sophistry on Your Right

I found the following in an article by Lew Rockwell:
Let's not reform taxes. Let's eliminate them, starting with the income tax. That is not unrealistic. The income tax this year will yield $1 trillion for the federal government. Cutting that amount gives us a budget equal to the federal budget of 1987. Was the government intolerably small back then?
Needless to say, I was suspicious. Government has certainly grown since 1987, but I couldn't believe it had grown that much. I strongly suspected that Rockwell had failed to adjust for inflation, but I was too lazy to prove it. But today, a colleague to whom I'd mentioned the article pointed me to the right numbers in a public finance book, which I confirmed using online government statistics. In 2002 (estimated), the government spent $1,827.5 billion, of which $879.5 billion came from individual income taxes. The difference is $948 billion, or just under $1 trillion, of revenue from sources other than individual income taxes. And indeed, it turns out the government spent 1,004.1 billion in 1987, or just over $1 trillion. So Rockwell appears to be correct -- except that all of these are nominal figures.

Once we adjust for inflation to put things in real terms, it turns out that $948 billion of current dollars is worth only $594 billion of 1987 dollars. In other words, abolishing the individual income tax would only leave us with enough money to cover about 59% of the expenditures we had in 1987. Now, don't get me wrong -- I'd love to see the federal budget slashed to 59% of its 1987 size, or smaller for that matter. But let's be honest about it: abolishing the individual income tax (without replacing it with something else) means radically downsizing government. No two ways about it.

Rockwell errs in a couple of other ways as well. In arguing against the consumption tax, he responds to the claim that a consumption tax doesn't tax savings as follows:
But the government should not be in the business of prodding us into a particular pattern of saving and consumption. It should leave that up to us. Saving is great to the extent it reflects individual preferences. Consumption is great in the same way. But there is no way to know a priori what the right mix should be.
The question, then, is how different taxes affect the savings-consumption trade off. It turns out (if you do the math) that an income tax biases people toward greater consumption by altering the effective rate of interest, whereas a consumption tax is neutral in that regard. So if Rockwell really believes that government should not "prod us into a particular pattern of savings and consumption," he should favor the consumption tax as an alternative to the income tax. (He is right, however, the politicians might cleverly introduce a consumption tax and then conveniently "forget" to repeal the income tax it was supposed to replace.) Rockwell continues:
And think of this: the degree to which the consumption tax discourages consumption is the same degree to which it does not raise revenue. How does the tax-hungry state deal with that paradox?
There is no paradox here. The extent to which *any* tax discourages the taxed activity (consumption, smoking, whatever) is the extent to which it does not raise revenue. If the demand for (or supply of) the activity were perfectly elastic, then no revenue would be raised at all, as people would just quit the activity altogether. If it were perfectly inelastic, then the government could raise as much revenue as it wanted without affecting the activity level at all. But in the real world, almost nothing in life is perfectly elastic or inelastic -- and that means the government can raise (some) revenue while simultaneously reducing (but not eliminating) the activity.

I know Lew Rockwell wants to reduce the size of government, and I sympathize. But fallacious and economically unsound arguments will get us nowhere.

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Constitutional Cognitive Dissonance

Mark Kleiman's response to my comments below about constitutional mustard, which I'll pass on with relish (sorry):
I should have said that such a decision would make me happy substantively, though not procedurally. It's more or less the position of a lawyer winning a motion he mostly thinks he deserved to lose.
Makes sense to me.

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Passing the Constitutional Mustard

Stuart Banner observes, correctly I think, that people's opinions about constitutional questions have an uncanny way of tracking their opinions about the desirability of the related policies. In other words, it's rare to hear someone say, "I favor X, but I realize X is unconstitutional," or "I oppose X, but I recognize that it's constitutional." Gun control is a nice example -- the gun controllers are sure that the Second Amendment only protects states' right to have a national guard, whereas gun advocates are sure it protects an individual right to bear arms.

Mark Kleiman, though, appears to be an exception to the rule when it comes to anti-sodomy laws. In his words, "I think that anti-sodomy laws are a thoroughly bad idea, and that politicians who support them are mostly pandering to prejudice. But I have a hard time wrapping my head around the idea that those laws are unconstitutional." This is a respectable position, in large part for its willingness to admit the Constitution doesn't always say exactly what you want it to say.

However, Kleiman ends by saying this: "I'll be happy if the Court reverses Bowers [the 1986 Supreme Court decision that refused to strike down a Georgia anti-sodomy law], and even happier if its doing so, or failing to do so, helps split the Republican coalition. That's not the same thing, however, as thinking that striking down the law would be right as a matter of Constitutional interpretation." In other words, Kleiman is saying that the Constitution allows anti-sodomy laws, but that he'd be happy to see the Supreme Court strike them down anyway. (Unless there's some way to reverse Bowers while upholding anti-sodomy laws? I don't see it.) This strikes me as a profoundly anti-constitutionalist position, and it undermines Kleiman's status as a counterexample to Banner's Law. It's easy to say that the Constitution disagrees with your ideological position if you don't think it's important for the Supreme Court to uphold the Constitution! So perhaps Banner's Law should be modified like so: *for people who think upholding the Constitution is important*, their views on constitutionality have a strong tendency to reflect their ideological viewpoints.

(Just for the record: I'm opposed to anti-sodomy laws, but I'm ambivalent on the constitutional question. Maybe I'll blog my reasons later.)

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Monday, December 09, 2002

Group Dynamics

As I walked back from lunch today with three other economists, we passed by the college dean, who asked if this would be called a "gaggle of economists." This got us speculating about the appropriate group names for professions. These labels exist already for groups of animals ("murder of crows," "exaltation of larks," etc.). Why not for humans? We had the following ideas:
An optimization of economists
A set of mathematicians
A bewilderment of philosophers
An agglomeration of sociologists
A buggery of lawyers
Sorry, I just couldn't resist that last one. Anyway, I'd love to hear people's suggested additions to (or revisions of) the list. I'll post the good ones.

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